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The problem of radicalization and violent extremism is one of the most important challenges facing modern plural societies. The brutality of terrorist attacks and their frequency together with 
some of the ‘collateral’ problems associated with radicalisation and vio-
lent extremism, e.g. Islamophobia (Esposito & Iner, 2019), ‘moral panic’ 
(Sukarieh & Tannock, 2018), right-wing populism [and terrorism] togeth-
er with other forms of political extremism have brought to the forefront 
problems previously either compartmentalized in specialized courses on 
intelligence and security studies or at the very fringes of scholarly inter-
est. Despite the consensus that radicalization and violent extremism rep-
resent a major threat to political, economic and social security of contem-
porary democratic societies, with terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 
figuring as some sort of ‘Year One’1 on the calendar of the ‘war on ter-
ror’, the discussion about what precisely is radicalization, as the authors 
of the book Counter-Radicalization: Critical Perspectives have empha-
sized, ‘has been marked by a significant degree of conceptual confusion’ 
(2014: 5). Interestingly enough, the process of radicalization and the ad-
jacent issue of violent extremism has opened up a number of different is-
sues, which the theories, policies and practices of counter-radicalization, 
deradicalization and anti-polarization do not offer a unanimous answer 
to. Other important questions arise here as well, e.g. what criteria apply 
in order to distinguish between non-violent and violent radicalization 
(Bartlett & Miller, 2012)? What is the relationship between the cognitive 
1 The analogy of ‘Year One’ is based on the French Republican Calendar created in 1792 
during the French Revolution after the abolition of the monarchy in France.
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and the behavioral dimension of radicalization? Is radicalization problem-
atic only when it turns to violent extremism or is radicalization wrong in 
itself? Is the process of radicalization problematic irrespective of the meth-
od being used or is its negative valence associated exclusively with the use 
of indoctrination? 
These and other questions are a clear sign that existing research and 
its focus on the etiology of radicalization [looking primarily for a caus-
al explanation of the process of radicalization or the turn to violent ex-
tremism] leaves several definitional and conceptual issues either neglect-
ed or outrightly ignored. Radicalization, as Jonathan Githens-Mazer and 
Robert Lambert, have emphasized ‘is a research topic plagued by assump-
tion and intuition, unhappily dominated by “conventional wisdom” rath-
er than systematic scientific and empirically based research’ (2010: 889). 
At the same time, radicalization and violent extremism are only one part 
of the puzzle associated with the polarization of contemporary societies as 
hate speech and fake news [as well as other dystopian narratives (e.g. sen-
sationalism)] combined with prejudices and stereotypes are an important 
factor contributing to social fragmentation and the phenomenon of con-
flicting diversity. Most importantly perhaps, these [and other] problems 
also challenge some of the foundational principles of contemporary dem-
ocratic societies. For example, how to strike a balance between the respect 
of privacy and the requirements of security? What are the limits of the 
freedom of expression etc.?
In his well-known essay on punishment and accountability 
[‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’], H.L.A. Hart, one of 
the most important scholars working in jurisprudence, made  an insightful 
comment on punishment, one of the most controversial and pressing pub-
lic issues back in the 1950s [at least in the UK]. As he eloquently empha-
sized, ‘[g]eneral interest in the topic of punishment has never been greater 
than it is at present and I doubt if the public discussion of it has ever been 
more confused’ (Hart, 2008: 1). This observation applies well also to the 
many issues addressed in this journal special issue of Šolsko polje entitled 
‘Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity’. Its over-
all aim is to move beyond the ‘conventional wisdom’ over radicalization 
(Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010: 889) best represented by many well-
known slogans [e.g. ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’], 
metaphors [e.g. ‘hearts & minds’]2 as well as various thought-terminating 
clichés [e.g. ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’]. It brings together 
2 The metaphor of the ‘hearts and minds’ figures prominently in both radicalization and 
violent extremism literature including other adjacent areas of scholarly research, e.g. coun-
ter-insurgency operations (Egnell, 2010), ‘war on terror’ (Mockaitis, 2003) etc. as well as in 
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a set of articles discussing some of the most important empirical, meth-
odological (Knudsen, 2018) and conceptual (Kundnani, 2012, Neumann, 
2013) questions associated with this area of scholarly research. Without 
sounding as a truism, the unifying assumption of the articles published 
in this journal special issue is the complex nature of radicalization, vio-
lent extremism and conflicting diversity [as well as their interwoven rela-
tionship]. While radicalization has become one of the ‘great buzzwords of 
our time’ (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013: 360) and ‘perhaps the most per-
vasive framework for understanding micro-level transitions towards vio-
lence’ (Silva, 2018: 34), pleas for its very abandonment as a useful analyt-
ical category due to some of its  ‘conceptual fault-lines’ (Neumann, 2013) 
have started to emerge as well. 
In order to tackle a sort of conceptual carelessness stemming from 
much of the literature on radicalization and violent extremism, Julian 
Richards takes a closer look at the concept of radicalization itself and 
discusses the main trends, problems and challenges associated with it. 
Interestingly enough, some of the recent publications have moved to-
ward the examination of the concept of radicalization itself (Knudsen, 
2018; Silva, 2018). Kundnani (2012). Next, Dianne Gereluk and Carol-
Ann Titus look at the role of schools in addressing youth radicalization 
as well as in making sense of the alleged paradox between the overall dis-
engagement of youth in contemporary democratic societies on the one 
hand and the radicalization of youth [the single most vulnerable group 
being exposed to radicalization and violent extremism] on the other. As 
they write, ‘[w]hile schools must not be burdened solely to address those 
youth who may become radicalized, schools have a significant role to help 
support those youth who feel that radicalization is the only way forward 
for them’. Furthermore, their emphasis on the role of slogans [and oth-
er buzzwords] on the way we make sense of such complex phenomena is 
an illuminating example for future research. The interview with Michel 
Wieviorka discusses some of the most pressing issues associated with radi-
calization and violent extremism. The initial section of the interview is de-
voted to the discussion of the main differences between violent extremism 
fueled by radicalisation and other forms of terrorism that existed in dif-
ferent European countries back in the 1960s and 1970s. In the central part 
of the interview, Prof. Wieviorka reflects on some of the conceptual prob-
lems associated with the ‘standard’ interpretation of radicalization and vi-
olent extremism. The concluding part of the interview takes a closer look 
political rhetoric as both the former US president Barack Obama and the Canadian PM 
Justin Trudeau made considerable use of it. 
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at the role education should play in the tackling of radicalization and vi-
olent extremism. Based on the analysis of the key distinctions associated 
with radicalization and violent extremism, Kosta Bovan, Marko Kovačić 
and Milica Vučković present the findings of their research on ‘how the 
terms “radical” and “mainstream” are understood by Croatian youth’ as 
well as how young people in Croatia conceptualise radicalism as a relative, 
neutral, and context-dependent term. The article by Iztok Prezelj, Klemen 
Kocjančič and Urša Marinšek discusses the process of Islamist radicalisa-
tion at the conceptual level as well as ‘the fight for the hearts and minds 
of the population’ strategy that has gained considerable leverage in discus-
sions over radicalization. Ultimately, as the authors emphasize, their ar-
ticle also ‘proposes some ideas of how to fight Islamist radicalisation in 
public schools’. In his article ‘Factors of Radicalization’, Srečo Dragoš ad-
dresses the various uses of the term radicalization through the concept of 
a “cage” made of four dimensions. As he emphasizes, ‘[r]adicalisation is 
defined by the coincidence of unfavourable combinations of these dimen-
sions, which is why it is difficult to understand it, if it is reduced only to 
one level and qualified more as a reason than as an effect’. The second part 
of his paper ‘gives some examples on the influence of the social context on 
the phenomenon of radicalism, with a special emphasis on the Slovenian 
example’. The final article to this special issue ‘Radical Hate Speech and 
Islamophobia: The Fascination with Hitler and Fascism on the Slovenian 
Webosphere’ by Boris Vezjak examines cases of radical hate speech posted 
on Slovenian social networks during the development of the refugee crisis 
in Europe and Slovenia beginning in 2015. 
Alongside the focus on problems and challenges associated with the 
‘standard’ interpretation [the ‘security paradigm’], this journal special is-
sue aims to address also other contextual, definitional and conceptual is-
sues as the relationship between radicalisation, violent extremism and 
conflicting diversity is anything but unambiguous or unproblematic.
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A Conceptual Exploration of Radicalisation
Julian Richards
Introduction
The concept of radicalism in society has a long history, with many suggesting a close affiliation to the developments of eighteenth-cen-tury Enlightenment Europe (Bötticher, 2017: p. 76). It appears to 
be the case that the active process of “radicalisation”, however, has taken 
on a new lease of life in the twenty-first century. A rough starting-point 
for such a development can be identified as the 9/11 attacks in the US, 
which not only triggered a global shift in security policy and irrevocably 
reoriented the post-Cold War security landscape; but which also empha-
sised the human element of identity in the postmodern, internet-age ter-
rorist movements with whom we found ourselves at odds. 
Two key factors are inherent in these more recent developments. 
Firstly, the importance of bureaucratic drivers to the debates, formula-
tions and reformulations of radicalisation theory cannot be overestimat-
ed. It appears to be the case that studies supporting governments and state 
agencies in the early years after 9/11 increasingly identified and scoped a 
“process” connected with radicalisation, which could be modelled and 
turned into clearly-defined counter-radicalisation policy and strategy. 
This work, in turn, catalysed an interest in academic circles in the notions 
of extremism, radicalism and radicalisation. 
Second, a line was drawn in the chronology of counter-terrorism 
strategies in many states, such that policy after 9/11 took on a greater pre-
occupation with the human element than was the case before. This be-
came an accelerating process in the aftermath of the major terrorist 
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attacks that followed 9/11 in the US, such as those in Bali (2002), Madrid 
(2004) and London (2005), to name but a few. Here – somewhat unlike 
the situation in 9/11 – the attackers were not radicals from overseas who 
had breached the borders and brought in a foreign radicalism; but citizens 
of the very states themselves under attack in which the perpetrators had 
been born and brought up. 
A number of paradoxes unfolded. In the London attacks, for exam-
ple, the leader of the bombing cell, Muhammad Siddique Khan, had not 
only been born and brought-up in the UK, but had been relatively success-
ful in the sense that he had achieved a university degree and landed a solid 
job. His occupation, furthermore, had been in the healthcare profession. 
How, asked the state and its citizenry, could an individual move from car-
ing for his fellow citizens to murdering and maiming them in the most 
dramatic fashion? A depressingly substantial number of other cases have 
subsequently followed in many nations. 
Insofar as answers could be established (and it is worth noting that 
we are still some way from doing so at the time of writing), the obvious ex-
planation seemed to be that something had happened to these individu-
als whereby their conceptualisation of their own identity and role in soci-
ety had undergone some sort of transformative process, taking them away 
from a “normal” member of society to one with the most violent intent. 
Furthermore, in the normative sociological language of rational-choice 
which has largely held sway since the latter part of the twentieth centu-
ry, such individuals were not mentally disturbed, but had each made some 
sort of rational calculation about the best way forward for themselves and 
others in society. 
The advent of such developments led to a growing bureaucratic in-
terest not only in the fire-fighting of terrorist attacks on the streets (which 
involves such actions as police and military action, and gathering intelli-
gence on those involved) but also in the “fire prevention” activities, where-
by the circumstances in which individuals find themselves being drawn 
towards violently extreme actions are examined at a deeper and longer-
term level of societal development and intervention. A whole range of pol-
icies and strategies have subsequently been instituted, known as “CVE”, 
or Countering Violent Extremism strategies. Here, the key word – ex-
tremism – suggests something ideological and societal, rather than the 
black-and-white legalistic notion of a violent criminal act.
It should be noted that, while 9/11 set in motion the bureaucratic 
and academic thinking in these directions, an awareness has grown that 
the “extreme” ideology in question may not be confined to the violent ji-
hadist ideologies of the likes of Al Qaeda and Daesh, but could equally 
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involve radical-right ideologies, as Anders Breivik starkly underlined in 
2011 when he killed 77 and maimed many more in a terrorist attack in 
Oslo, inspired by what Khosrokhavar describes as a “frenzied utopianism” 
defined by extreme Islamophobia and ultra-nationalism (Khosrokhavar, 
2015: p. 119). 
As a result, the concept of radicalisation could be said to have been 
approached from two major directions, with intersections between them. 
These can be differentiated as macro-, and micro-level approaches; or the 
question of extreme ideology set against extremist individuals. The mac-
ro-level approach mirrors much analysis in the realms of Politics and 
International Relations, whereby the behaviours of individuals are con-
sidered within the wider context of societal structures and developments. 
Here, questions of power-relations in society are significant, and have 
driven such thinking that socio-economic marginalisation underpins the 
emergence of violent and revolutionary movements. Such an approach 
also allows for a notion that discrimination and Islamophobia, which may 
be as stressful for conceptions of personal identity as for actual daily phys-
ical experience, may lead whole sections of society to feel dangerously em-
bittered and to turn to violent thoughts as a way of redemption. 
Rather like the calculation concerning gun control, however, the au-
thor has noted elsewhere that ideologies are important, but it is the indi-
vidual who becomes violently extreme (Richards, 2017: p. 220). The mi-
cro-level approach is initiated in part by the challenge that bedevils much 
political and sociological analysis, namely that: if some people respond to 
societal pressures in violent ways, why do so many others – all of whom 
are living in exactly the same environment – not do so? There must there-
fore be some level of context-specificity that needs to be considered in the 
process of radicalisation. 
This has driven much psychological and anthropological work on 
radicalisation, which looks not at ideologies per se but at the cognitive 
and human processes that may cause one individual to become violently 
extreme when another will not. It is intriguing, for example, that the vast 
majority of individuals who have carried out violent “jihadist” attacks in 
Western countries under the Daesh banner, for example, could not be de-
scribed as religious ideologues in their formative years, but quite the oppo-
site (Sexton, 2017). Indeed, most of them have had histories of criminali-
ty and problems with the vices of secular, Western society. In most cases, 
their understanding of Islam could be described as shallow at best. This 
must surely mean that the influence of extreme, religiously-inspired ideol-
ogy is rather more complicated than initially presumed. 
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Such factors have led to a certain degree of introspection in the ac-
ademic community in more recent years about the radicalisation process 
models that characterised much of the early, post-9/11 debate, and which 
were driven to a significant degree by bureaucratic impetuses in the coun-
ter-terrorism realm. Indeed, some of the protagonists of the “step” mod-
els of radicalisation in this period, such as Horgan and Sageman, are start-
ing to question their own earlier thinking to such an extent that one could 
ponder whether the established notion of radicalisation is reaching its end 
(Schmid, 2013). For somewhat different reasons, there are also critics who 
suggest that the bureaucratic drivers of the radicalisation debate actually 
had covert, sinister motives in othering certain communities and practis-
ing a form of institutional Islamophobia (Kundnani, 2009: p. 24). 
In this paper, the argument is presented that radicalisation is not be-
coming a completely moot concept, and that some of the original think-
ing still has a great deal of utility. More specifically, theories that empha-
sise the dual and synergistic processes of top-down (macro-level) and 
bottom-up (micro-level) drivers which may (or may not) cause a particu-
lar individual to become involved in a violent and extreme act, remain im-
portant and useful in our analysis. Any theories that over-emphasise the 
importance of ideology over individual identity factors, or vice versa, are 
likely to have far less utility. 
The various theories and debates across the spectrum of discussion 
concerning radicalisation are reviewed in this paper. These will consider 
each of the macro- and micro-level positions, before moving on to an anal-
ysis of the synergistic, over-arching theories that, it is argued, sensibly take 
the discussion forward. Some of the implications of the debate for poli-
cy-makers will also be briefly considered in conclusion. 
The Macro-level Approach
One of the areas of socio-political research that has also enjoyed a resur-
gence in recent years alongside the question of radicalisation is that ex-
amining populist politics; boosted in part by the rise of new, Far Right 
movements in Western politics, and by the elevation to power of the pro-
tagonists of identity-politics such as President Trump in the US. 
Much of the analysis in this area takes a structuralist stance, in the 
sense of structuralism as a Neo-Marxist critique of global politics and 
economy. This leads to an analysis of postmodern and post-industrial so-
ciety, in which political constituencies are increasingly thinking not only 
about the traditional deleterious effects of inequitable distribution in cap-
italist society, but also, in a somewhat postmodern way, about “govern-
ance structures of social organization and cultural life styles” (Kitschelt, 
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2004: p. 1). In the Kitscheltian argument, populist, identity-based poli-
tics may capitalise on the “times of uncertainty” to offer an intersubjective 
identity politics to those looking for answers (Monroe et al., 2000: p. 438). 
In some cases, new political movements are emerging to compete in 
the traditional political sphere and are gaining traction, notably in south-
ern Europe where the likes of Syriza in Greece and Movimento Cinque 
Stelle (M5S) in Italy are starting to gain power. In other cases, “freedom 
parties” on the far right-wing of politics, such as Geert Wilders’ PVV in 
the Netherlands or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, are 
also shaking the traditional political establishment. Many of these parties 
and their sister movements and groups on the fringes of politics would be 
considered radical at best and extreme at worst by many in the political 
mainstream. 
In this context, several constituencies who may be drawn towards 
this more disruptive politics are significant. First are what some have 
described as the “left behinds” of postindustrial society (Speed and 
Mannian, 2017: p. 249), namely those with low levels of skills and edu-
cation, who find themselves poorly equipped to find jobs in the new in-
formation economy, or indeed competing for manual jobs with incoming 
migrants or with overseas producers operating at lower costs. This constit-
uency feels the cold winds of globalisation more than most, against which 
populist politicians may offer a redemptive narrative, such as a promise 
to “Make America Great Again” that rings in the ears of embittered Rust 
Belt workers. Similarly, such processes may be reminiscent of political de-
velopments in earlier periods of history, and notably the rise of Fascist, na-
tional-socialist movements in Europe during the severe economic depres-
sion of the 1930s. 
A related key constituency is the so-called “precariat” of workers in 
the new “gig economy” (Standing, 2014), whose sharply reduced job and 
income security compared to some of their forebears can lead to feelings 
of anxiety and a desire to change the fundamental economic structure. 
For such members of society, technological advances such as the increas-
ing penetration of the economy by automation and artificial intelligence 
(AI) offer a growing anxiety about the future as much as of the present. 
Political analysis looks closely at such structural shifts in the econo-
my and society and considers how they feed into shifts in voting towards 
more “extreme” parties away from the traditional mainstream. While a 
shift towards an unorthodox political party is not necessarily cause for 
major alarm, recruitment into more extreme and violent groups by ide-
ologues protesting a more revolutionary and anti-democratic narrative 
most certainly is. Thus, in December 2016, the UK government placed on 
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the proscribed list a Far Right organisation called National Action: the 
first such group to be placed on the banned list in British political histo-
ry. The trigger was the murder a few months before of a sitting member 
of parliament, Jo Cox, by an extremist proclaiming the nationalist slogan 
of “Britain First!” and subsequently being found to have sympathies for 
National Action. 
Interestingly, the author of Jo Cox’s murder, Tony Mair, turned out 
to be a troubled and embittered member of the majority white community, 
who had lived for many years in exactly the same district as Muhammad 
Siddique Khan, the leader of the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London 
(Rayner at al., 2016). Here, we may be seeing a connection between the 
dangerous embitterment of the “left-behinds”, and certain structural fac-
tors affecting minority communities living within Western society. For 
these minority communities, structural discrimination and socio-eco-
nomic marginalisation may increase the lure of revolutionary ideologies 
in slightly different ways. 
Here, there is a particularly pertinent reference to Muslim society. A 
nostalgic “golden age” thesis whereby Islamic society may be perceived to 
have been progressively subjugated and undermined by Western imperial-
ism over the centuries from the heady days of the Umayyud and Abbasid 
caliphates, can – in the hands of skilful ideologues – feed upon a grim 
economic reality in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in Europe, 
whereby a youth-bulge of relatively well-educated and skilled citizens find 
themselves faced with extremely poor economic prospects. In Europe, the 
frustration this engenders is coupled with real or perceived discrimination 
and marginalisation. 
Khosrokhavar (2015: p. 22) characterises the dual and relentless ef-
fect of “humiliation and despair” in such minority communities as the 
most common trigger for radicalisation towards a “theology of wild 
hope”, in which the perceived injustices are turned upon their perpetra-
tors and the wrongs are scheduled to be righted at some indeterminate 
time in the future. Such a thesis may partly explain the “Arab Spring” up-
risings against entrenched authoritarian regimes in the Middle East from 
2011 onwards, but may also offer some explanation for how some troubled 
Muslims living in Western societies may be drawn towards violent jihad-
ist movements in their quest for self-meaning or redemption. 
At the macro-level of analysis, therefore, structural factors in so-
ciety such as shifts in relative economic and political power relations 
across different groups, feed into environmental factors that may cause 
the dangerous radicalisation of certain individuals. The manifestation of 
that radicalisation may emerge in several different places, such as on the 
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extreme-right of politics in an expression of violent nationalism and xeno-
phobia; or in the radicalisation of minority groups towards revolutionary, 
sectarian and anti-democratic movements such as Daesh. When looking 
at the problem through the macro end of the telescope therefore, radical-
isation must be conceptualised as the result of structural shifts in society. 
The Micro-level Approach
However, it is pertinent at this stage to return to the troubling question 
of why responses to structural factors that affect broad swathes of socie-
ty are so variable, not only between regions but right down to the indi-
vidual level. Why did structural transformations in society cause Thomas 
Mair and Muhammad Siddique Khan to decide that murder was an ap-
propriate way forward, when the vast majority of their immediate neigh-
bours and associates have decided otherwise? This must mean that gener-
alisations must be taken carefully, and that context-specificity may often 
be crucially important. 
What this also means is that much of the analysis of the concept of 
radicalisation has connected with micro-level analysis in the realms of an-
thropology, sociology and psychology, taking as a frame the closely-relat-
ed questions of how and why individuals can turn to violence. 
Jeff Victoroff undertook a useful survey of theorising around ex-
tremism and radicalisation in the run-up to, and immediately post-9/11, 
which identified a significant range of macro-level and micro-level the-
ories (Victoroff, 2005). Echoing Crenshaw’s triumvirate of perspectives 
based on person, group and society (Crenshaw, 1981), theories have been 
active in the political, sociological and psychological realms. At the mac-
ro-level, “relative deprivation and oppression theories” appear to be dom-
inant (Victoroff, 2005: p. 11), but at the psycho-social levels, theories have 
abounded to include rational choice theory, identity theory, theories fo-
cusing on narcissism and paranoia, cognitive, and group process theo-
ries. Indeed, particularly after the spur of 9/11 and notwithstanding the 
difficulties in defining “terrorism”, a veritable “potpourri of psycholog-
ical theories” have emerged about extremism and radicalisation leading 
to terrorism (Victoroff, 2005: p. 31). Virtually all of these are somewhat 
flawed in their methodological approaches and none can be taken as safe 
generalisations. 
With that said, one of the key intersections between the macro and 
micro-levels of analysis can be seen in identity theory, and specifically in 
Sheldon Stryker’s development of “structural symbolic interactionism” 
(SSI). As Stryker suggests, the starting point for identity theory is that 
“society impacts self impacts social behavior” (Stryker, 2008: p. 20). It 
š ol s ko p ol j e ,  l e t n i k x x i x ,  š t e v i l k a 5– 6 
18
could be argued that all of us live within particular inescapable societal 
contexts which have a major bearing on our sense of ourselves and our in-
teractions with others around us. But the sense of “interactionism” sug-
gests that the relationship between societal structures and any one indi-
vidual’s behaviour is a complex and variable one. 
Closely related to SSI is “identity control theory” (ICT), which, in 
the words of Stryker, is: 
concerned with the internal dynamic of selves viewed as cybernetic sys-
tems seeking to restore equilibriums when identities are threatened by 
external events (Stryker, 2008: p. 21). 
The notion here is that individuals are constituted by a complex sys-
tem of identity drivers and values, arranged in a delicate and finely-bal-
anced “hierarchy of salience” to the individual. The individual’s behaviour 
will be determined by a constant rebalancing and adjustment in response 
to external events and stimuli, depending on how far a particular element 
of identity may be challenged and how salient that particular identity fac-
tor is to the overall identity of the individual. Perceived challenges to the 
more important elements of identity in the hierarchy of an individual may 
be followed by particularly robust responses as a way of attempted rebal-
ancing. Such a theory applies not only to how and why individuals may 
turn to violence, but much more widely to interactions in the workplace, 
management psychology and so on. 
On the question of violence, one of the most infamous experiments 
is that conducted by Stanley Milgram in the early 1960s. The Milgram 
Experiment, as it came to be known, explored the relationship between 
power and hierarchy by establishing in fairly chilling terms that ordinary 
individuals will be prepared to inflict suffering on others if told to do so 
by those in positions of power over them (De Vos, 2009: p. 223). The ex-
periment helped to shed some light on the gruesome bureaucratisation of 
daily violence during the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, in which the hu-
man desire for conformity trumped adherence to fundamental values of 
humanity.
In terms of security, ICT can help to conceptualise how and why in-
dividuals choose to undertake a violent act, with some analysts building 
on the essentials of rational choice theory by using linear “decision-tree” 
approaches (see for example Dornschneider (2016)). There has also been 
much connection in these approaches with cognitive psychology, nota-
bly in terrorism studies. Maikovich, for example, presents an interesting 
“cognitive dissonance” model for understanding terrorists. Here, the rad-
icalisation process (although Maikovich does not describe it as such) aims 
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to gradually reduce an individual’s cognitive dissonance between feeling 
embittered about an issue and considering extreme violence against oth-
er human beings as an appropriate response (Maikovich, 2005). In this 
way, radical ideologues will use “dissonance-reducing mechanisms” to en-
able individuals to make the journey into violence, by offering social sup-
port (making people feel part of a wider collective); suppressing unhelp-
fully contradictory information; and developing a “just world bias” in the 
worldview of the individual. Such information strategies will be broad-
ened and deepened by opportunities offered through new media. At a 
level of broad conceptualisation, this is little different from how a state 
may recruit an individual into an army and train them to feel comforta-
ble with using violence. 
In social group theory, some of the analysis of how and why individ-
uals become drawn into radical movements suggests a more problemat-
ic lack of generalities. In a very interesting empirical study of how wom-
en became drawn into radical-right organisations in the US, for example, 
Kathleen Blee observed that a move into violent extremism can often be 
down to circumstantial and social developments in an individual’s life 
(such as meeting a new person or group of people socially) which can offer 
the promise of a new narrative that helps to “make sense” of an otherwise 
seemingly disconnected and happenstance life (Blee, 2002: p. 45). This 
suggests the nexus of two important processes: vulnerability and stress in 
a person’s life (a need to make sense) and socialisation (meeting new peo-
ple who invite one into a particular group). This might mean that individ-
uals could be just as likely to be drawn into a church group, or hobby circle, 
as into an extremist organisation, given a different set of circumstances. 
Blee’s analysis also supports an apparent geographical clustering of 
recruitment into extremist organisations, which may suggest that social 
connections may be as important as any other structural or personal fac-
tors. In a study of the social media traffic of 99 individuals who had left 
Germany to fight for violent jihadist organisations in Syria, Reynolds and 
Hafez (2017) found that the “integration deficit” hypothesis appeared 
to be a weak factor in this particular dataset. Meanwhile, the study ac-
corded with some of the findings of a similar study in Belgium and the 
Netherlands by Bakker and de Bont (2016), noting that face-to-face peer-
group socialisation was potentially as important as any other factor, in-
cluding social media (Reynolds and Hafez, 2017: p. 24). Indeed, three cities 
in the North Rhine-Westphalia region (Bonn, Solingen and Dinslaken) 
appeared to have contributed more than half of all identified German “ji-
hadist foreign fighters” in the recent conflict in the Middle East. This may 
explain why certain very specific districts, such as the Molenbeek region 
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of Brussels; or parts of the Hague in the case of the “Hofstad Group” of 
terrorists in the Netherlands, appear to have been so significant in the sto-
ries of recent terrorist attacks in Europe. 
Radicalisation Models
There are undoubtedly problems with conducting empirical work in the 
fields of terrorism and extremism, since the subjects of interest are either 
difficult or dangerous to reach; incarcerated in prison which poses a par-
ticular set of ethical issues on interviewing; or are deceased. There are also 
methodological problems in asking someone, where they are available, 
why they became a radical or a terrorist, as Horgan observes, since there 
may be a natural tendency for the response to focus lazily on an ideolog-
ical narrative about “the cause” rather than revealing anything personal 
(Horgan, 2008: p. 87). 
This does not, however, mean there is a dearth of empirical study in 
the area of radicalisation, as some have suggested (Githens-Mazer, 2012: p. 
558). In fact, many have undertaken surveys of a range of people of inter-
est about notions of radicalisation and extremism, delivering an interest-
ing body of primary material. The problem is not so much about the many 
valiant efforts to gather such data, but about the ability to derive general-
isations from them. 
One of the more interesting recent studies was that of McGilloway, 
Ghosh and Bhui, who undertook an extensive survey of academic outputs 
on the radicalization of Muslims in the West up to 2012 (McGilloway et 
al., 2015). This project identified 17 relevant major studies based on orig-
inal primary research. The conclusions of this survey were broadly that 
there was:
no single cause or route responsible for engaging in violent extremism. 
Radicalization was seen as a process of change, but that some may be 
more predisposed to being vulnerable if catalytic events/precipitating 
factors are present (McGilloway et al., 2015: p. 49). 
There was general consensus across the studies reviewed that there is 
a significant connection between personal “vulnerabilities” and the risk of 
exposure to “violent radicalization”; namely the synthesis of macro- and 
micro-level processes and influences, to which we will return. All of the 
studies involving empirical survey work with young Muslims seemed to 
suggest that the difficulties in “finding a sense of identity and belonging” 
were highly significant sources of vulnerability for many, with a number 
of studies identifying this factor among young British Muslims in par-
ticular (McGilloway et al., 2015: p. 49). 
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Despite these identified difficulties in establishing generalities about 
the radicalisation “process”, however, the bureaucratic drivers described 
above in the post-9/11 period have been key factors in the development 
of a range of radicalisation process models. These can be collectively con-
ceptualised as “step” or “pathway” models (following Moghaddam’s influ-
ential “staircase” model (Moghaddam, 2005)), in that they generally de-
scribe a phased transitional process whereby an individual moves from 
being a law-abiding and peaceful member of society to a dangerous radi-
cal with violent intent. (In Moghaddam’s analysis, the process is likened 
to ascending an ever-narrowing staircase in which distracting influences 
and opportunities are increasingly expunged.) 
King and Taylor looked at five of the more quoted and discussed 
models of radicalization that emerged in this period (King and Taylor, 
2011). These are: Randy Borum’s four-stage progressive model of psycho-
logical development towards extremism (Borum, 2003); Wiktorowicz’s 
four-stage model of joining extremist organizations, with the now-pro-
scribed British group Al-Muhajiroun (the Emigrants) as the case study 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004); Moghaddam’s aforementioned six-stage staircase 
model of radicalization into terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005); Silber and 
Bhatt’s four-stage radicalization model, developed in conjunction with 
the New York Police Department (Silber and Bhatt, 2007); and Marc 
Sageman’s “four-prong” heuristic, published in 2008. In all cases apart 
from Sageman, these are linear models, whereby the individual under 
analysis moves progressively along a pathway towards problematic extrem-
ism. In Sageman’s model, the four prongs are not linear, in that they can 
be present and affect an individual in simultaneous ways and in different 
combinations (King and Taylor, 2011). 
One of the defining characteristics of these models was the cleanly 
identified linear sequence of processes through which target individuals 
may progress (with the exception of Sageman’s study in which several iden-
tifiers could appear simultaneously). There was clear utility in these linear 
models for counter-terrorism bureaucracies, in that these models could be 
used institutionally to train analysts and security practitioners to “watch 
for the signs” and tick off the identifiers of radicalisation as they were ob-
served. Much of Randy Borum’s work has been conducted in conjunction 
with the FBI, and Silber and Bhatt’s model was produced in conjunction 
with the NYPD. Others in this field, such as Elaine Pressman, have also 
developed multiple indicator models (Pressman 2006). Pressman’s ten-in-
dicator model, for example, identifies a set of personal indicators, weight-
ed according to their importance, which combine to describe an eventu-
al pathway towards dangerous radicalisation. There are clear connections 
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here to work in identity theory, and notably the “hierarchy of salience” 
conceptualisation at the heart of ICT, whereby an individual’s struggle 
with factors important to their self-identity can lead to a problematic anx-
iety and schism. 
Other important studies in this period also described alleged indi-
cators of radicalisation without necessarily building these into a “path-
way” as such. Notable examples were Taylor and Horgan’s 2006 con-
ceptual framework (Taylor and Horgan, 2006); and Kruglanski and 
Fishman’s 2009 study of psychological factors in terrorism (Kruglanski 
and Fishman, 2009), to name but two. 
The key conclusions emerging from an over-arching analysis of these 
studies and models are twofold. Firstly, there is an “assumption that rad-
icalization is a transformation based on social-psychological processes” 
(King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609). This reflects a primarily micro-level focus 
on the identity formulation and development of the individual. Secondly, 
there was also something of a consensus about the central importance of 
“relative deprivation” as a driver (King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609), which 
brings us back to the broader structural considerations. Here we can re-
call Stryker’s observation that self, society and social behaviour are inex-
tricably interwoven (Stryker, 2008: p. 20). 
 “Relative” is an important word here in a social constructivist sense. 
One might imagine that many young men joining militant groups in eco-
nomically very deprived areas of the world, whether it be the Taliban, 
Lord’s Resistance Army or any number of other groups, may be motivated 
in part by simple factors of daily income and protection, and not necessar-
ily because of a strong ideological affiliation. In a major study looking at 
Somalia, Colombia and Afghanistan, the NGO MercyCorps attempted 
to understand why young men were joining insurgent and terrorist groups 
in such areas. The report somewhat debunked – or at least finessed – what 
they called the “economics of terrorism narrative”, noting that:
In some cases, economic inducements may compel someone to join an 
armed group, but upon further analysis, this appears to be rare. While 
unemployment is often emblematic of systemic sources of frustration 
and marginalization, employment status alone does not appear to determine 
whether a young person is likely to join an insurgency. Violence makes people 
poor, but poverty doesn’t appear to make them violent (Mercy Corps, 
2015: p. 17; emphasis in original). 
The report concluded that “young people take up the gun not be-
cause they are poor, but because they are angry” (Mercy Corps 2015: 3). 
In part, this is a comment on the corrupt and venal nature of the states in 
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which such young people live, which echoes the “humiliation and despair” 
narrative noted above in the context of the Middle East (Khosrokhavar, 
2015: p. 22). It is also a specific comment on the importance of making 
sure aid and development programmes do not make problems worse in 
such environments. 
But what of radicals living in Western contexts, who, by compar-
ison, are much better-off than their counterparts in war-torn and de-
prived parts of the world? This is where the “relative” nature of depriva-
tion may be important. Muslim radicals in European contexts, claims 
Khosrokhavar (2015: p. 39–40) tend to be of a “lower social strata”, and 
hailing from “tough neighbourhoods”. This may explain the preponder-
ance of cases of criminality amongst the recent cohort of Western ter-
rorists, since this characterises the environments in which many of the 
subjects have lived. It may also increase the importance of fundamental 
socio-economic struggle to the radicalisation story. Again, the notion of 
a generation of indignados driving political radicalism in different ways 
gains further weight. 
Similarly, a factor concerning modern, information-age society is 
probably of critical importance in this respect, and this concerns the ease 
with which the disaffected of Western society can access and consume 
narratives from other parts of the world and identify with the plight of 
others. The aforementioned Muhammad Siddique Khan, who led the July 
2005 terrorist cell that struck London, noted in his posthumously-aired 
suicide video that he identified with a wider ummah of believers and saw 
them as “my people”, for whom revenge and justice were a collective duty 
(Horgan, 2008: p. 85). Similarly, the perpetrators of a brutal terrorist at-
tack in a French church in July 2016 explained to one of their hostages 
that “peace” was what they wanted, and that “as long as there are bombs 
on Syria, we will continue our attacks. And they will happen every day. 
When you stop, we will stop” (Sky News, 2016).
From a psycho-social theory perspective, such factors may accord 
with the results of Tajfel’s “minimal group paradigm” experiments of 
the late 1960s, which confirmed in-group and out-group dynamics, even 
when the groups were artificially designed in a laboratory setting and 
there were no real-world consequences for affiliation with any particular 
group (Tajfel, 1970). Wider group identification may allow for a disaffect-
ed Muslim in the West to feel a sense of shared anger and humiliation at 
the suffering of co-religionists in Palestine, Kashmir or Syria. In this sense, 
deprivation or injustice may not need to be experienced directly to form 
a component of radicalisation, providing the narrative is developed and 
promulgated skilfully. It might also explain how groups can be mobilised 
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in a collective way to establish a “dehumanized other”, or a “life unwor-
thy of life” as was the case with Nazi Germany (Glass, 1999). Similarly 
extreme cases of the bestial denigration and rejection of outgroup others 
were seen in Rwanda, or Gaddafi’s Libya, in which outgroups and polit-
ical opponents were described as “cockroaches”, from whom the country 
had to be “cleansed” (Higiro, 2007: p. 85; BBC, 2011). There are almost 
certainly parallels between such genocidal mass movements, and the nar-
ratives of radicalisation. 
Synthesised Perspectives
The over-arching message of this analysis and modelling could be said to 
be a growing acceptance that the early aspirations for “profiling” or mod-
elling the sorts of people who will be dangerously radicalised, and the 
processes by which this will happen, are probably a fruitless pursuit. As 
Horgan noted, the “moment of epiphany” concept of an embittered indi-
vidual suddenly crossing an identified line and deciding they will become 
violent, is naïve at best (Horgan, 2008: p. 92). Instead, we seem to be faced 
with a framework of situations and environments which could lead to vi-
olent radicalisation, but whether and how these take effect on any one in-
dividual is very much a case-by-case analysis. 
In a detailed study of the circumstances in which a group of indi-
viduals came to be recruited by Palestinian militant organisations as su-
icide bombers during the Second Intifada, Assef Moghaddam devel-
oped a useful synthesised top-down and bottom-up schema, which has 
a great deal of utility in considering the wider question of radicalisation 
(Moghaddam, 2003). In his “two-phase model”, Moghaddam suggested 
that the factors that lead to an individual being successfully recruited as 
a violent militant are when a set of personal motivations intersect to a suf-
ficient degree with the organisational motivations of a particular group 
(Moghaddam, 2003: p. 68). 
At the individual level, a set of ideas, frustrations, and direct or indi-
rect experience of oppression or violence may lead to an individual feeling 
so embittered that they might be willing to die to achieve some sort of jus-
tice or redemption. But only when these feelings neatly align with the or-
ganisational objectives of a particular group do the two come together at 
the “recruitment” stage. Thereafter, the group will have to further radical-
ise and train the individual to carry out an attack before the second and fi-
nal phase of the process is completed. (Indeed, some individuals will nev-
er proceed from recruitment to actual attack.) 
Here, we see the complex interplay between bottom-up personal cir-
cumstances, and the top-down objectives of a militant organisation or 
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movement. The situation is almost infinitely variable, and it will be very 
difficult to predict when any one individual will pass successfully through 
the recruitment and deployment phases. This also helps to explain why 
most individuals who experience exactly the same things and consume 
the same narratives will not become violent militants. 
In a wider-ranging sense, Horgan used the language of “push and 
pull” factors which describe a similar situation (Horgan, 2008: p. 87). 
Militant organisations and movements will be constantly trying to pull 
recruits into their ranks, but they will only be successful where a set of in-
dividual factors push a particular person sufficiently far into the arms of 
that organisation or movement. More significantly, from a policy point of 
view, Horgan notes: 
Despite the increased discussions of root causes of terrorism, we can do 
little in a practical sense to change the “push” factors (i.e., the broad so-
ciopolitical conditions) that give rise to the increased likelihood of the 
emergence of terrorism. In contrast, counterterrorism programs may 
be more effective in concentrating on the “pull” factors (or “lures”), since 
they tend to be narrower, more easily identifiable, and specific to particu-
lar groups and contexts (Horgan, 2008: p. 90).
Thus, macro-level factors are not ignored, but policy may be bet-
ter aimed at a bottom-up perspective than an exclusively top-down one. 
In some ways, we can see these ideas reflected in more contempo-
rary Western counter-terrorism policy. In the post-2010 refreshed ver-
sion of the UK government’s “Prevent” Strategy document, for example, 
the word “radicalisation” and its derivatives are mentioned 185 times. The 
strategy notes that: 
All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and 
recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are pre-
pared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is sig-
nificantly greater amongst young people. We now have more informa-
tion about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and 
then to engage in terrorist-related activity. It is important to understand 
these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks 
it poses to our national security. We judge that radicalisation is driven 
by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists 
for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and 
specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology 
seem both attractive and compelling. There is evidence to indicate that 
support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrat-
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ed, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal 
with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to 
this country and support for our core values. Terrorist groups can take 
up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popu-
larised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country. 
This has significant implications for the scope of our Prevent strategy. 
Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who 
have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist 
organisations (HM Government, 2011: p. 13). 
The statement here is extremely interesting and indicative of more 
recent thinking about the process, although it is also – as you might ex-
pect from an official pronouncement – somewhat political in nature. 
From a definition point of view, the above statement reflects an un-
derstanding of the interwoven relationship between micro-level factors 
(“personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors”); and macro-level 
factors, in terms of the top-down effect of propagandists, recruiters and 
“extremist organisations”. Thus, some people will fall prey to such actors 
(those who are vulnerable to their narrative) while the majority of others 
will not. 
The political elements are the sense that the core problem is a rejec-
tion of the political system the government is charged with upholding. 
Any government is primarily interested in winning votes and consolidat-
ing power, and a successful and proportionate discharging of security pol-
icy will help to do so. Within this process sits the sanctity of a secular and 
democratic order, placing those interested in a more extreme millennial, 
caliphatist vision on the wrong side of history and decency. 
From a policy point of view, the thinking about radicalisation re-
flected above has helped to shape the detail of the Prevent policy: itself an 
arch example of a European CVE policy. Specifically, the thinking drives 
intensive work in institutions and environments where “vulnerable peo-
ple” are expected to be located, and notably prisons, or the education and 
health sectors. 
The potential problem with such official approaches, as McCauley 
and Moskalenko (2017: p. 211) note, is that they tend to concentrate over-
ly on the importance of political ideology and thus find themselves sucked 
into a “war on ideas”. This can be dangerous and problematic, since ideas 
as to how a perfect system should be, are many and varied, and none more 
so than in a supposedly free-thinking democracy. 
This, in a sense, strikes at the heart of some of the conceptual prob-
lems around a notion of radicalisation. There are those who suggest that 
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the inherent relativity of terms such as “radical” is dangerous, in the 
Orwellian sense of a state outlawing any thoughts or ideas it considers 
non-mainstream; and unhelpful, as there have been good and bad radi-
cals in history and radicalism itself is not necessarily a bad thing per se 
(Githens-Mazer, 2012; Sedgwick 2010). Latterly, like the word “terrorist”, 
it could be argued that radicalisation has “become part of the rhetorical 
structure of the waging of the ‘War on Terror’” as an inherently danger-
ous and negative concept (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009: p. 82).
A suitable response to such thinking does not necessarily mean 
ditching the term “radicalisation” altogether, since it would probably only 
result in another term being inserted in its place with similar problems of 
definition (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). Clearly something is 
happening repeatedly whereby individuals move from being law-abiding 
members of society to violent and dangerous individuals, and we should 
not bury our heads in the sand in response. 
McCauley and Moskalenko’s prescription has been to develop a 
“two pyramid” model, whereby “radical thought” is separated from “radi-
cal action”, with the former being not necessarily problematic (McCauley 
and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). To be fair to governments, this has been 
recognised variously across the Western world as a suitable approach, not 
least since becoming embroiled in ideological and counter-extremism bat-
tles and debates is an extraordinarily resource-hungry and controversial 
business. Indeed, the “VE” element of Countering Violent Extremism re-
flects such thinking in essence. 
Peter Neumann outlines some of the issues in his appropriate-
ly-named paper, “The trouble with radicalization” (Neumann, 2013). He 
outlines two important positions taken on the concept of radicalization, 
which he characterises as the Anglo-Saxon, and European approaches. 
The former tends to be fairly reductionist, focusing almost entirely on the 
rule of law and not generally on the wider hinterland of radical views or 
beliefs. (With this said, the official statement by the British government 
above shows there has been some degree of ambiguity about whether and 
how ideology should be part of the picture.) By contrast, the European 
model is defined by a clear connectivity between terrorist operations and 
the ideological activities of those who might be on the track of violent 
extremism, or who might be facilitating others on that pathway. In this 
way, holding views defined as radical can be a cause of state attention. It is 
thus no surprise that countries such as France and Denmark have gener-
ated controversy over their approach towards such issues as Islamic dress 
in public spaces, when “banning the burqa” would be much more complex 
in an Anglo-Saxon country. Conversely, recent thinking by the British 
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government has suggested some degree of convergence with policy against 
radicalisers and recruiters as well as actual terrorists. 
Conclusions
Martha Crenshaw showed remarkable foresight by writing some years be-
fore 9/11 that an analysis of who becomes a terrorist and why, should sen-
sibly focus on the three interlocking dimensions of person, group and so-
ciety (Crenshaw, 1981). This was all the more noteworthy when much of 
the post-war analysis of radical movements in Europe, such as the Red 
Brigades or Baader-Meinhof gang, had been imbued with a “pathology 
aura” in seeking to suggest that terrorist behaviour must surely reflect 
mental instability (Silke, 1998: p. 67). 
After 9/11, Sageman further undermined the pathology thesis in his 
study of 172 militants associated with Al Qaeda, which, he found, showed 
unusually high indicators of income, education and mental health when 
compared to the population at large (Sageman, 2004). While this study 
was admittedly based on a relatively small number of individuals associ-
ated with one particular movement, it did suggest a more general finding 
that radicalisation is not necessarily as simple as it first seems. 
Sageman was writing in a period when studies of terrorism and rad-
icalisation were flowering at a remarkable rate following the shock of the 
9/11 attacks. The results generated a great deal of heat but not necessarily 
light, in the sense that a considerable range of top-down and bottom-up 
theories delivered a panoply of possible explanations, united only in the 
fact that none of them worked against statistically significant samples of 
subjects; and none offered strong replication across environments and 
circumstances. 
As with most areas of social science, the most important conclu-
sion is that much further research will be needed before the science can 
be substantially moved forward. In the meantime, notions of radicalisa-
tion seem to be settling on the understanding that a combination of top-
down and bottom-up drivers will cause any one individual to move into 
violent extremism, but when and whether this happens will be almost en-
tirely case-specific. It does seem to be the case that frustration and despair 
(both immediate in a personal sense and concerning wider developments 
in society) can act as some of the most important drivers, as can personal 
struggles over identity, but when these will cause one person to become vi-
olently extreme and his or her neighbour not to do so, are matters of con-
tinual debate and examination. 
In some ways therefore, the challenge is akin to that of mental health 
in society, in that the drivers that push any one person into difficulties are 
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extremely numerous and varied, and the best that can be done is to bolster 
community networks, support and information. In other ways, of course, 
radicalisation is significantly different in that there are anti-state groups 
and organisations working to “pull” recruits into their fold and offer an 
outlet for violent intentions. States inevitably have to work against these 
organisations in gathering intelligence and understanding, and disrupt-
ing networks. Back at the individual level, both state and society have a 
strong interest in continuing to try to understand how and why individu-
als become violently extreme, and who most sensibly conforms to the no-
tion of a “vulnerable individual”. Unfortunately, the most effective sam-
ple-set to help with so doing tends to be the biographies of individuals 
who have already carried out violent actions. 
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Introduction
Arguably, youth radicalization, extremism and terrorism are among the most divisive issues in the public discourse internationally. We do not wish to create an apocalyptic panic about the rise of such 
activities. Extremism and terrorism have been a part of history since the 
test of time. Yet the very public nature of such events that are proliferated 
on social and news media makes it accentuated in our public lives, mak-
ing it seemingly more present and unnerving. This said, the terrorist at-
tacks of 9/11, and subsequent attacks that have ranged in scope since then, 
created an unprecedented rise in the issue on interrelated aspects of ter-
rorism and extremism. The increasing fear and anxiety about terrorism fil-
ters commonly into other issues and influences debates such as immigra-
tion and refugee policies, the rise of fundamentalist ideologies, typologies 
of those individuals who may be predisposed to carry out terrorist attacks, 
and the polarization among diverse populations who may undermine and 
threaten the stability of democratic societies. The educational response is 
not unlike these broader political debates and the range of responses to 
these issues appear to be both sporadic and limited in scope about how to 
best respond to these complex issues (Gereluk, 2012).
There has been a subtle but perceptible shift in discourse from the 
actual terrorist acts in terms of the response from societies to looking at 
the preconditions of what makes individuals become radicalized in the 
first place. The nature of many of the terrorist attacks over the last decade 
suggests that the characteristics of individuals are not homogenous, and 
How Schools Can Reduce Youth Radicalization
Dianne Gereluk and Carol-Ann Titus
commonly are perplexing to individuals. There is no single terrorist pro-
file and looking at age, gender or socio-economic backgrounds will not 
detect the next terrorist. The stereotypes of immigrants or refugees who 
move to a new country in order to carry out terrorist activities is actual-
ly few and far between. For instance, in many cases the public finds out 
with the aftermath of a terrorist attack that the individual was not an im-
migrant or refugee, but rather a person born in the country in which the 
attack occurred. For example, the attack by Alexandre Bissonette relat-
ed to the slayings that occurred in a Quebec City mosque in 2016 noted 
that the student was a French Canadian citizen (Perreaux and Andrew-
Gee, 2017). Aaron Driver, an Ontario student in Canada, was killed by 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) during an altercation prior 
to an imminent terrorist attack in Toronto. Damian Clairmont, who con-
verted to Islam shortly before he travelled to Syria to join a terrorist group 
in 2012, was born in Nova Scotia into an Acadian family. He was killed 
in 2014 during fighting between the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) militias. André Poulin, from Timmins, Ontario, loved hock-
ey and was by all accounts an average Canadian until his conversion to 
Islam and subsequent departure to Syria. In all of these instances, the par-
ents were utterly shocked and traumatized that their children were ter-
rorists, coming from long-standing Canadian families. They did not fit 
the profile of having recently moved or been indoctrinated by fundamen-
talist parents. While we are clear that the prototypes of terrorists are as 
vast and unique as the nature and context of each of the attacks, what we 
wish to highlight in the previous cases is that they did not fit the common 
stereotype that is perceived by the general public, these boys were: white 
Caucasian; raised by Canadian parents1, and; were not raised by funda-
mentalist parents. The perplexing question that arises is how did these 
boys become radicalized in the first place that leads to terrorist actions?
We do not suggest that schools must take the full burden of ad-
dressing this broader complex issue about youth radicalization. This said, 
Trees Pels and Doret de Ruyter (2012) suggest that education has largely 
been conspicuously absent from the discussions on youth radicalization 
where schools might offer some attempts to be better responsive and at-
tentive to youth radicalization. While we do not offer the solution, this 
article wishes to create an educative space to consider what role schools, 
and specifically teachers, might be able to do to mitigate the rise of youth 
1 Given that Canada is an immigrant population other than the Indigenous peoples, every-
one is arguably an immigrant. For the purposes of making a distinction, however, I wish 
to suggest that in these cases the parents were not first or second generation immigrant 
parents. 
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radicalization. In the first section, we define and distinguish between the 
notions of youth radicalization, extremism and terrorism, and focus our 
attention on the principles of youth radicalization. In the second section, 
we examine what role educators may play to create a learning environ-
ment to reduce polarization, isolation, and marginalization. In so doing, 
we contend that schools can play a partial role in how the formal curricu-
lum may better inform students about the broader political and social de-
terminants that lead to terrorism and extremism and reduce more funda-
mentalist and ideological stances. 
Indicators of Youth Radicalization
Youth radicalization is an increasingly common rhetorical device that is 
used in public media portrayals. Yet, little articulation is provided as to 
what that means or how youth become radicalized in the first place. More 
commonly, it is a term that is used in a reactive sense, when a public act 
of violence or atrocity has been committed, to describe a youth as ‘oth-
er’ in light of what is perceived as within mainstream society. To start, I 
draw upon David Mendel’s (2010) definition of youth radicalization as 
the “increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking senti-
ments, and/or behavior of individuals and/or groups of individuals” (p. 
111). In this way, it is distinguished from extremism, which focuses pri-
marily on the nature of the principles, values, and beliefs that are limited 
and constrained in options and choices, commonly fixated on a particu-
lar ideology or absolute truth. Youth radicalization emphasizes the pro-
cess by which an individual or group becomes more extremist in nature, 
while extremism is on the current state of beliefs by an individual or group 
“who has a particular perspective to the exclusion of other perspectives or 
that it strays from the accepted norms and behaviors of mainstream soci-
ety” (Gereluk, 2012: p. 7). In both cases, neither refers to the act of com-
mitting an act of violence, nor does it refer to any particular political, so-
cial or religious movement. When such acts of violence are committed to 
destabilize the citizens of society and to create fear, it is terrorism. In this 
case, terrorism is the actual act against civilians to cause general instabili-
ty, often to disrupt the political, religious or social discourses that terror-
ists are trying to upend (Bonar, 2002). Radicalized youth and extremists 
may or may not commit an act. 
There is a futility in declaring definitive principles of what makes 
youth become radicalized. Trying to pinpoint the motivational bases for 
reasons why youth become radicalized is as frustrating as trying to deci-
pher why a person commits gun violence in schools. The reasons for why 
individuals become radicalized are as vast and varied. As noted in the 
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introduction, they may or may not be educated, single or married, have 
jobs, be men or women, and come from high or low socio-economic sta-
tus. Despite those individuals who inevitably commit terrorist attacks, 
media portrayals inevitably default to highlighting the characteristics 
that may be deemed as abnormal, half crazed, or come from indoctrina-
tory families of communities (Vertigans, 2011). It is a caricature that helps 
to assuage the anxieties that the individual could lurk anywhere, and in-
stead creates an individual who is unlike the rest of us. Yet, this problema-
tizes and obscures the way in which our societies could better support in-
dividuals who become radicalized in our own societies. 
As such, we draw upon some of the research that examines possi-
ble indicators of radicalizing youth, understanding full well that there is 
a complexity and uniqueness in the formation of youth who become in-
creasingly extremist in nature. Knowing that this is a flawed approach, 
akin to trying to hit a fly with a baseball bat, we argue that there is some 
relevance for considering more broadly several factors that may move 
youth in this direction. Despite the relative amorphous tendencies, we 
contend that there are some general factors that are worthy of considera-
tion from an educational standpoint. 
It would be remiss to suggest that history is not a critical factor in 
setting the preconditions for the way in which stories are told, positioned, 
and applied. Historical narratives shape particular norms and values, of-
ten feelings of superiority or conversely insecurity that do not promote 
mutual interdependence. Drawing upon particular events as a catalyst to 
strengthen the narrative, stories, songs, and folklore position a particular 
story for targeted purposes; in the case of radicalizing individuals, histor-
ical narratives may mobilize support for a particular cause or movement. 
The historical past helps to create a collective memory positioned in a par-
ticular way to either exploit past wrongs and injustices, glorious heroes, 
or of a particular time and place that was once held in great esteem of a 
golden age now lost. There is a narrowing of citizenship that prioritizes 
and highlights particular narrow versions of patriotism, commonly not-
ing the heroes of their cause, solidarity and unity of the collective move-
ment, which affirms their particular ideology to the exclusion of others 
(Ben-Porath, 2006). 
Drawing upon the past, contemporary rhetoric builds momentum 
to valorize or condemn the past. “Across discursive and nationalist ter-
ror groups there is therefore a tendency both to integrate ideas and behav-
ior from the past into contemporary rhetoric and strategies” (Vertigans, 
2001: p. 31). Individuals who move toward radicalized positions may 
take two different views of considering the past. In one way, there may 
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be a view to position the past of what once was – a nostalgic depiction 
of what the group once had. Arguably, the rise of the far Right in the 
United States calls forth a call back to a “Golden Age’, where the superi-
ority of the white Anglo-Saxon settler, and colonizer, had positional au-
thority and racial supremacy over others (Johnson & Frombgen, 2009). 
The Far Right Christian movements harken back to this racial supremacy 
and Christian assimilation is commonly used to spur increasing polariza-
tion and radical extremism for the shifting political and religious diversi-
ty across America. The desperation to return to such a past may help vali-
date the nature of individuals to take more radicalized stances. 
Conversely, radicalized groups may draw upon the injustices of the 
past to justify the means for more extremist positions. Calling upon in-
appropriate use of military or state force against a particular group may 
become a catalyst for the injustices of the past. Bloody Sunday, a peace-
ful protest on January 22, 1905 at the Tsar’s winter palace regarding the 
plight of the common Russian people, is often attributed to the catalyst 
and eventual fall of the Romanov Dynasty and the subsequent Bolshevik 
Revolution. The massacre of approximately 500 individuals who peace-
fully demanded reforms from the increasing corrupt nature of the dynas-
ty was met with the Imperial forces drawing fire on the demonstrators. 
In this case, the inappropriate act of violence became a catalyst for strikes 
and riots across the country, and for growing sympathy and support for 
the socialist revolutionary Bolsheviks. In this way, such an event adds le-
gitimacy and urgency to the collective memory and agency of a radical-
ized group that feels historically persecuted. Without the mechanism to 
redress such injustices in the current day, in the recognition and formal 
apologies of such atrocities, with substantive attempts to create any form 
of reconciliation and understanding between groups, then there is more 
inclination for radicalized groups to create momentum that something 
drastic ought to occur if the balance of power is to be shifted. 
Social media has shifted the lens for recruiting and attracting rad-
icalized youth towards extremist views. Vertigans (2011) starts from the 
premise that social media in and of itself does not create a radicalized per-
son; rather, individuals who already hold dispositions toward more radi-
calized ideas may search out events, behaviors, to help validate their par-
ticular dispositions. However, the way in which the media is used to 
describe a particular terrorist event has unintentionally helped to radical-
ized individuals and groups. The process of describing the event, how it 
was done, and the fear and anxiety amongst the citizenry helps to further 
legitimize the nature of those events for groups who wish to commit vio-
lent acts. In this way there is some parallel to the use of historical events. 
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Similar to the historical events which give legitimacy, it also raises the rep-
utational status of the extremist groups in that the values and behaviors 
have been propagated broadly in popular media and that the act of vio-
lence created the intended result. Ironically, the news-worthiness of com-
batting terrorism, further legitimizes those groups that turn to terrorist 
actions given the viral nature of terrorist activities and events. For the in-
dividual who may yearn of having a place or an identity, there is the poten-
tial to create a romanticized excitement at the prospect of gaining notorie-
ty, particularly if that individual has felt isolated, marginalized, or on the 
peripheries of communities.
At an individual level, the potential to create a convert requires to 
some extent a particular narrowing of one’s affiliations and identity to the 
one group to the exclusion of others. It creates a sense of affiliation of be-
longing, a purpose, particularly if those individuals have been isolated or 
pushed to the peripheries of society. It creates a form of legitimacy for their 
frustrations or worldviews that are exclusive to the group. Capitalizing 
on an individual’s disenfranchisement is critical to becoming radicalized. 
One’s own dissatisfaction, frustration, isolation, inequalities, discrimi-
nation or racism, and relative deprivation, is commonly a catalyst for in-
dividual who become more radicalized (Toolis, 1995, Richardson, 2007; 
Sageman, 2008). Youths who are the most susceptible to radical messag-
ing are those who perceive themselves to be politically, economically or so-
cially marginalized, resulting in a pervasive sense of purposelessness and 
lack of hope for the future. It is not solely poor socio-economic status that 
results in susceptibility, but rather a sense of relative deprivation, coupled 
with feelings of political and/or social exclusion that makes youth suscep-
tible to the radicalization process. This process entails drawing upon the 
affective emotions and for the group to create a more compelling affilia-
tion to them than to any alternative affiliations that may include family, 
friends, schools, communities and other forms of affiliation or belonging. 
As such, one’s existing social relations, bonds, and ties, are all but substan-
tively severed in favor of this one particular group to the exclusion of any 
others. This process creates a new form of socialization where secrecy and 
trust creates a heightened sense of self, of being an insider, and concom-
itantly attempts to sever any alternative groups that may provide an al-
ternative worldview. The attempt then is to instill increased apathy and 
disillusionment with the outside world, with an unbreakable pact with 
those within the extremist group. In so doing, it lessens one’s own individ-
ual identity to a more collective solidarity and unity, which in some cas-
es can sacrifice the self to a greater cause espoused by the group. “Secrecy 
and trust, the intersection between group charism and stigmatization and 
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minorities of the best and worst are integral to group cohesion, recruit-
ment and retention processes” (Vertigans, 2011: p. 110). Finally, as part of 
their greater affiliation to one extremist view propagated by a group, there 
is often a corollary weakening of moral obligations that reduce the inhi-
bitions of an individual to think about, and potentially carry out, acts 
of violence. Ensuring that the valor of the collective memory and agency 
takes precedence over the individual wellbeing of citizens is paramount 
to the extremist position that is inculcated by the group on the particu-
lar individual. 
Radicalization and mobilization to violence are distinct but often 
intertwined processes. Mobilization is the process by which a radicalized 
individual moves from extremist intent, to preparing for an act of terror, 
travel to join a terrorist entity and/or facilitating the terrorist activity of 
someone else (CSIS, 2018). While terrorist attacks may be difficult to an-
ticipate, indicators are often present. Analysis conducted by the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) found that the speed of mobilization 
to violence takes an average of twelve (12) months, but that youth mobi-
lize to violence more quickly than adults and that they tend to mobilize 
in groups. Young adults and minors generally have fewer obstacles to over-
come in their process of mobilization and by mobilizing in groups. They 
can overcome any existing obstacles quickly by pooling resources and ex-
pertise allowing them to engage in terrorist activities. For example, “a per-
son may give money to another member of the group and share items such 
as luggage or cell phones” (CSIS, 2018). Of note, however, are the find-
ings that many extremist mobilizers demonstrate behaviours that they are 
mobilizing to those around them. In other words, youth mobilizers will 
demonstrate observable ‘leakage’, which puts bystanders (friends, family, 
educators) in a position to identify their impending mobilization to vio-
lence (CSIS, 2018). According to the research conducted by CSIS, howev-
er, it is often more difficult to spot indicators of mobilization to violence 
in groups than by individuals alone. 
The nature of radicalizing youth, and subsequent possible mobiliza-
tion, is thus a progression of increasing extremist views that narrows one’s 
own outlook on the world that is aligned with the extremist views, and 
gives legitimacy and potentially valour to the individual who may yearn 
for creating such an identity and persona. There is a valorization of playing 
a role in the greater cause, built upon the historical legacy, rhetoric, and 
broader public discourse on extremism and terrorism that may fuel great-
er polarization toward a view of one absolute truth to the neglect of any 
others. Self-radicalization does not exist. While radicalization is an indi-
vidualized process, it is influenced both by factors (such as peer pressure, 
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grievances, international events) and through association with people 
supporting and/or promoting a violent extremist ideology. These associ-
ations or relationships can occur in person (face to face) but they often 
take place online. The consumption of extremist media and/or messag-
ing promotes violent ideological norms through which a person becomes 
convinced that violence is a legitimate means to advance their ideological 
causes or beliefs. 
In reviewing these imprecise indicators, what is most prevalent is 
the relative normalcy that leads an individual to become radicalized. 
There is a particular historical perspective that is positioned in a par-
ticular way to promote the particular norms and values that are to be 
perpetuated and amplified. The individual identifies with the group and 
with the values that resonate with the individual, whether it be disillu-
sionment, frustration, disenfranchisement, or isolation at the one end of 
the spectrum to that of heroism, valorization, heightened recognition, 
or martyrdom on the other. The move toward extremist views and acts 
of terror may remove the suffering of the one event and highlight the 
suffering and plight of the people for whom have historically or present-
ly commonly feel atrocities over a longer period. In this way those who 
move to more radicalized groups may see that their views are not to their 
own benefit but serving the greater need of those who have suffered, and 
thus create a moral distinction between that of a criminal to one who is 
sacrificing oneself to the benefit of others (Richardson, 2007). The na-
ture of youth who becomes radicalized is not half crazed, or a villain, 
or evil. The weight of their values and arguments have been shaped and 
constructed within the broader historical, political and social discours-
es. For instance, Jihadi groups utilize these discourses effectively to put 
forward narratives that are enticing to youth who may not be well edu-
cated in the nuance of Islamic history, other religious history, or theolo-
gy writ large. These discourses feed their disillusionment and fuel their 
desires to belong to a group and participate in what they see as a noble 
cause.
If the nature of the individual who becomes more radicalized is 
not simply a case of someone with severe mental health issues or evil as 
is often caricaturized by popular media, and is relatively mundane and 
normal indicators that may move a person to become more extreme, 
then there may be a corollary educative response to consider the ways 
that may reduce those initial inclinations to become radicalized in the 
first place. Let us turn to the corollary educational response to youth 
radicalization. 
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An Educational Response to Youth Radicalization
Similar to the previous section, we want to be explicit that we do not 
think that schools have the sole responsibility to address this complex 
issue. Further, it might seem imprudent to address youth radicalization 
at all given the very few youth who may become increasingly extremism 
and radicalized, which begs the question of whether this is an education-
al question at all. We start from the premise that the pedagogical task is 
beneficial not only to those who may be susceptible to radicalization, but 
would bolster general polarization that is prevalent. A purposeful educa-
tional task to create more opportunities for more robust historical and po-
litical analysis, political deliberation, and political tolerance seems more 
than warranted for all students. Thus, the intended aim is to build capac-
ity for students to better negotiate the rhetoric and public discourse that 
narrows and polarizes particular ideologies. 
If the aim of radicalized groups is to create an absolute truth among 
its members – a historical and contemporary narrative that rises to their 
cause, to the exclusion of all other possible alternative ways forward – 
then arguably the primary task is to interrupt one particular ideology and 
worldview. Yet historically, educational institutions and historical curric-
ula have been quite poor at this (Loewen, 2010). It requires thus a move 
away from a particular dominant ideology, which often positions the wars 
and events as winners and losers, providing a simply descriptive narrative 
of key dates, leaders, and heroes. In many cases, the work of developing a 
democratic conception, and an historical understanding of one’s society, 
may skew and obfuscate the complexities, nuances, and tensions among 
individuals and groups. For instance, an approach that suggests that the 
“mark of true citizens: courage, loyalty, responsibility, gratitude to fore-
bears, and a self-sacrificing devotion to the common good” (Kersten, 2011: 
para 2), may move us toward belligerent forms of citizenship, and only 
heighten the polarization and isolation felt by some (Ben-Porath, 2006). 
In creating a narrow, commonly simplified historical narrative, it poten-
tially causes problems for multiple students. For those disenfranchised, 
the historical narrative may further silence or oppress their perspective. 
And similarly, it may create a lack of awareness or understanding from 
those who do not see a particular historical time period as problematic. 
For instance, the portrayal of Afghanistan under current regimes may 
highlight the current oppressions of women and children, with increas-
ing religious indoctrinations. However, without a better understand-
ing of the historical epochs, which has been a strategic place for its lo-
cation to South Asia, one may have a one dimension and misconstrued 
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understanding of the rise of radicalized groups in Afghanistan. For in-
stance, the tribes and sub-tribes fought for territory in the early eight-
eenth century. The colonization of Europe in the 1800s had yet another 
element of territorial strife, with Britain increasing its world dominance 
and forcible entry into Afghanistan creating an artificial an unnatural 
boundary line – the Durand line – dividing the people of Afghanistan 
until 1919. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia also affected the nature 
of the reforms and Afghan people, which raised hopes of removing the 
British imperialism that it felt. The ideals of the socialist attempt at world 
revolution would affect the Afghan tribes and their way of life. Lands 
were confiscated, and legal courts were replaced with their Indigenous 
customs and laws, and changes to the familial unit with women enter-
ing education. The growing radical movements bolstered by the Stalinist 
and socialist movement thereafter forced further drastic reforms on the 
nation. The American government visibly nervous of this shift in power 
by the Russians, created a deliberately armed, financed coalition against 
the Afghan Soar Revolution in 1978. Billions of dollars were spent by 
the American government so that they could defeat the positionality of 
Russia in Afghanistan. The fall of Kabul, however, represented a victory 
to Islamic fundamentalism, who had yearned for the nostalgic past and 
had felt oppressed by the increased reforms, shifts in land and customs. 
The very nature of the rise of the Taliban, funded and supported histor-
ically by the American government, is now mostly lost in the contempo-
rary political discourse surrounding the terrorist activities of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan. Yet, the understanding of the historical turmoil of this 
nation highlights the strife and trauma of the people, commonly invad-
ed, conquered and oppressed from multiple regimes and multiple points 
of history. This (briefly and crudely portrayed) example is just a glimpse 
of what is lacking when students are asked to learn about history. Rather 
than simply having an understanding that the Taliban are ‘bad’ people, 
a more robust understanding of the history may account for the move 
toward more extremist stances given the historical legacy that has been 
largely unresolved, contested, and volatile. 
If our contemporary understanding of a particular country such as 
Afghanistan is devoid of the broader historical, political and religious con-
text that gives rise to extremist fundamentalism, then this creates a car-
icature of the complexity and spectrum of injustice that has occurred to 
redress the issue. Such a lack of understanding of how the Afghan people 
and its tribes and sub-tribes have battled and struggled, been manipulated 
and exploited, for the bigger positional global power by major countries, 
exacerbates the historical narrative held by extremist groups to propagate 
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their views. Rapoport (1989) notes that “for most commentators terror-
ism has no history, or at least they would have us believe that the ’terror-
ist problem’ had no significance until the 1960s, when the full impact of 
modern technology was felt, endowing most individuals as individuals or 
as members of small groups, with capacities they never had before” (xii). 
In this sense, the deep history of societies is critical to better understand-
ing the impetus for, and long-standing desperation of, particular individ-
uals and groups to become radicalized. If we turn to the United States, a 
robust history of the country would include the precursors of the nation 
built upon colonialism, genocide, revolution, racism, oppression, overlaid 
upon the broader espoused civic dispositions of life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness from their Declaration of Independence. In this way, 
Aislinn O’Donnell warns that “both schools and society more broadly 
offer cultural scripts that privilege certain kinds of responses to violence, 
which depend on the perceived identity of the perpetrator” (p. 480). In 
disrupting the cultural scripts that represent a more accurate portrayal of 
strife, the aim is to create an opening for more honest deliberation about 
how to “imagine and practice another future, one that will move beyond 
the current cycle of revenge” (Butler, 2004: p. 20).
In such instances when there has been such entangled injustices that 
remain unresolved, there is a second educational response worth consid-
ering: that of restorative justice. For understanding the past atrocities 
gives individuals better clarity of what is at stake when individuals be-
come more radical, yet it does little to create another space where individ-
uals can see beyond the one absolute truth told by radicalized groups. In 
this case, restorative justice calls upon individuals, institutions and soci-
eties to formally recognize and acknowledge past atrocities, and call for 
mechanisms for increased dialogue and reforms, to promote reconcilia-
tion and mitigate conflict over the past. O’Donnell contends that part of 
uncovering the historical genealogies help to make visible those who have 
been silenced. She states, “Renewed honest conversations and reimagined 
curricula would ask how we can respond to, and talk about, violence in 
the broader lived context of students. These conversations and curricu-
la would find ways of including the voices of those who are pushed out-
side and beyond political consideration” (2015: p. 477). Without naming 
the historical legacy that informs and fuels contemporary radical move-
ments, the potential for groups to capitalize and draw upon an historical 
narrative as evidence that they have been silenced, humiliated and shamed 
throughout history is compelling for a radicalized group to recruit and 
mobilize. 
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Inevitably such an approach might elicit concerns about further po-
larization of ideological differences. It is at this point that the pedagogi-
cal task of opening a deliberative space for critical reflection, and critical 
analysis of rhetoric comes into play. As part of the task of making explic-
it the conflicts in history, and in contemporary times, the task is then to 
develop students’ capacities to examine, critique, and offer their voices to 
understanding these worldviews with the hope of developing more capac-
ity to consider alternative perspectives and ways forward. If radicalized 
groups primary purpose is to espouse one view and one way forward, the 
educational response is to complicate and encourage a deliberative space 
where students can begin to unpack such rhetoric. There is no simple, de-
finitive response to radicalization and/or the mobilization to a violent ter-
ror attack; however, combatting the rhetoric and providing alternative 
messaging may provide an opportunity for educators to help susceptible 
youth recognize the dangers of radicalization, challenge and debunk the 
false allure of violent extremism, and offer them another more produc-
tive pathway. To illustrate this point, a common educational practice is to 
look at the rhetoric and slogans used in commercials for children to un-
derstand how the slogans target particular individuals, create an associ-
ation or identity with the product, and persuade them to ultimately buy 
and have an affinity with that product. Of the large brand names, we can 
point to Coca Cola’s historical legacy of slogans that aligned their prod-
uct with the good life (e.g. 1923, Enjoy life, 1964 Things go better with 
Coke, 1985 America’s real choice, etc.2) The list is endless and targeted to 
particular political and social periods, different countries, and different 
emotions, dispositions and experiences. A teacher may draw upon this 
timeline to unpack the slogans and the targeted messaging that notes the 
ways in which the company tries to evoke more than buying the drink, but 
rather to create a positive experience in so doing.
This common activity is useful for students to understand rhetoric 
in a non-threatening manner in how rhetoric, and specifically slogans, in-
form our perceptions of a particular phenomenon. Yet, there is a missed 
opportunity to then look at political slogans that do the same with par-
ticular movements. For instance, the Irish Republican Army commonly 
would use the slogan, “Tiocfaidh ár lá” (our day will come) to incite soli-
darity and as a reminder to the historical injustices felt by the movement. 
Popularized by Booy Sands, an IRA prisoner who wrote prolifically from 
his cell, the latter used the Irish language to both revitalize the language 
2 For a full list, see Wikipedia “coca cola slogans” Wikpedia (2018) List of coca-cola slogans. 
Retrieved on July 30, 2018 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Coca-Cola_slogans
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as part of the broader movement to preserve their culture, but also to keep 
secrets from the prison wardens and smuggle out radicalized ideas to oth-
er republicans. The phrase was a rally cry and would be drawn in the songs 
of the IRA, written in the speeches and used in the protest marches. 
Like the rhetoric used by the IRA, terrorist groups like the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al Qaeda (AQ) use the word ‘jihad’ to 
describe a declaration of war or a ‘holy war’ against their enemies. They 
have hijacked the concept of ‘jihad’ to justify various forms of violence. 
However, jihad, as described by the Quran, has many meanings. It can re-
fer to internal as well as external efforts to be a good Muslim or believer; 
jihad means the striving or struggle to be good. When returning from a 
military campaign, the Prophet Mohammed told his followers that “the 
jihad of the battlefield is a lesser form of the concept when compared to 
the greatest jihad – jihad ul-nafs – the inner struggle to lead an ethical 
and pious life” (Awad, 2015). Other verses in the Quran have also been 
used by terrorist groups to convince suicide bombers that they will inher-
it paradise:
Those who believe and who have forsaken the domain of evil and have 
striven [jihad] hard in God’s cause with their possessions and their lives 
have the highest rank in the sight of God; and it is they, they who shall 
triumph in the end! Their Sustainer gives them glad tidings of the grace 
that flows from Him, and of His goodly acceptance, and od the gardens 
which await them, full of lasting bliss, therein to abide beyond the count 
of time. Verily, with God is a mighty reward! (Rodgers-Melnick, 2001: 
para 7)
These verses have been taken out of context by terrorist groups and 
have been promoted to those who do not understand their true meaning. 
The violent rhetoric espoused by terrorist groups contradict and violate 
the fundamental tenets of Islam and they “do not give blanket permission 
to condemn or kill those who hold political or religious views other than 
your own” (Rogers-Melnick, 2001: para 8). 
The explicit unpacking of slogans and rhetoric for radicalized groups 
thus shows the power of permeating and disseminating its message. For 
students to unpack political and social slogans and rhetoric with an abil-
ity for critical analysis and critique, may both offer acknowledgement to 
the rise of those movements, but also create a disruption to how they may 
narrow one’s own scope. 
The recent slogan, ‘Make America Great Again’, similarly harkens 
back to a perceived golden age when the United States was considered a 
dominant global power (Edwards, 2018). Yet, it also lingers of times when 
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held power over blacks, and when there was an explicit isolationist stance 
by the country. It further underpins more Christian fundamentalist per-
spectives, commonly interwoven with Far Right policies, that commonly 
advocate for social conservative policies on aspects of reproductive rights 
and women’s rights. Conversely, if we look to the key phrases espoused 
by Malcolm X, you can note the rise of African American rights, but dif-
ferent from Martin Luther King Junior. In this way, the phrases provid-
ed a call to action, and sometimes justified use of force. One such slogan 
by Malcom X: “I don’t even call it violence when it’s in self-defense; I call 
it intelligence”, provides the justification of violence and one’s credibil-
ity. On this view, to not defend oneself suggests a weakness, and a lack 
of judgment or discretion to not take action. Violence is justified under 
the guise of self-defense, and is linked to the greater cause of the rights of 
African Americans. 
By unpacking the language that is commonly seen on t-shirts, pro-
test marches, speeches, songs, and so forth, the intent is to build the ca-
pacity of students to engage in civil discourse. Paula McAvoy and Diana 
Hess (2013) note how one teacher captures this sentiment aptly, by stating:
I think students should be able to carry out an intelligent conversation 
using civil discourse to express themselves and not to be simply a politi-
cal pundit… and express themselves in an appropriate manner and have 
honest, genuine discussions with one another about these issues. I think 
what they see a lot of times, in the media today, it is not really modelling 
civil discourse. (p. 15).
The aim is that by deliberating through these issues, such as rhetoric 
and slogan, it can create more political engagement. Furthermore, Diana 
Mutz (2006) contends that not only does talking across political spec-
trums build civic discourse – a term she coins ‘cross-cutting political talk’ 
– the process itself creates more political tolerance among those from di-
verse perspectives. When a classroom creates such a learning environment 
that invites respectful dialogue and deliberation, students may better be 
equipped to develop dispositions that weigh the evidence, understand the 
diversity of values and beliefs at play, and be more apt to listen and con-
sider alternative perspectives. And while they may not shift their view or 
change their perspective, they may have a bit more empathy, understand-
ing or tolerance to the different perspective. It opens up the ability to 
think beyond the limited narrow view of oneself and their own perspec-
tive, and rather consider that all views do not hold an ‘absolute truth’, but 
are located in a particular time and place, and highly contextual. This dis-
ruption and interruption of an absolute, narrow perspective compromises 
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the radicalized group’s mandate. Giving voice to students – simply, letting 
students talk about such issues – arguably is a strong determinant of cre-
ating more openness for political engagement and deliberation (McAvoy 
and Hess, 2013).
This leads to the final point. That when students can see themselves 
as part of the conversation, not silenced, marginalized or oppressed, there 
is a greater chance that those students will not feel hopeless, destitute, and 
desperate. For those students who do not have a sense of hope or opti-
mism, where they do not see themselves as part of broader society, there 
is greater chance that radicalized groups can seduce and recruit based on 
their vulnerabilities and emotional burden that they carry. A call for em-
pathy and inclusion, while reconciling very different worldviews, may pro-
vide an opening to create some cautious optimism whereby the individual 
can see themselves as living out a flourishing life rather than a life of des-
peration and despondency. In this regard, schools have a great role to play 
in ensuring that students see their rightful place among their peers in this 
community. For example, programs that physically remove individuals 
into targeted programs (for instance, English Language Learners for refu-
gee students) on the one hand may provide targeted support for language 
skills; unintentionally, however, the language program may physically re-
move students who do not have the opportunities to meet other students 
in the school, and to have such opportunities for deliberation, belonging, 
or a sense of community. It is a missed opportunity for both the refugee 
students who do not become enculturated with other students from di-
verse backgrounds; it is also a missed opportunity for those students who 
may have stereotypes of refugee students, or worse, do not see them at all 
and are metaphorically ‘invisible’ to the school population. The mecha-
nisms to create substantive opportunities for support and belonging to a 
range of communities in and beyond the school are critical to ensure that 
individuals who may feel on the periphery feel otherwise. When individ-
uals see opportunities that they can lead fulfilling lives beyond the walls 
of the school, then there is more optimism that the future is worth pur-
suing for oneself. When little future opportunity exists, and students re-
main isolated from their peers and their communities, radicalized groups 
see the opportunity to create a collective identity that is currently lacking 
in that individual.
Conclusion
We began this article with some indicators of why youth may turn to 
radicalized groups. And while these indicators are not definitive or set, 
they suggest that the indicators are fairly mundane and normal, and do 
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not necessarily require a strong indoctrinatory upbringing or extremist 
community for it to rise. Further, the indicators suggest that there are far 
more youth who may be radicalized than is perceived by the greater pub-
lic. Given that the youth need not commit an act of violence, but rather 
have a narrowing of extremist views, it suggests that the numbers are be-
yond the rare individual, and there may be more youth who are increas-
ingly becoming radicalized. This is troubling given that there is some ev-
idence to suggest that youth are more susceptible to radicalization than 
adults. The nature of recruiting youth makes it easier to conform and cre-
ate allegiances among youth who are negotiating their own cognitive and 
emotional development as adolescents. It thus begs the question of wheth-
er schools are able to attend to this concern.
In this way, we argue that schools ought to provide more robust po-
litical deliberation in classrooms. The ability for students to better negoti-
ate the complex historical, political, social and religious discourses builds 
capacity to trouble single narratives and rhetoric that perpetuates a super-
ficial account of the ‘Other’. Giving voice to students may help unpack 
the issues, rhetoric and power, and in so doing, help develop the disposi-
tions that create more political engagement and tolerance. And while we 
do not suggest that students may drastically shift their ideological stances, 
it may better create a possibility that the other perspective may hold some 
weight. In an effort to disrupt polarized radical views, educators can build 
students’ capacity to create a complexity to such long contested and com-
plex issues, as part of the effort to prevent socialization into violent ex-
tremist movements.
Finally, in so doing, we do not suggest that this is yet another addi-
tive burden that teachers must do to solve society’s ills. Nor do we think 
that schools shoulder the burden for redressing the radicalization of 
youth. Yet, these recommendations call for a shift in pedagogy to what 
is currently done, that creates a deliberative space for students to feel in-
cluded and empowered. In this way, the suggestions offered above support 
good pedagogical practices that are helpful to all students – not simply 
the ones who may be more susceptible and at-risk for radicalization. The 
ability to negotiate and wrestle with the historical and contemporary po-
litical discourses in a controlled learning environment, may better allow 
individuals to negotiate a more nuanced perspective more generally that 
does not revert back to ‘absolute truths’ and ‘rhetorical slogans’.
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What are the most important differences between violent ex-
tremism fueled by radicalisation and other forms of terrorism 
that existed in different European countries back in the 1960s 
and 1970s, e.g. Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK (those you have 
examined in your book The Making of Terrorism [Sociétés et 
terrorisme])?
We have to distinguish, between what I will call classical terrorism, and 
global terrorism. Classical terrorism began, at least seen from Europe, 
in the sixties, and was at its highest level in the seventies and ear-
ly eighties. It could be domestic, then with three main possibilities: ex-
treme-left, extreme-right, and independentist (for instance, Basque, or 
Irish). Sometimes, a same country, or a same movement could combine 
two aspects. Italy faced in the seventies both extreme-left and extreme 
right terrorisms, the Basque and the Irish movements had sometimes ex-
treme-left components. And classical terrorism could also be internation-
al, which was mainly the case with those groups that acted in name of the 
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Palestinian cause, but also, less important, with the Asala, the Armenian 
movement. Classical terrorism was highly political, not religious. 
Global terrorism began to appear, from my point of view, in the early 
or mid eighties, with some attacks in Lebanon, and, later, in France – but 
not only. In the nineties, it began to be much more active, and there was 
a summit in 2001, in the United States, with Bin Laden and 9/11. Global 
terrorism is religious, and either meta-political or infrapolitical. The actors 
want to die, as “martyrs”. In some cases, the actors are at the crossroads of 
two logics, a domestic one – they are for instance migrants in a country 
where they feel badly treated – and a geopolitical one – they are part of 
a world fight, like in the Huntington theory of “Clash of Civilizations”. 
In some cases, they have no territorial basis, and act as a network, which 
has been the case with Al Qaeda, but they may also try to have their own 
State, the Califate for Daech. Global terrorism can become individual, i.e. 
actors act as “lone wolves”, without strong ties with any network. It is in 
fact not so frequent with Daech; I would say that the more a country expe-
riences only these kind of terrorist actors, the more it means that there are 
no strong centers abroad, no real capacity to organize important attacks 
from abroad, like in Paris in January and November 2015.
My book (in English: The Making of Terrorism [University of 
Chicago Press]) results from some eight or nine years of research, includ-
ing fieldwork, at a time when classical terrorism was at stake, and it mainly 
deals with it. But I also made my research at a time when the new, Global 
Terrorism was appearing – which was very difficult to understand and, 
much more, to conceptualize. 
Should we only use one term for this process or do we need to em-
ploy the term radicalisation(s) instead?
Radicalisation is not a concept, nor a theoretical category, but one of these 
words that is used in ordinary life, or by experts, technocrats, journalists, 
etc. when they want to speak of those people that are ready to commit 
terrorist acts. Or who commits them. When social scientists use it, they 
very quickly understand that it is not easy to pass from an ordinary vo-
cabulary to a scientific one. In history, so many actors have been involved 
in commitments that today we could call “radical”! The French or Soviet 
Revolutionaries were radicalized! Those that were acting in order to de-
colonize their people were radicalized! Leftism, and extreme-right ideolo-
gies are radical! It is much more useful to introduce other concepts such as 
subjectivation and desubjectivation, and to analyze processes where they 
are at stake.
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Despite the fact that in the EU’s Internal Security Strategy and 
Action, radicalisation is defined as ‘a complex phenomenon in 
which individuals adopt a radical ideology that can lead to com-
mitting terrorist acts’, the relationship between radicalisation, vi-
olent extremism and terrorism is anything but unambiguous or 
unproblematic. Is there any distinction between these terms that 
is in need of further clarification? 
If social scientists expect to have their conceptual categories provided by 
the US or EU bureaucrats or politicians, then we can consider that social 
science does not exist! How do some individuals enter in a specific way 
of thinking, this is a first question. And here, it is clear that there is not 
only one worse way, but several, and that in order to understand this phe-
nomenon, we need in-depth interviews or any other solid materials. In my 
own research for instance, I have been frequently surprised by the narra-
tive which were provided to me by former terrorists accepting to tell me 
their life-story: the moment when they passed to some ideological “radi-
calisation” was not at all what you could have expected. It may have been 
purely accidental, or connected with very ordinary events, or interactions. 
Then, there is a second question due to the fact that many people can share 
radical ideas or ideology, but very few act as terrorists. Why and how do 
some people only pass from ideas to action? As far as Islamic terrorism is 
at stake, I consider that religion is absolutely decisive, even if the terrorist 
actor doesn’t know a lot about Islam, or if he discovered Islam only a few 
months before he committed an attack. Without religion, there wouldn’t 
be this impetus that makes possible the decision to die: dying, here, due to 
religion, means passing to another word, where you will have a wonderful 
life. So, let us forget this confusing word, “radicalisation”, and let us ana-
lyse terrorism with other categories!
The ‘causal’ interpretation of the process of radicalisation as a 
‘path’ or ‘staircase’ to terrorism advanced by some scholars has 
been very influential in this area of scholarly research. Is the pro-
cess of radicalisation deterministic [that any individual who 
is radicalised is already a potential terrorist (the equivalence 
premise)]? 
We had some years ago an interesting debate in France on this issue. Gilles 
Kepel, a good specialist, explained that religion is the key element in or-
der to analyse passing to terrorism, in opposition to another good special-
ist, Olivier Roy, who gave more importance to social radicalisation, i.e. 
the social trajectory that leads to terrorism, for instance, in France: young 
migrants, living in poor neighbourhoods, victims of discrimination, and 
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racism, becoming small criminals, going into jail, meeting some Islamist 
preacher there … So, Kepel spoke of radicalisation of Islam when Roy 
spoke of islamisation of radicality … But a third excellent specialist, Farhad 
Khosrokhavar, published recently a great book in which he demonstrates 
that there is not only one single model, but many different paths, some of 
them including long training in religion, and others a short one, or almost 
none. And we should avoid two risks. One can be called “sociologism”: 
explaining terrorism only by social determinations, which is risky since 
many people share the same experience, but only a few may become ter-
rorists; the second risk can be called “psychologism”: explaining terrorism 
by the personality, without taking into account the social background of 
actors. Many people are “radicalised” and will never commit any terrorist 
attack, and many people have an authoritarian and destructive personali-
ty but will not act like this too.  
Some scholars argue that radicalisation is exclusively a reaction to 
the status quo [causal interpretation]? Do you find this interpre-
tation ‘reductionist’ or otherwise problematic? 
This is a very old way of thinking, explaining the action without analys-
ing the actor, nor any kind of interaction, but observing the system and 
its modifications that make people react. Terrorism, like any other action, 
has its meaning, even if we should consider much more its loss of mean-
ing. Actors do not become actors only because they react, for instance to 
some change in the status quo. They become actors in order to fulfil some 
goals, and because they want, as subjects, to transform the situation, and 
not only react. 
Existing research on violent extremism focuses prevalently on its 
etiology looking for a causal explanation of the process of radicali-
sation leaving several conceptual issues either neglected or even ig-
nored. What are the most important shortcomings of existing dis-
cussions on radicalisation(s) and violent extremism?
Let me say again that any causal explanation is generally too simplistic. 
And let me add a methodological remark: we need, when discussing this 
kind of affirmation, some proof, some test, some demonstration. In my 
case, the demonstrations were the result of fieldwork with former (or not 
so former) terrorist actors: when it has been possible for me to present 
to these people my analysis of their action as terrorists, the test was in 
what they did with my analysis. When they accepted it, and when they 
said something like: this analysis helps me to understand better what 
happened with such event, or what I did in such context, when they did 
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something with my analysis, I could consider that there was some element 
of demonstration. So, to these people that propose a causal explanation: 
what is the proof, the demonstration, the test?
Can the process of radicalisation be considered as ‘the last of 
the remaining options’ (when the ‘ loss of meaning’ is taken into 
account)? 
I wouldn’t give a general answer, I would take this as a hypothesis, and I 
would test it with concrete actors. Did they have the feeling of having no 
other option? How do they react when I introduce this idea? My first re-
action to this question is that I would be surprised to see terrorist actors 
accepting this kind of proposal, and say: yes, it is or it was the last option. I 
imagine much more them saying: it was the best option, far from any oth-
er one.
The brutality of terrorist attacks and their ever-increasing fre-
quency also open the space for ‘moral panic’, Islamophobia, right-
wing populism and political extremism that contribute consid-
erably to the polarization of societies. How to deal with these 
so-called ‘collateral’ problems associated with radicalisation and 
violent extremism?
When terrorist attacks are striking a society, there is a lot of fear and irra-
tionality that develops. Democracy then is in danger, the executive power 
will consider it necessary not to let the judicial and the legislative powers 
work as usual, and will diminish their capacity of action. Rumours, look-
ing for scapegoats, prejudice will develop. Some very small issues will be-
come big affairs; people will sometimes say they want a very strong, non-
democratic authoritarian regime. I don’t have any recipe in order to face 
such challenges, I can only say that social scientists have here an important 
responsibility, we must explain, provide serious analysis, contribute in the 
public debate on the basis of our researches.
Furthermore, how can radicalisation be understood within the 
framework of discussions about diversity? Perhaps as ‘conflicting 
diversity’?
What you still want me to call “radicalisation” is one aspect of thinking 
and eventually acting when the processes of subjectivation, desubjecti-
vation and resubjectivation appear in social life. If such processes exist, 
it is because social life is made of divisions, and they appear and devel-
op when a non-radical action is not possible, when it is not possible for 
some individuals to transform through debates and non-violent conflicts 
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their subjectivity into action. Non-violent conflictuality including dem-
ocratic negotiations and dialogues is the best answer to violence and 
“radicalisation”.  
Are the phenomena of radicalisation, right-wing populism and 
political extremism poised to ultimately dominate our future? 
Is there a way of ‘exiting violence’ (to borrow the term from the 
‘Violence and Exiting Violence Platform’ that you chair)? 
You could add international criminality, school shooting, extreme na-
tionalisms, etc.! One should not be too optimistic! Sometimes, one form 
of violence disappears, but another appears. For instance in Mexico, there 
is almost no more political violence, but there is a lot of criminal violence! 
There are no total solutions, but real possibilities to always try and im-
plement preventing, reducing and eventually exiting violence. This means 
for instance being able to help traumatised people to recover, justice and 
peace to be articulated and not opposed, law, democracy and the state to 
replace chaos and civil war, etc. We are living in very dangerous times, and 
it is difficult not to be pessimistic.
Several scholars argue that one of the main limitations of existing 
approaches to the problem of radicalisation lies in its reliance on 
the ‘security’ paradigm, which leaves unanswered several key is-
sues associated with the tackling of radicalisation and violent ex-
tremism. What would be the most pressing challenges to the ‘se-
curity paradigm’?
Radicalisation is a process, and in order to understand this process, we 
must first of all take into account the great diversities, on the one hand of 
those that are “radicalised” and on the other hand, of not only the nation-
al, but also international and local situations in which radicalisation has 
been possible. The “security” paradigm intervenes mainly at the national 
level, and deals with limited dimensions, most of them in the very short 
term. It doesn’t take into consideration the long-term issues, for instance 
education, and it has nothing to do with the economic, political, cultur-
al and social sources of radicalisation, such as racism, social inequalities. 
It may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and exert devastating perverse 
effects, for instance by stigmatizing some people that have at the begin-
ning nothing to do with terrorism and violence. Security is necessary, but 
should appear as just one aspect of public policies. And security measures 
shouldn’t be voted in order to face terrorism, and be used for other goals.
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What are the most important motivational factors that ‘trigger’ 
the process of radicalisation and what groups or individuals do 
you think are most at risk?
Radicalisation is such a diverse phenomenon; one cannot say that there 
are some “most important factors” that would “trigger” it. More generally, 
social science shouldn’t try to propose one or several “factors” of “causes to 
explain human behaviours, since these behaviours are not determined by 
them, they develop within the framework of relations between human be-
ings, and usually these relations are not explained just by some “factors”. 
We shouldn’t think in terms of social or political determinism.
In some cases, radicalized individuals or groups select one kind of 
targets – journalists, Jews, catholic priests for instance. In other cases, the 
action is blind and there is no specific target, they just kill those that are 
there when they act, in the street for instance, like in Nice on July 14th, 
2016. Today, there is such an importance of geopolitical and religious di-
mensions as far as radical violence is at stake that those individuals and 
groups that are concerned with these dimensions are most at risks – visi-
bly Jews first.
What role should education play in the tackling of radicalisa-
tion and violent extremism and what educational programs and 
strategies do you find most appropriate? Which educational envi-
ronments are most appropriate for programs and other activities 
associated with deradicalisation, counter-radicalisation, anti-po-
larisation (e.g. schools, peer groups, civil society organizations)? 
Why?
Education will not solve all issues, but no education will contribute to a 
more radical and violent society. The more important, from my point of 
view, is to consider that educational systems should create such conditions 
for more capacity, for each individual to become a Subject, i.e. a person 
able to master his or her own life while considering that all human beings 
should also be able to be more and more able subjects. This means: more 
capacity to analyze problems and situations, and one’s own participation 
or role in some problems and situations. When some individuals are rad-
icalized, or in a process of radicalisation, there is always also a tendency 
towards sectarianism, incapacity to discuss out of one’s own group, feel-
ing that “society” cannot understand, and then, I consider that facing this 
means creating new opportunities for these individuals to be re-integrat-
ed in debates and even tense discussions. Let me give you an example. In 
the early 70s in France, there was a revolutionary leftist “maoïste” group 
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who was radicalized, and not far from passing to terrorism. Their chance 
was that some very important intellectuals, including Jean-Paul Sartre or 
Michel Foucault were interested and concerned with talking to them, the 
leaders of this group had a relationship with external people that talked 
with them, and it has been one element that made them decide to finish 
with these tendencies of clandestine and violent action.
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Introduction
To understand new modes of terrorist attacks that were happen-ing in USA and Europe at the beginning of the 21st century, poli-cy-makers and researchers in terrorist studies employed the concept 
of radicalisation. Since then, however, several authors have questioned the 
analytical use of radicalisation in explaining terrorist actions (e.g. Githens-
Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Kühle & Lindekilde, 
2010; Kundnani, 2012), as well as the lack of sound empirical support for 
radicalisation models and theories (Borum, 2011b; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2010; Geeraerts, 2012). Some authors have been explicit about the useless-
ness of the concept. For example, John Horgan (2013) stated in an inter-
view with Rolling Stone magazine that “the idea that radicalisation causes 
terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism research”, 
and Marc Sageman (2013) told in an interview for Huffington Post that 
“the notion that there is any serious process called ‘radicalisation’, or in-
doctrination, is really a mistake”. Regardless of the negative tone of these 
quotes, it is clear that the concept of radicalisation is present in the (USA) 
mainstream media. Keeping the above-mentioned caveats in mind, this 
article has two goals. First, we offer an elaboration of the way researchers 
have used radicalisation in the past, point to several issues, and offer a rel-
ativistic and contextual approach to it (following authors like Sedgwick 
(2010), Onnerfos & Steiner (2018), and Neumann (2013)). With this ap-
proach radicalisation can be studied in a broader context (non-Western, 
as well as non-democratic states), and not necessarily limited to political 
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violence and terrorism. The second part of the article discusses a qual-
itative empirical study that was done using focus groups with youth in 
Croatia. The goal of the study was to grasp how young people in Croatia 
understand the concepts of mainstream and radical individuals.
Radicalisation – Short History and Major Issues
When one is confronted with the vast literature and definitions of rad-
icalisation, one finds that the only thing common among them is that 
they portray radicalisation as a process, i.e. a change, a shift from being a 
non-radical to becoming a radical. All other aspects are debated and con-
tested – what does it mean to be a radical; are there multiple ways of be-
coming one; what is the relationship of radicalisation with violence and 
terrorism; is it a change in attitudes and/or behaviour, etc. 
It is perhaps best to start with the meta-approaches to radicalisation. 
Neumann (2013) makes a distinction between the Anglo-Saxon and the 
European approach to radicalisation, the former focusing on the behav-
ioural aspects of radicalisation (such as terrorism and violence), while the 
latter shifts the focus a bit more towards radical ideas1. The Anglo-Saxon 
approach to radicalisation was the one that came first in the post-9/11 
era, solidifying with the so-called NYPD model (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). 
Within this model, radicalisation is the change that happens within in-
dividuals before they plan and execute a terrorist attack. Radicalisation 
includes four distinct phases – pre-radicalisation, self-identification, in-
doctrination, and Jihadisation. The model is reminiscent of the staircase 
model to terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005) according to which individu-
als, who perceive a certain unfairness or relative deprivation, go up five 
“floors” after which their inhibition of killing is removed and they per-
form terrorist acts. Both models were important for dismissing the ideas 
that all terrorists are people with psychological problems or are motivated 
primarily by their low economic status. Instead, they point to psychologi-
cal factors as being key for terrorist actions, such as the processes of identi-
fication, anger, moral reasoning, cognitive process of categorisation, feel-
ings of helplessness, etc. At the same time, these authors are aware, and are 
explicit about, the fact that not all individuals that start on the radicalisa-
tion pathway end up as terrorists. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, especially following the London 
and Madrid attacks, policy makers and academics have also adopted the 
1 Neumann (2013) points out that this distinction is probably due to the emphasis that 
American society has on free speech. Thus, the act of violence is problematic, not radical 
ideas, since ideas are not illegal and going down the path of intervening into that sphere is 
seen as going against freedom of speech.
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radicalisation discourse and framework for understanding terrorist acts 
(e.g. Khalil, 2014; Lindekilde, 2012b; Slootman & Tillie, 2006). In line 
with the Anglo-Saxon approach the outcome of the radicalisation pro-
cess concerns violent acts. However, the difference is in the explicit sep-
aration between cognitive radicalisation (thoughts, ideas, or attitudes), 
and behavioural radicalisation. In both instances violence is present, i.e. 
in “increasing motivation to use violent means” (Doosje et al., 2016: p. 79), 
“change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasing-
ly justify intergroup violence” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: p. 416), 
“active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated 
goal” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: p. 4), or “a movement in the direction 
of supporting or enacting radical behaviour” (Kruglanski et al., 2014: p. 
70). Borum (2011a: p. 9) differentiates between “…developing extremist 
ideologies and beliefs…” and “engaging in terrorism or violent extremist 
actions”, while Busher and Macklin (2015) use the terms extreme narra-
tives and extreme forms of action. Perhaps the best known model of this 
approach to radicalisation is McCauley and Moskalenko’s (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008; 2014; 2017) two pyramid model. They argue that “it 
is necessary to separately theorise radicalisation of opinion and radicalisa-
tion of action” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017: p. 213) precisely because 
they are psychologically different phenomena. According to the model, a 
person goes up or down the opinion or action pyramid. On the former, 
one can be neutral, believe in a cause but not justify violence, believe in a 
cause and justify violence, or feel a moral obligation to act violently to pro-
mote the cause; on the latter, one can do nothing for a cause, engage le-
gally, engage illegally, or engage illegally toward civilians. Given the point 
that these are two distinct pathways of radicalisation, they argue that se-
curity counter-measures must use different policies and actions to prevent 
ideas and actions. 
Regardless of the differences between these two approaches, both 
come from a securitisation frame, i.e. they are focused on “how one be-
comes a radical”. Since the consequences of the radicalisation process 
are clearly negative and can hurt the fabric of a society, understanding 
how that process occurs has major security implications. But even more, 
the securitisation frame creates “an atmosphere of a ‘state of emergen-
cy’ which calls for extraordinary policy measures” (Lindekilde, 2012a: p. 
339). Onnerfors and Steiner (2018) juxtapose this with the socio-cultur-
al frame, within which the question is why certain individuals or groups 
radicalise. The answers usually come from contexts, discourses, anthro-
pological factors, narratives, etc. For example, Hafez and Mullins (2015) 
argue that the answer to the “radicalisation puzzle” must include micro, 
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meso, and macro levels of understanding, which in turn include griev-
ances, existing networks, ideologies, support structures, foreign policies, 
etc. Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2012) argue that radicalisation can be un-
derstood as a consequence of the clash of civilisations, lack of integration, 
dissolution of civil society, and even as the result of the counter-terrorist 
measures that were intended to prevent it (Lindekilde, 2012). On the oth-
er hand, Costanza (2015: p. 14) points out that a “theoretically-grounded 
discursive approach that seeks to understand individuals within their so-
ciocultural environment seems better suited to capture the changing na-
ture of behaviour within context”. This includes studying cultural narra-
tives of different social structures that include family, school, peer groups, 
and local community. If we think about the Anglo-Saxon and European 
approach as bringing the psychological process into the field of political 
violence and terrorism, the socio-cultural frame offers a “step back” out-
side of an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the socio-cultural frame is not incompat-
ible with the securitisation frame; it could be viewed as the causal back-
ground of the radicalisation phases through which an individual goes. 
For example, the concept of radicalisation that the authors want to un-
derstand still includes an extremist worldview and legitimising violence 
(e.g. Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012). 
There are three broad issues that are present within the above-men-
tioned approaches. First, the definition of radicalisation, and its rela-
tion to close concepts is inconclusive/ambiguous. For example, is the end 
point of radicalisation extremism (e.g. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; 
Mandel, 2009), terrorism (e.g. Al-Badayneh, Alhasan, & Almawajdeh, 
2016; Kruglanski et al., 2014), or is attaining extremist beliefs a step in the 
radicalisation process that ends in terrorist acts (e.g. Doosje, Loseman, 
& van den Bos, 2013)? Furthermore, if we accept any of these end re-
sults of radicalisation, we are left with the question – what characteris-
tics constitute a radical person? This issue is even more troubling when 
authors study radicalisation without defining it (e.g. Grattan, 2008; 
Quayle & Taylor, 2011; Rousseau, Hassan, & Oulhote, 2018). One can 
only agree with Neumann’s (2008: p. 4) widely cited statement that “ex-
perts and officials started referring to the idea of ‘radicalisation’ when-
ever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’.” 
Still, it seems that the key outcome, or rather ingredient, of the radicali-
sation process is violence; increasing the justification of violence of rele-
vant groups and/or increasing the probability of performing violent acts 
(e.g. Della Porta & LaFree, 2012; Doosje et al., 2016; Jaskoski, Wilson, 
& Lazareno, 2017; Khalil, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Yet, 
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researchers have pointed out that radicalisation can be non-violent (e.g. 
Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013), and some use the 
term “radicalisation to violent extremism” to distinguish between these 
two types (Borum, 2014). Thus, we are left with a theoretically extreme-
ly contested term, and without any agreement even on its basic definition. 
Due to its versatility and usage in various disciplines, radicalisation is in 
fact something scholars in the field of humanities call – travelling con-
cepts. This basically means “they travel – between disciplines, between in-
dividual scholars, between historical periods, and between geographically 
dispersed academic communities” (Bal, 2002: p. 2).
Unfortunately, when we move to the empirical findings the situa-
tion is even worse. First of all, there is a general paucity of empirical stud-
ies on the topic of radicalisation (see Borum, 2011b; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2010). Second, studies that use empirical data usually do not study the 
processes of radicalisation, even though the transformation to extrem-
ism or radicalism is the key aspect of the concept. Instead, for example, 
they study the characteristics of individuals already identified as radicals 
(Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Jaskoski et al., 2017), use a questionnaire to de-
termine the level of radicalisation within individuals (Al-Badayneh et al., 
2016; Chebotareva, 2014), identify determinants of radical beliefs (Doosje 
et al., 2013; Doosje, van den Bos, Loseman, Feddes, & Mann, 2012), etc. 
This by itself would not be a problem if not for the lack of studies dealing 
with the processes of radicalisation, not just with the characteristics and 
determinants of radicals2. Finally, the studies on radicalisation are geo-
graphically and sample-wise narrow – they almost exclusively deal with 
Western democracies and Muslims3 (see Della Porta & LaFree, 2012). 
Kundnani (2012: p. 5) captures these issues stating that research on rad-
icalisation is “in practice, limited to a much narrower question: why do 
some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam 
that leads to violence?”
Finally, several authors have been critical of what could be dubbed 
“the sociological background” of radicalisation studies. Since the begin-
ning of the surge in radicalisation studies, academia has been closely con-
nected with security and public policy experts. From one point of view 
this is expected – the former can gain data, the latter insights that can be 
used for de-radicalisation policies. On the other hand, Kundnani (2012: 
2 Studies dealing with the processes use post-hoc accounts of radicals (mostly terrorists) or 
close acquaintances which is of course subject to major rationalisation processes (see Pi-
soiu, 2013).
3 This is clear in the “symbolic purging of the NYPD radicalisation report” (Jenkins & 
Daddario, 2016).
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p. 4) argues that “the radicalisation discourse was, from the beginning, 
circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorist policy-makers rath-
er than an attempt to objectively study how terrorism comes into being”. 
The de-radicalisation efforts have been portrayed as “industries” (Kühle 
& Lindekilde, 2010), while Githens-Mazer & Lambert (2010: p. 901) ar-
gue that academics, politicians, and the media use conventional wisdom 
on radicalisation to ensure that the public feels safe – “Deviation from 
conventional wisdom requires one group of participants to break this cy-
cle—at the tangible risk, variously, of livelihood, of not being re-elected, 
of losing sales, and of losing research funding”. 
After this brief overview of radicalisation studies, we can conclude 
that most of them use non-empirical methodology and are based on con-
tested models of radicalisation to violent extremism of Muslim youth 
in Western democracies. Furthermore, they are mostly embedded with-
in the securitisation frame, and as such have been under the influence of 
public policy agendas and needs. At the same time, there are several voices 
that argue that a different approach to radicalisation is not only possible, 
but theoretically clearer and analytically more useful. 
Radicalisation – An Alternative Approach
It should be clear that radicalisation is a term that has “terminological 
‘baggage’” (Khalil, 2014: p. 199). It has a negative connotation, usually 
connected with extremist positions and political violence. At the same 
time, several authors have pointed out that the radicalisation process is 
highly context dependent (e.g. Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; Onnerfors & 
Steiner, 2018). Neumann (2013) points out that the term “radical” has no 
meaning on its own, and what gives it meaning is its position to the main-
stream, to the status quo. Bartlett and Miller (2012: p. 2) also state clearly 
that “to be a radical is to reject the status quo”. This means that there is no 
single ideology or position that is universally radical, and one can be a rad-
ical democrat in an authoritarian regime or a radical anti-democrat in a 
democratic regime; an extremist, a terrorist, or a defender of human rights 
(Schmid, 2013). In this sense, mainstream and radical positions are mutu-
ally co-determined and can shift, which means that today’s “radicals” can 
be tomorrow’s “regulars” (Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018). It’s important to 
note that based on this approach extremism is only a specific type of rad-
icalism – it includes anti-democratic tendencies and values within a dem-
ocratic setting (mainstream). 
But it is not only the relative (o)position to the mainstream that de-
fines radicals, it is also the desire for a fundamental and immediate change 
of society’s dominant values and/or political regime (Mclaughlin, 2012). 
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This desire can, but does not necessarily encompass, violent behaviour or 
support for violent actions. Following this approach, radicalisation can 
be defined as a shift toward adopting more radical values and positions. 
This approach is relatively new, and there are a lot of open issues – such 
as what are the differences in radicalisation in different settings, are there 
any universal phases or steps in the process, under what conditions is vi-
olence present or supported, what is the relationship between radical val-
ues and radical behaviour, etc. However, these issues are open within the 
studies of Islamist radicalisation to violent extremism, which means that 
we are not “losing” any insights by adopting an alternative approach to 
radicalisation. On the other hand, this allows us to broaden our scope of 
research, both in different socio-political settings as well as within groups 
and individuals with different ideological positions. Furthermore, this ap-
proach points out potential fallacies in simply assuming what the norma-
tive/mainstream position is, and who the radicals are, as was done in the 
majority of studies so far (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Sedgwick, 2010). 
Radicalisation and Youth
The field of radicalisation studies is young, and once we adopt an alterna-
tive approach to radicalism it becomes even younger. Thus, the goal of this 
study is to take a few steps back toward the basics of radicalisation and 
study the relationship between the mainstream and radical positions and 
put it in the context of young people. One way to do this is to see how citi-
zens/young people themselves see these terms and what they think are the 
defining characteristics of radicals. 
Growing literature in the area of security studies points out youth 
as a group particularly prone to radicalisation. Young people are thus 
seen as a “growing concern for counter-terrorism policy” (Bizina, Grey, 
2014: p. 72), relatively easy to recruit for violent radical acts and extrem-
ism (Özerdem, Podder 2011; Costanza, 2015), or even as an emerging is-
sue for national security in various national contexts (Yom, Sammour, 
2017; Doosje et al., 2017; Bezunartea et al. , 2009). Even though relevant 
sociological research also pinpoints young people as being more predis-
posed to extremist values than adults (Ilisin, 1999), this notion should not 
be taken for granted without taking into account other variables that in-
fluence youth behaviour, such as political culture of a specific state, eco-
nomic situation, the quality of governance and democracy as such, social 
values constellation and so on. That being so, there is a tacit consensus 
among youth researchers that young people should be involved not only 
in policy-making but also in research when investigating their universes. 
In other words, it is advisable to give voice to young people when studying 
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phenomena related to them in order to assure greater accuracy and ample 
analytical value. Considering the fact that the aforementioned research 
papers stem from security studies rather than youth studies, they fail to 
assure youth voices when constructing arguments on youth radicalisation. 
As a result, this paper seeks to deconstruct the meaning behind radicalism 
and put this originally Western European concept emerged within the 
security studies paradigm (Borum, 2012), in the context of Croatia and 
youth studies. More concretely, the goal of this paper is to analyse how 
radicalism is understood by Croatian youth. We believe that by focusing 
on youth radicalisation from the perspective of youth studies we could get 
clearer and more substantial understanding of radicalism which can result 
in more effective policies in that area. 
Youth in Croatia
The situation regarding young people in Croatia is rather ambiguous. On 
the one hand, the recent empirical studies on young people in Croatia 
(Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas, 2017; Kovacic & Horvat, 2016; Ilisin et al, 2013) 
describe this generation of young people as “disillusioned”. Hence, they 
show “overall deterioration of the social standing of young people com-
pared to that of young generations 10-15 years ago” (Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas, 
2017: p. 422), further weakening of youth’s trust in the social perspec-
tive, retraction into a private sphere, and distancing themselves from so-
cial and political matters (ibid), as well as a growing process of retradi-
tionalisation (Kovacic & Gvozdanovic, forthcoming). On the other hand, 
there is a trend of diminishing gender differences, better understanding 
of the importance of political participation, and growing personal opti-
mism (Kovacic & Horvat, 2016). When describing youth mainstream in 
Croatia, authors claim that “young people are actually still predominant-
ly oriented on pragmatic adaptation to requirements of the environment 
for the purpose of personal prosperity, by relying on individual and family 
resources, without worrying too much about large topics and problems of 
society” (Ilisin et al, 2013: p. 145). Still, in order to understand these find-
ings, they should be analysed within Croatian social and political reality. 
Paradoxically, in the years after joining the European Union in 2013, 
Croatia entered a politically and socially turbulent period. In less than 
a year, the government changed three times, numerous independent po-
litical and public institutions were censured or pacified, public discourse 
shifted towards neoconservative values, the sphere for progressive civil so-
ciety organisations shrunk, and several normative acts changed in order to 
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limit different minorities’ rights4. As demonstrated, young people on av-
erage are not as interested in greater societal and political occurrences and 
their actors which cannot be said vice versa. In other words, even though 
young people do not find radical societal actors important, young people 
are important to them because they wish to influence them. In Croatia, 
topics of young people and education are of great interest for various soci-
etal actors due to their importance for shaping (future) society. Both pro-
gressive and (neo)conservative social and political actors seek to influence 
curricula and young people in order to perpetuate and strengthen their 
values and points of views on society. Kovacic & Horvat (2016) in their 
book analyse civic competences of young people in Croatia and point out 
the progressive actors’ agenda to empower young people, teach them to 
think critically, and engage them in society and politics via quality im-
plementation of civic education in schools. Complementary, Petricusic et 
al. (2017: p. 69–70) point out that “the religious-political movement ob-
jects to the introduction of health and civic education programs in school 
curricula on the grounds that learning about sexuality in elementary and 
high schools is contrary to parental rights and interests of educating their 
children in accordance with their own value systems”. Latter actors are 
particularly important in the context of radicalisation due to their wish 
for fundamental and immediate change of society’s dominant values and/
or political regime which is how McLaughlin (2012) defines radicalism. 
Furthermore, both conservative and progressive actors consider the other 
one radical. Thus, one of the incentives for this research was to see what do 
young people understand as being radical and what is mainstream from 
their perspective. 
Methodological Framework
For that purpose, six focus groups, each consisting of nine questions, were 
conducted encompassing a total of 33 young people between the ages of 
15 to 30, from five Croatian cities and towns (Zagreb, Split, Šibenik, Sinj, 
Dalj), throughout May and June 2018. All focus groups were transcribed 
and analysed by using Nvivo software. Focus groups were used because 
this qualitative research method technique allows researchers to explore 
participants’ knowledge and experience in order to examine how they 
4 Petricusic et al. (2017: p. 69) in their text on the rise of the neoconservative movement in 
Croatia describe the hallmark of this movement, namely the “initiative ‘In the Name of 
the Family’ that managed to include the definition of marriage into the text of the Cro-
atian constitution as a union between a man and a woman. In this way they were able to 
create a constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage and the impossibility of marriage 
equality for LGBT individuals”
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think, construct reality, and why they think in that way (Kitzinger 1995). 
Considering the fact the main research question of this empirical study is 
to comprehend where the line between “radical” and “mainstream” is for 
young people and what does radicalism means for them, it was important 
to assure the platform for participants’ interaction. This aim is particularly 
relevant because it will assure researchers in the field of radicalism use it in 
a way that is in line with youth’s understanding of it. Therefore, the meth-
odological design built upon focus groups has been chosen. Furthermore, 
relying on previous studies which define radicalisation as context depend-
ent (e.g. Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018), and bear-
ing in mind that the studies on radicalisation almost exclusively deal with 
Western democracies and Muslims (see Della Porta & LaFree, 2012), we 
decided to conduct research in Croatia, a country that has a different con-
text from previously studied country cases. 
Since the starting point of the research was to study how young peo-
ple conceptualise the radical and the mainstream, both constructs were op-
erationalised into the focus groups’ questions, which can be seen in Table 
1. Participants were asked to assess general characteristics of Croatian so-
ciety and specifically the situation regarding themselves - young people. 
Additionally, they were asked to offer their conceptualisation of radical-
ism, both in the general public and youth specifically. 
Table 1. Operationalisation of the relevant constructs.
Mainstream Radical
How would you describe a good citizen? What 
characteristics does a typical/ordinary citizen 
have?
How would you describe a radical citizen? What 
characteristics should a radical citizen have?
Who is a typical/ordinary citizen in Croatian 
context? Describe one’s characteristics
Who is a radical citizen in Croatian context? 
Describe one’s characteristics
What does it mean to be a typical young person 
today?
What does it mean to be a radical young person 
today?
Results and Discussion
Being “between the hammer and the anvil” or struggling to exercise their 
autonomy and innovation by expressing their creativity in a setting where 
society has expectations from them to perpetuate existing value pat-
terns and societal norms, young people of today mature in a perplexed, 
confused, and hectic environment reinforced by uncertainty, prolonged 
economic dependence on their families, insufficient inclusion in deci-
sion-making, and growing disparities among the rich and the poor. Thus, 
the youth perception of the society they live in is an important insight for 
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sociologists and political scientists. Hence, by understanding their per-
ception one can analyse the position of young people in society, current 
developments and projections for future development of society, and the 
structure and constellation of societal values due to youth’s characteristic 
of being “one of the most sensitive seismographs of social change” (Ilisin 
et al, 2013: p. 9).
Results of the data obtained from the focus groups conducted 
with young people, point to some rather compelling findings (Table 2). 
Generally, young people are rather pessimistic when characterising society 
as well as themselves. Despite nominally claiming radicalism to be a neu-
tral concept, they in fact perceive it negatively, particularly when describ-
ing a radical young person. In continuation we analyse each set of charac-
teristics and discuss wider consequences of these findings for society. 
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It is no surprise young people believe Croatian citizens are relatively pas-
sive and apathetic. In public discourse there is an ongoing perception 
that the average Croatian citizen is disinterested, dissatisfied, or even lazy 
when it comes to standing up for society or themselves (Gvozdanovic & 
Bagic, 2015). Interestingly, young people very distinctively address pre-
vailing problems of Croatian society, namely corruption, nepotism, lack 
of responsiveness between the government and society, weak econo-
my, low salaries, etc. Young people claim the average citizen is aware of 
these problems but not ready to actively engage in changing their reality. 
When asked whom to blame for this, the unfavourable situation Croatian 
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society is in, they point to both passive and lazy citizens as well as the in-
competent government. 
One of the key elements of this apathy is certainly the lack of com-
petences that could motivate citizens to rebel in case they are not satisfied. 
One of the participants addressed it as follows:
I would like to emphasise one other thing; we love to talk a lot but we 
don’t have tools and means to act. We can sit and discuss for hours while 
having coffee but we don’t know how to act. (Zagreb)
Similarly, a participant from Dalj believes that there are mechanisms 
to raise one’s voice, but they are not used by Croatian people. 
We don’t do anything! Whatever will be, will be! They complain a lot 
about their bad situation but when there are protests organised about it, 
half of them don’t attend them, they are too lazy to appear, they just sit 
at home.
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim citizens in Croatia do 
not fight for their rights. However, young people believe these are relative-
ly isolated acts and when they exist they are connected with so-called sin-
gle-issue activism. Citizens in Croatia rebel when their (way of) life or the 
life of people close to them is being jeopardised. 
I would like to point out that here we are discussing the average citizen 
of the Republic of Croatia, and I don’t think they are not as active. In or-
der to activate this trigger [for activism] the life of this individual or one’s 
children has to be in danger. Furthermore, the percentage of people that 
have this trigger is small… (Zagreb)
All aforementioned circumstances make citizens prone to media ma-
nipulation. Media, according to young people, has an important role to 
educate citizens and yet it is providing useless information which pacifies 
citizens who stop following the news and retract into their private sphere. 
Our participants feel that this modus operandi is intentional, since politi-
cal elites prefer disengaged citizens who are not vigilant nor adequately in-
formed about the way the polity works. 
“Youth in the Chains of Society”
Another dimension studied in this research was self-perception. Young 
people were asked to describe themselves – young people in Croatia. The 
analysis of their responses confirms sociological insights that young peo-
ple are the mirror of society. Most of the attributed characteristics for cit-
izens can be applied to young people too. Young people describe their 
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generation as confused, anxious, impatient, disinterested, and unin-
formed. On top of that, young people are pliable and rarely engage in the 
deconstruction of certain processes and constructs but rather “go with the 
flow”.
A young person does not take any responsibility, we have one of the low-
est election turnout rates. (Sinj)
Generally, to be popular is the main goal right now, but there are ex-
ceptions; however, for most young people this is an imperative, to have as 
many followers as possible on Instagram…. As many “likes” as possible…. 
And if someone goes out on the weekends and does something like get-
ting drunk then everyone else feels they need to do the same. (Dalj)
The most convincing explanation for this situation is a system which 
is not responsive, nor recognising of the needs and potentials of young 
people. Due to their limited access to power, young people are much more 
dependent on the system than adult citizens, thus they feel the flaws of the 
system much more. For instance, a participant from Dalj summarised this 
problem very well by claiming that the scarcity of investment in young 
people makes young people disappear.
I think there are two things… there are… how to say two things…. There 
are no young people because there is no money and there is no money 
because the country is deteriorating. 
Contrary to citizens, young people are characterised as being full of 
potential. Despite this rather negative view of young people, participants 
believe young people in Croatia have certain potentials that could be used 
for the benefit of themselves and society. Participants once again pointed 
out that the state does not allow young people to express themselves and 
use the potentials they have. They offer some examples of young people 
who left Croatia and succeeded in their intentions due to a better system. 
But then what I see is that they have certain knowledge which is boring 
for them, which was not accessible before the internet. They have more 
opportunities and they are aware of them but I think they lack self-confi-
dence to use them. I dunno how to describe that… (Zagreb)
I believe that plenty of young people that go abroad to make some 
money for their future life if they’re gonna get married or something, 
they see that abroad is better because people are more fair and more kind 
and that the mentality is different than in Croatia. Perhaps they like that 
more, they decide to stay, find a job and have a good salary. (Dalj)
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To sum up, just as regular citizens, Croatian youth is facing the ills 
of contemporary Croatia. They react by retracting from the public sphere 
and ignoring potential means for active involvement in society and pol-
itics. This relatively gloomy picture of Croatian youth is to some extent 
mitigated by the perception of young people being full of potential; how-
ever, they need to be given a change to exercise it adequately. After getting 
the picture of an average (young) person in Croatia, our second goal was 
to see what it means to be a radical in Croatia and how this perception re-
lates to the mainstream.
“Radical vs. Mainstream”
The analysis of responses from participants shows that young people were 
able to do two things when conceptualising radicalism. First, they offered 
their view on radicalism by contrasting it with the mainstream, which is 
in agreement with our theoretical concept. Second, and rather impressive, 
young people managed to identify the roots of radicalism.
When asked to explain the term radical, participants understood it 
as a great change or a shift from the average. Thus, any oscillation from 
something that is widely accepted and widespread in society is, from the 
point of view of young people, radical.
The radical act is one that makes a great change, a turn from something that is 
the norm, a norm that one society decides to set. We can suppose that the norm in 
society in Croatia is centre-right, I don’t have any empirical evidence, but let’s just 
assume it is – society does not have any far-right attitudes but is more prone to ac-
cept them than the values from the left. However, there are some elements from the 
left that society embraces, for instance public services. Radicalisation is oscillation 
from that norm, that’s how I see a radical citizen. (Zagreb)
Firstly, I’ d set a hypothesis that a radical citizen is a person that diverges from the 
mainstream, for example that you are not in some liberal mainstream and have 
some conservative opinion – that you are a fascist, a Nazi. A radical citizen is 
someone like Željka Markić, who is Opus Dei. (Split)
Another example of a radical citizen is one on the other side of the ideological 
spectrum who does not care about anything apart from progressive values, such 
as LGBT rights, gender rights…. I think this is a bit premature for our country. 
(Split)
For radicals, it is important to have a certain set of values which cre-
ates solidarity within the group. 
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Having a set of values clearly organised is important. In other words, the system of 
values in which one believes in. Furthermore, the set of values as such has to have a 
hierarchical setup. (Zagreb)
Another interesting finding is that, nominally, young people char-
acterise radicalism as a neutral concept which can be filled with mean-
ing depending on the context, just as this participant from Zagreb claims: 
For me, for this is important to define what it means to be radical because, for me, 
this concept is not necessarily negative, it is neutral and being filled by negative and 
positive connotations. A certain type of radicalisation can be very useful if directed 
adequately, it can be productive for societal change and in some cases it is even nec-
essary. On the other hand, it can be very problematic when it is directed towards 
those at the bottom. If radicalisation is directed towards the top, towards the power 
structures then it is acceptable, but if it is directed towards the bottom, towards those 
who are weak then it is very problematic.
However, when we analysed later responses (even from partici-
pants who described radicalism neutrally), it is evident that our partic-
ipants view radicalism as in fact a negative occurrence. Attributed with 
reductionism, exclusion, lack of tolerance for others, and belief of superi-
ority of one’s set of values, for young people radicalism is unwanted. This 
claim is supported by their diagnosis of how radicalism is being created. 
According to participants the combination of reductionism and reaction 
to societal problems creates a radical response. Young people therefore see 
radicalism as a product of narrow-mindedness and a tainted system which 
is clearly a negative attribution of a concept.
A radical citizen is someone who looks only in one direction and sees nothing left or 
right and does not agree with other attitudes. He does not accept other opinions/at-
titudes and stubbornly pushes his head against the wall. It doesn’t matter in which 
direction this radical is looking, right or left, but he does not accept anything except 
his framework which is there since his childhood. (Split)
Radicalism is a consequence of not seeing the whole picture, not looking at the wider 
context, but only how your family has educated you. (Zagreb)
This discrepancy between the text and subtext is of a particular value 
because it shows that young people in fact reluctantly accept everything 
that diverges from the average or common. This clearly demonstrates that 
young people have “fallen into society’s trap”; they predominantly want to 
replicate existing social patterns and values and want less to enforce inno-
vation and creativity. The perception of young people is that everything 
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that challenges the status quo, no matter in which direction, is seen as 
radical. 
Lastly, young people were asked to define a radical young person. 
Here, again the negativity of the concept comes to play. Young people de-
scribed a radical young person as being enthralled, exclusive, and focused 
on goals rather than the means.
That’s the group of people that talks only among themselves. They have relatively 
similar opinions and every time this opinion reflects to themselves back and for-
ward. And if somehow another opinion shows up, the opposite from theirs then they 
will attack that person and just say: ‘ you’re a fool, what you think is idiotism’ and 
keep thinking what they were thinking before. (Split)
Some characteristics of a young radical is not allowing the intervention in their 
opinions or any shift from that. They might think it is, I dunno, OK to hit a wom-
an. (Zagreb)
I’ d say one is perhaps a bit ignorant because he/she accepts only one form of opinion 
and one type of information. (Sibenik)
For young radicals it is important publicly to express their attitudes 
and opinions. They are not quiet and wish to impose their point of view 
as dominant. 
They are very loud and like to draw attention to themselves. They try to be a loud 
minority because they believe that what they believe should be so. (Split)
As seen, young radical people are negatively characterised which is a 
rather peculiar situation. From the description of the mainstream young 
people believe the status quo is negative and thus it is plausible to expect 
that a radical young person in Croatia will be positively described, espe-
cially because youth is earlier described as being full of potential. However, 
this does not happen. Surprisingly, both mainstream and radical young 
people are viewed equally negative. One of the potential explanations for 
this is the worrisome epidemic of apathy and hopelessness among Croatian 
citizens and youth. This explanation is supported by the huge emigration 
rates of Croatian youth due to economic instability, ideological divisions, 
and ineffective government (Adamovic & Potocnik, 2018), coupled with 
the relatively low 88th position on the World Happiness Report for 2018 
(Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2018).
Discussion and Conclusion
Many authors have tried to define the phenomena of radicalisation and 
radicalism and their complexity resulted in many different concepts and 
k. bovan, m. kovačić, m. vučković ■ being mainstream, being radical ...
75
definitions. Most of these definitions have been conceptualised in the 
context of terrorist attacks in Western Europe and the US, while the in-
tention of this study was to investigate different forms of radicalism in a 
country without terrorist attacks, with the focus on young people. 
Encouraged with the unclear and confusing use of the term radical-
isation, the general lack of empirical studies on the topic of radicalisation 
(see Borum, 2011b; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010), and relying on the existing 
literature which suggests that young people have been particularly prone 
to radicalisation (Özerdem & Podder, 2011; Costanza, 2015), we conduct-
ed empirical research to reveal what young people in Croatia understand 
under the term “radical” and what they perceive as elementary character-
istics of radical individuals. To get these answers we conducted six focus 
groups among young people in Croatia. 
This rather new approach to studying radicalism resulted in sever-
al interesting observations. Firstly, our research confirmed that the radi-
calisation process is highly context dependent (Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; 
Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018). When giving some examples of radicals from 
their point of view, our participants recall politicians and different “ad-
vocacy” groups on the extreme right or extreme left political spectrum in 
Croatia. Although terrorist group ISIS has been recognised as an exam-
ple of radicals, our research revealed that terrorists in the Croatian con-
text, which luckily never suffered terrorist attacks, are not among the first 
associations with the term radical. Furthermore, when emphasising the 
importance of the context for explaining what is radical, authors under-
line the mainstream, i.e. the status quo, defining radical as a shift from 
that status quo (Neumann, 2013; Bartlett and Miller, 2012). Findings 
from our research immensely support this definition that sees radical as 
a shift from the mainstream. Following, from the point of view of young 
people in Croatia, any oscillation from something that is widely accept-
ed and widespread in society is, radical. As mainstream, or as a “norm” 
in society, they posit centre-right political beliefs and related sets of val-
ues. Consequently, as radical citizens they identify for instance politicians 
who do not fit into the “norm”, like Ivan Pernar, one of the leaders of left-
ist populist party Živi zid, or former politician and leader of green liberal 
party Orah, Mirela Holy.
Further, young people in Croatia describe as radical Željka Markić, 
the leader of the Croatian neoconservative movement “In the Name of 
the Family”, that among other things fights against marriage equality for 
LGBT individuals. Interestingly, while on the one hand they see Markić 
as radical, they also see as radical all those people who fight for LGBT 
rights! Protesting for LGBT rights or showing an LGBT flag as an act of 
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support, they also see as radical, because, as one respondent said, “that is 
a little bit too premature for our state”. Not only should the importance 
of context be emphasised here, but also what Schmid (2013) argues that 
no single ideology or position is universally radical, and that one can be 
a radical democrat in an authoritarian regime or a radical anti-democrat 
in a democratic regime; an extremist, a terrorist, or a defender of human 
rights (2013). Moreover, Onnerfors & Steiner (2018) find that mainstream 
and radical positions are mutually co-determined and can shift, which 
means that today’s “radicals” can be tomorrow’s “regulars”. In line with 
this notion our respondents provided an example of women rights activ-
ists who were identified as radicals at the time, while today young people 
in Croatia see as radicals those who offend women’s rights. 
Secondly, our findings revealed the presence of a corrosive apathy 
among Croatian youth. Young people described a typical young person in 
Croatia using negative terms, captured in the negativity and problems of 
the entirety of society. While one could expect that this could be fertile 
ground for radicals to bring change or a “shift from the status quo”, this 
does not happen. Surprisingly, both mainstream and radical young people 
are described as equally negative. Although young participants in our re-
search claimed that radicalism is not necessarily a negative term and that 
it depends on the context and content, obviously the “terminological ‘bag-
gage’” (Khalil, 2014: p. 199) was heavier and the negative connotation of 
the term prevailed. 
Feeling helpless in the chains of numerous problems in the state, 
young people in Croatia have fallen into corrosive apathy. Only single-is-
sue problems and personal involvement in a particular thing can motivate 
them to stand up and try to change what bothers them. But, most of the 
time, they feel deprived and abandoned by society, and yet, they are not 
ready to do anything to change that. It seems they just want to fit into ex-
isting norms and structures, and be part of the “status quo”. However, 
that would be perfectly understandable if they did not describe that same 
status quo as corrupted, lazy, missing cultural norms, poor, etc. Their ap-
athy is obviously strongly correlated with state affairs, because, on the 
one hand they are ready to leave the country and change their lives from 
the roots, whereas on the other hand, while in Croatia, they are not even 
ready to vote in elections. 
Thirdly, describing a radical young person as enthralled, exclu-
sive, as a public attention seeker, as someone who has a specific set of 
values, someone who is in solidarity with one’s group, and who favours 
Machiavellianism, and giving examples of radicals who do not use vio-
lence to achieve their goals, young people in Croatia confirmed that 
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radicalisation has many different faces and that it can be non-violent, as 
some scholars already stated (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Kundnani, 2012; 
Schmid, 2013). Our participants perceive radicalism as something that 
is omnipresent in different political spectrums in Croatia. Furthermore, 
many questions arise from our research: what are the causes and origins of 
radicalism in Croatia, how does the process of radicalisation start, where is 
the line between radical ideas and radical actions? Existing literature ded-
icated to radicalisation, published dominantly in the area of security stud-
ies, does not provide sufficient answers to our questions. Therefore, we be-
lieve that further research that will study radicalisation interdisciplinary 
in different research areas, in youth studies, cultural studies, media and 
communication studies, is not only necessary, but obligatory. Also, most 
scholars agree that radicalisation is always context related, hence, we be-
lieve more research should be conducted in different contexts and from 
different points of view. For example, a major issue in research on radical-
isation is the relationship between radical ideas and radical action. One 
way to think about this is to use the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 
2002), according to which behaviour is in part a result of an individual’s 
perception of social norms. Thus, the key aspect by which individuals turn 
their radical ideas into radical behaviour could be their perception of soci-
etal rules, dominant norms, and, of course, who occupies the mainstream 
and radical positions in society. 
Even though this research demonstrated several important insights 
about young people in Croatia and their relation to radicalism, there are 
still several caveats to it. Firstly, our sample consisted of 33 young people 
from Croatia, so our generalisation scope is limited. However, as our main 
goal was to investigate the concepts of mainstream and radical in more 
depth, this methodological design was chosen deliberately. Furthermore, 
the results of this research are in line with studies conducted on larger 
samples using quantitative approach. Even though this paper focused ex-
clusively on Croatia, being a single-case study, it is advisable to replicate 
this type of research in different contexts, as well as using a broader sam-
ple within Croatia. Secondly, the focus of this paper was not to study in-
dividuals that would be identified as radicals from the point of view of 
society, or from dominant approaches to radicalisation. Thus, we could 
not study the radicalisation processes or characteristics of such individ-
uals. However, the idea of this paper was to grasp the conceptualisation, 
perception, and notions about radicalism of young people in Croatia, 
which is in line with the relativistic and context-dependent approach to 
radicalism. 
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Finally, even though this paper did not provide a straightforward 
way of identifying radical individuals, its innovation lies in the fact that 
for the first time young people’s perceptions about radicalism were stud-
ied. Therefore, this paper should serve as a starting point for research-
ers particularly interested in non-violent radicalisation in non-Western 
contexts. 
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Violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism have become an in-creasing problem and threat in contemporary Europe. European countries and all relevant international organisations (UN, EU, 
OSCE, and NATO) identified terrorism and related radicalisation as a 
threat to national and international security. Presently, these countries are 
shaping or reshaping their policies and programs for monitoring radical-
isation, de-radicalisation, and countering terrorism. This has also necessi-
tated an increased scientific attention expressed in an increasing number 
of studies, books, and articles published in this field.
There is no universal definition of ‘radicalisation’ in the literature 
and in practice. In this paper, we define it as a complex process of adopting 
radical views by individuals and social groups about political or social prob-
lems, which can eventually lead to the use of extreme violence in the form 
of terrorism. This process is more or less hidden from the general public, 
but not in its end phase. Radicalisation is a problem predominantly be-
cause it may, at its evolutionary end point, lead to terrorism. In contrast, 
not all radicalisation processes lead to the use of violence for the purpose 
of achieving specific goals. As pointed out by Veldhuis and Staun (2009), 
some radicalisations can be linked with non-violent changes of the ex-
isting system. This means that we are actually worried more about those 
kinds of radicalisation where individuals, social groups, or entire societies 
1 This article was prepared with the support of the RadCePro project financed by the Slove-
nian Research Agency and the Ministry of the Interior.
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move from the peaceful solving of pressing conflicts to the use of illegal 
and extreme violence.
Terrorism as the end point of the radicalisation process refers to the 
use of extreme violence for the purpose of achieving political goals. Key 
characteristics of terrorist violence are human casualties, destruction, and 
fear. Most of the time terrorists cannot achieve their extreme goals, so 
spreading fear is also good enough for their purposes. A key form of ter-
rorism is the terrorist attack, and we can observe several forms of it, such 
as political murders or assassinations, kidnapping, hijacking of airplanes, 
ships, buses, etc., arson, bomb attacks (including the use of letter bombs, 
car bombs, or suicide bomb attacks), attacks on embassies and diplomats, 
shootings in public places, etc. Radicalisation may also end up in the use 
of the so-called special or nonconventional terrorism, such as chemical, bi-
ological, nuclear, and radiological terrorism. The motivation of terrorist 
actors in the direction of non-conventional terrorism is increasing due to 
their wish to perform more visible and influential events. Trends on the 
use of terrorist violence show increasing brutality, the primacy of innocent 
civilian targets and victims, connections with military presence in crisis 
areas, connections with migrations and inter-cultural and inter-religious 
relations, and a broadening of the spectrum of methods (such as the use 
of suicide terrorists in Europe, simultaneous attacks, use of vans, attacks 
on concerts, restaurants, media houses, etc.). The radicalisation end point, 
however, does not relate only to the execution of terrorist attacks. As Prezelj 
(2007: p. 81) argued, terrorism includes, besides carrying out attacks, also 
planning, organizing, and supporting terrorist activities. Additionally, ter-
rorism refers to threats with terrorism as well. This all means that terror-
ism is actually a very complex security and social problem.
After this explanation of the evolutionary end point of radicalisa-
tion, we should also define more precisely the relationship between terror-
ism and extremism. Terrorism is always an expression of extremism. The 
latter refers to an ideology of maximising own goals without consider-
ing the majority view. It also refers to activities that are far away from the 
normal persuasions, values, opinions, activities, strategies, etc. All exam-
ples of terrorism are a form of political extremism, though not all forms of 
political extremism are terrorism. Many extremists and even political ex-
tremists live in our world, but they are not considered as terrorists because 
they do not (or intend to) use violence to achieve their political goals. This 
means that terrorists are to be found among political extremists, but not 
all such extremists are terrorists. Additionally, several sources point to 
subjectivity or political nature of the labelling act of someone as extremist 
(see Bartoli and Coleman, 2003, etc.). 
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A study of radicalisation is necessary for preventing individuals and 
groups from pursuing the path towards using violence in solving their 
(perceived) problems. This paper aims to explain the process of Islamist 
radicalisation at the conceptual level, present the idea of Jihad, the related 
misuse of Islamic religious principles, and empirically explore the related 
propaganda process (especially the use of social media to attract and mo-
bilise potential terrorists). We argue in this paper that the basic element in 
the radicalisation story is a fight for the hearts and minds of the popula-
tion. The basic rule of the game is that the actor who attracts more popu-
lar support will prevail, and actually be able to define what is normal and 
what is radical.
This paper is structured in the following way. Firstly, we define the 
process of Islamist radicalisation, its aims and define one of its key pur-
poses: winning the hearts and minds of the general population to increase 
support for own goals. Secondly, we present and analyse the misuse of 
Islamic religious principles in the radicalisation process. In the last part of 
the paper, we explain the role of communication tools and propaganda in 
the radicalisation process. In this respect, the paper identifies typical ele-
ments of Islamist propaganda (especially used by al-Qaeda and ISIS), the 
role of social media, and the role of the online magazine Inspire. In conclu-
sion, we collect and verify evidence for our argument on winning hearts 
and minds.
Islamist Radicalisation towards Terrorism 
and the Struggle for Winning the Hearts and Minds 
of the Population
The existing literature defines several types of terrorism and related moti-
vations. This implicitly means that we have also several types of radicalisa-
tion. These types are different in terms of their goals and end points, but 
also share some similarities. In this respect, we distinguish among:
- Islamist radicalisation towards the use of violence for the establish-
ment of an Islamic religious state (caliphate), 
- Right-wing radicalisation towards the use of violence for establish-
ing a mono-ethnic and mono-religious state (e.g. Blood and Honour, 
Fuorza Nuova, Sturm 34, Soldiers of Odin), 
- Left-wing or anarchistic radicalisation with the use of violence 
against the existing capitalist systems and its symbols (e.g. Secours 
Rouge), 
- Secessionist or ethno-nationalistic radicalisation towards the use of 
violence to secede or to increase autonomy (e.g. IRA, ETA), and 
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- Single-issue radicalisation linked to solving specific problems 
through the use of violence (e.g. Animal Liberation Front, etc.).
Accordingly, Islamist radicalisation is a religion-related process of 
radicalisation towards the use of violence for achieving religious or pseu-
do-religious goals, such as the establishment of an Islamic religious state 
with the supremacy of Sharia law. Islamist radicalisation and the related 
terrorism have become the most pressing type of terrorism in Europe since 
9/11. As Laquer found out (2004: p. 29), such religious motivation has be-
come prevalent over the previously strongest ideological motivation. After 
a brief look at the history of radicalisation, we can see that Al-Qaeda has 
become a supreme organisational and motivational actor with global in-
fluence on the Islamist radicalisation process, and that ISIS successfully 
continued this work on the global level. The main aim of Islamist radical-
isation process has been to increase the number of supporters and members of 
terrorist or radical groups. This process has been based on recruiting vol-
unteers for Jihad in present conflict areas (Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Syria, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Lebanon, etc.), enabling these volunteers to get 
into conflict areas and return from there (foreign fighters and returnees), 
sending them to training camps in various countries (where they learn to 
shoot, assemble bombs, collect intelligence), etc. The radicalisation pro-
cess, however, does not lead only to the recruitment of fighters, it also fo-
cuses on the recruitment of people for several support roles.  
The whole radicalisation process is strongly based on the use of com-
munication tools and propaganda to increase membership, increase broad-
er support, and explain or excuse their violence. Accordingly, the radicals 
and terrorists increasingly use the internet, publish speeches of imams and 
other relevant persons, carry out and publish interviews, publish maga-
zines, produce movies and other multimedia materials, promise paradise 
for jihadists, etc. With ISIS, the radicalisation time has decreased, partic-
ipation in foreign conflict areas by the so-called foreign fighters has in-
creased and more elaborated communication strategies targeted to vari-
ous publics have been used. 
We need to understand that Islamist radicalisation is a process com-
posed of several phases. It starts with pre-radicalisation or moral outrage, 
interpretation and self-identification, internalisation or indoctrination, 
and mobilization by terrorist network or jihadisation (see Sageman, 2008: 
pp. 71–89). Islamist terrorist and radical actors need to capture the mind of 
individuals in this process or, in other words, need to win their hearts and 
minds. The more people captured this way, the more support and legit-
imisation for their actions will exist. The same is true for fight against 
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terrorism and anti-radicalisation measures (normally carried out by gov-
ernments). If the government, with its own interpretation of affairs, does 
not win the hearts and minds of the population, it can never win over ter-
rorists and radicals. This is one of the key elements of the so-called ‘smart 
counter-terrorism’ (see Prezelj, 2013). The question is why terrorism still 
exists despite successful counterterrorist operations. Why have dead or 
captured leaders been replaced by new leaders and new hubs? 
Part of the answer lies in the network structure of radical and ter-
rorist groups, which is quite adaptable and resistant to traditional forms 
of combat and law enforcement.  The other part of the answer relates to 
the support of the people. At this cognitive level (in the world of meaning 
and feeling), radical terrorist and counter-terrorist narratives and ideolo-
gies are competing to win the hearts and minds of the population. These 
facts have been confirmed by the counter-insurgency literature. For exam-
ple, Nagl (2005) clearly explained that there are two basic approaches in 
counter-insurgency: directly annihilating the insurgents (extremists, rad-
icals, and terrorists in our discussion), or indirectly turning the loyalty of 
the people. The indirect approach (in Mao Tse-Tung’s terms “to separate 
the fish from the water”) recognizes that while continuing to attack the 
armed elements of the insurgency, it is also essential to attack the support 
of the people for the insurgents. Such an indirect approach is rather differ-
ent from the direct approach, and in the long term is usually more effec-
tive. O’Neill  (2002) also stressed that several aspects of popular support 
need to be considered, such as active and passive support, the role of in-
tellectuals and the masses, and various techniques to gain support. Such a 
fight for the loyalty of the population is essentially political in nature, but 
is also inseparable from law enforcement and military activities. 
This leads us to the need to understand how Islamist radicals try to 
win the hearts and minds of the population, as well as to increase their 
membership. We will first look at how they handle religious principles, 
and then how they use propaganda.
Misuse of Islamic Religious Principles 
in the Radicalisation Process
Islamist radicalisation and terrorism does not exist without a religious 
basis. The basis comes from religious texts, and more precisely from spe-
cific interpretations of religious texts (see Capan, 2006; Esposito, 2003; 
Hartevelt Kobrin, 2010). The purpose of this chapter is to explain how in-
dividuals move from Islam to jihadi extremism and terrorism, and how 
they misuse related religious principles and texts.
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The story of Islam starts with its founder, Muhammad, who was 
born around the year 570 into the Quraysh tribe, which controlled the 
west Arabian town of Mecca. The tribe was known predominantly for 
trading, mainly because in Mecca there was a sacred stone (displayed in 
Kaaba), which was a pilgrimage destination (Donner, 2006: pp. 23–24). 
Around the year 610, Muhammad had his first revelation that he was a 
new, and the final, prophet of God. This was the start of Islam. Initially, 
his new beliefs weren’t accepted in the tribe, so he migrated to Medina in 
622, where he started to acquire followers and became a leader of “an au-
tonomous political community” (Donner, 2006: pp. 24-26). With his new 
base in Medina, he started to expand his power with a variety of methods 
(from negotiations, purchase, marriage, to raids and battles). This culmi-
nated in 630 when he managed to conquer Mecca, and with this he be-
came the unchallenged political leader of Western Arabia and played the 
role of a monotheist prophet (Donner, 2006: pp. 27–29).
When Muhammad died in 632, the Muslim community (Ummah) 
was left without a leader (both as political and religious group). They start-
ed to collect his teachings and revelations, which resulted in the forma-
tion of Quran (Gilliot, 2006: pp. 44-45). Additionally, they also preserved 
the memories of the first-generation Muslims of Muhammad’s teach-
ings, deeds, and life; this collection is known as Hadith. Based on the 
Quran and Hadith, Muslims created their law (Sharia) (Gabriel, 2002: 
pp. 25–26).
One of more important concepts that was formed already in his life-
time is also that of jihad:
Jihad as struggle pertains to the difficulty and complexity of living a 
good life: struggling against the evil in oneself in order to be virtuous 
and moral, making a serious effort to do good works and to help to re-
form society. Depending on the circumstances in which one lives, it can 
also mean fighting injustice and oppression, spreading and defending 
Islam, and creating a just society through preaching, teaching, and, if 
necessary, armed struggle or holy war. (Esposito 2003: p. 28)
Knapp defines jihad as a “struggle or striving (in the way of God) or 
to work for a noble cause with determination; it does not mean holy war” 
(war in Arabic is harb and holy muqadassa). Hadith explains jihad as an 
“armed action,” while classical period theologians and jurists saw it as an 
obligation in a military sense (Knapp, 2003: pp. 82–83). 
Later, Islamic scholars defined four different ways how a Muslim is 
to perform Jihad: by his heart (to combat the Devil inside), his tongue and 
hands (both through supporting the right cause and correction of wrong), 
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and by war. Muhammad considered the first way as “the most important 
type of jihad” (Schwartz-Barcott, 2004: p. 271).
Already during Muhammad’s lifetime the expansion of Islamic rule 
was becoming more and more aggressive. Gabriel (2002: 31) wrote that 
“the Quranic revelations in Mecca talk about peace and cooperation with 
others. But in Medina, Muhammad became a military leader and invad-
er, so the revelations in Medina talk about military power and invasion 
in the name of Islam (jihad).” This resulted in the belief that Islam has to 
be spread with military action and not (only) through a just society: “The 
religious justification made for a jihad to propagate the word of God and 
the just reign of God’s will for all humanity” (Esposito, 2003: pp. 32–33). 
To participate in the jihad, you must be selected by the Imam (or his 
delegate) and also meet some requirements. The obligation to participate 
in jihad is defined by Knapp as follows: 
Jihad was not generally understood as an obligation of each individual 
Muslim (known as fard’ayn), but as a general requirement of the Muslim 
community (fard kifaya). Only in emergencies, when the Dar al-Islam2 
comes under unexpected attack, do all Muslims have to participate in 
jihad. Under normal circumstances, therefore, an individual Muslim 
need not take part so long as other Muslims carry the burden for all the 
defending of the realm.” (2003: pp. 83–84)
Furthermore, such military jihad must be waged for “justifiable rea-
sons,” and can also be “invoked in order to justify offensive operations 
in distant lands, to suppress and punish dissent, secession, and rebellion” 
(Schwartz-Barcott, 2004: pp. 272–273). 
Knapp (2003: p. 83) also specifies that jihad (in general) has a politi-
cal aim, which is the drive to establish a single, unified Muslim realm, and 
which justified Islam’s suppression of other faiths and allowed for the cre-
ation of a just political and social order. 
At the latter time, with the creation of modern states and the in-
ability to perform the military jihad, the goals of a just and fair socie-
ty (according to the Muslim interpretation) were tried by people to ac-
complish their goals through political process. This political movement is 
known as Islamism, which is focused on finding “empowerment and jus-
tice” for Muslims. But the political and economic decline led to the for-
mation of several extremist and radical responses from different political 
2 Sharia divides world in two hemisphers: dar al-Ismam(m) (land of Islam) and dar al-harb 
(land of war). The first is territory under Muslim control and rule, while the second con-
sists of all the states and communities outside the world of Islam; inhabitants of this world 
are known as infidels or unbelievers (Schwartz-Barcott, 2004: p. 270).
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and ideological camps. Combined with contemporary nationalist, social-
ist, and secular causes, this radical Islamism led to modern Islamist ter-
rorism. It strives to achieve a just (Muslim) society across the globe by us-
ing violent means (Azzam 2006: p. 1121). This is where the misuse of Islam 
starts in order to excuse the use of illegal violence.
Islamist jihadi terrorism can achieve its goals by basing its ideolo-
gy and motivation on Islamic religious teachings, or more correctly, on 
their interpretation of the Quran and Hadith (Capan, 2006; Esposito, 
2003; Hartevelt Kobrin, 2010; Taheri 1987; Kocjančič and Prezelj, 2015). 
According to Brachmann (2009), this is accomplished through three ba-
sic treatises of the global jihadist doctrine: 1) Muslims need to fulfill their 
religious commitment, 2) they should refrain from the modern interpre-
tation of Sharia and return to the original interpretation, and 3) Muslims 
need to love everything that leads to Allah and combat everything that 
hinders that. 
Several different studies (Halverson, Furlow and Corman 2012; 
Singh and Perry 2010) clearly showed that leading jihadists use quotes from 
the Quran and/or Hadith to justify their terrorist activities. This is done 
through manipulation and/or selective usage of Quranic verses. 
Halverson, Furlow, and Corman (2012) examined more than 2,000 
extremist texts, which were created between 1998 and 2011, and discov-
ered there is a disproportionate use of surahs (chapters) from the later 
Medinan over the earlier Meccan period. This is mostly because Medinan 
surahs represent “the onset and completion of military conflict between 
earliest Muslims and the ‘pagan’ clans of Mecca and their allies.” They 
were also surprised that Islamist extremist don’t use the most violent or 
militant verses, but are focused on themes of victimisation, dishonor, and 
retribution, which show close integration with the rhetorical vision of 
Islamist extremists. 
One notable example of militant verse is the so-called “Sword Verse” 
(9:5), which states: 
And when the forbidden months have passed, kill the idolaters wherever 
you find them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in 
wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe 
Prayer and pay the Zakat, then leave their way free. Surely, Allah is Most 
Forgiving, Merciful. 
The Islamist terrorists will predominantly use only the first part of 
the verse, which calls to the killing and enslavement of unbelievers, while 
they will omit the second part, which mandates peaceful coexistence (un-
der some terms). Furthermore, jihadist ideologists like to use Quranic 
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verses that speaks about salvation, the defense of Islam, and striving to-
wards a worldwide Islamist society. This political-religious goal is based 
on the radicalisation of masses that want to subdue other countries with 
the ultimate goal of creating the Islamic caliphate. To accomplish this goal, 
they deliberately misuse Quranic texts and Sharia law and propagate their 
vision of “true” Quranic understanding through their propaganda system. 
Their propaganda is based on the belief that the Muslim community as a 
whole is under (constant) attack from non-believers, and the only way to 
solve this, is to wage war (e. g. terrorism) against Western countries (see 
Kocjančič and Prezelj, 2015: pp. 311–313).
Role of Islamist Propaganda in the Radicalisation Process 
Radicalisation process contains elements of propaganda, but in some-
what specific circumstances. Winning the hearts and minds of new sup-
porters and even the general population can also be a result of typical prop-
agandistic approaches. Daugherty and Janowitz (in Malešič et al., 1997: 
p. 32) described propaganda as “a planned dissemination of news, infor-
mation, special arguments, and appeals designed to influence the beliefs, 
thoughts, and actions of a specific group.” Propaganda is actually a mul-
ti-layered and complex phenomena, and in this paper we can examine 
only one of its models. According to Malešič (see Malešič et al., 1997: pp. 
39–47), the study model of propaganda consists of elements that are di-
rectly connected to propaganda message (such as ideology expressed as na-
tionalism, religion or (re)interpretation of history, routine lies, collective 
and selective memory loss, classic or hard propaganda, and anti-propagan-
da), indirectly connected with a propaganda message (such as the use of 
language, source criticism, iconography, compatibility of visual and tex-
tual information, (de)construction of the national memory, and specify-
ing who is “the Other”), while there is also an environmental aspect of 
the message. The latter consists of the context of propaganda, the pub-
lic for propaganda, the propagandist, and the structure of the propagan-
da organisation.
Lakomy (2017: pp. 39–40) perceives Islamist propaganda as sophis-
ticated, well-thought-out threats to stability, and the safety of states. It is 
a part of psychological warfare aimed towards the Western world, which 
simultaneously also has to gain support from Islamist groups from this 
Western world.
The foundations for modern Islamist propaganda were laid by al-Qa-
eda and ISIS. Islamic propaganda is labelled as modern, where moderni-
ty refers to the fact of being predominantly disseminated through the so-
cial networks on the Web 2.0. Suitable, recruitable demographic groups 
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now exist only few clicks away from the propaganda source. This improves 
the chances for recruitment of new members of terrorist groups in ways 
previously seen only in case of propaganda by some nation states. ISIS’s 
use of the internet for propaganda purposes reflects a very professional 
approach, resulting in an increase in the reach of messages, and conse-
quently in the recruitment of new members (worldwide and not only in 
the Middle East). Dissemination of propagandistic messages through so-
cial networks is additionally appealing because of the use of online media 
and the simplicity of access (Taylor, 2017). 
The propaganda strategies of al-Qaeda and ISIS have actually been 
intertwined. They have many common characteristics. Allison Smith and 
her colleagues (in Cohen, Kruglanski, Gelfand, Webber and Gunaratna, 
2016: p. 144) studied the content of propagandistic material of several vi-
olent Islamist extremist groups. They discovered that the main points of 
propaganda material are based on the emphasis of in-group righteousness, 
morality, and civility. Al-Qaeda liked to use positive emotion words in its 
messages and in the speeches of its leaders (Osama bin Laden and Ayman 
al-Zawahiri), such as “happy,” “joy,” “love,” etc. Positive emotion words 
were actually used more frequently than negative emotion words, such as 
e.g. “awful,” “cry,” “hate,” and anger words (e.g. “kill,” etc.)  (Pennebaker 
and Chung, 2007: p. 5). An important element of Al-Qaeda’s propaganda 
material is also violence. Through violent content, the group gains access 
to even wider audiences and realises the group’s main objective – gain-
ing new activists, winning hearts and minds among the Muslim popula-
tion, awakening sympathy in parts of the audience, and terrorizing the en-
emies – who have to begin to seek surrender. The ideology in propaganda 
by al-Qaeda is strictly religious, since the group wanted to be a sole repre-
sentative of global Jihad (Jordan, Torres and Jeep, 2005). 
The religious ideology of al-Qaeda has performed like a glue, which 
held together the entire terrorist group, not only on a local scale, but on a 
global one as well. A strong ideology, which translates through the propa-
ganda of the group, is also needed because of the apparent out-numbering 
by the majority population. The ideology also serves as a motivational fac-
tor, and strict interpretations of Quran are helpful. In the case of al-Qae-
da, the ideology has been always internationally oriented and filled with 
the attempts of contextualising local conflict as parts of global struggles. 
But this is not enough for speeding up the whole radicalisation process. 
Dehumanisation of the enemy is often portrayed in propagandistic messag-
es, and it became one of the key factors of rapid radicalisation towards vi-
olence. This way, the ideology can have a deeper impact, since the enemy 
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and the victims become symbols, and not humans made out of flesh and 
blood. 
The al-Qaeda propaganda began to flourish when the above identi-
fied propagandistic elements were spread to a broad spectrum of internet 
users all around the globe. The group actually started using the internet 
for propagandistic dissemination in a similar way as modern states do or 
could do. Dissemination of messages was quick and global. Literacy barri-
ers, created by the Arab illiteracy, were transcended by the mixture of au-
dio-visual messages (Rabasa et al., 2006: p. 16). 
By the year 2006, Al-Qaeda operated more than 4,000 websites used 
for different purposes, such as attracting new members (beginning of the 
radicalisation process), communication among the core of the group and 
its periphery, fundraising, and planning of new and improved attacks, etc. 
(Rabasa et al., 2006: p. 18). Terrorist groups also used websites for public-
ly claiming their responsibility for the past attacks. One such website was 
revolutionmuslim.com. This website acted like a hub with links to other 
social platforms where individuals could start or proceed their online rad-
icalisation. The hub included links to YouTube (links to at least six chan-
nels), Facebook, Scribd, PalTalk, Slideshare, and BlipTV. One of the great-
est achievements of this hub, if we can say so, was introduction of “e-zine” or 
online magazine named Inspire. To this day, there have been 17 record-
ed issues of this magazine. The man behind the dissemination of Inspire, 
in its early issues, was Anwar al-Awlaki, sometimes dubbed as: “the bin 
Laden of the internet.” He was also well known for online sharing of his 
audio tapes and literature. He was also seeking connections with poten-
tial new terrorist members and sympathisers through the comments sec-
tions on his blog posts (Klausen, 2016: pp. 31–34). 
On the other hand, propaganda by ISIS became much more com-
plex and multi-faceted than the one by al-Qaeda. ISIS also used violence 
as a theme of its propaganda messages. ISIS actually turned out to be a 
much more brutal terrorist organisation than al-Qaeda, resulting in even 
more brutal messages (e.g. more video materials showing decapitations of 
hostages, shooting of prisoners in front of their freshly dug graves, disfig-
ured bodies of enemies, etc.). Flames of War, an ISIS movie from 2014, is a 
good example of incorporation of all above mentioned factors. The movie 
shows a symbolic image of the ISIS fighter on the one hand and also a very 
brutal message to their enemies on the other hand. ISIS fighters are shown 
as good, moral, and cheerful human beings, who defeat the opposing side 
in a battle. The lives of these fighters have meaning in an attractive way. 
These “good” and “moral” men as fighters show no mercy when it comes 
down to captured prisoners. The movie uses an example of such prisoners 
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who were punished for their disgraceful acts (i.e. fighting against ISIS). 
They had to dig their own graves and the movie ends with the prisoners’ 
mass murder, with their bodies falling into shallow graves. Such propa-
ganda tools can have a very strong pull and push effect for potential candi-
dates for radicalisation and Jihadisation, and also strong deterrent effects 
on all people who disagree with ISIS.
Gartenstein-Ross, Barr and Moreng (2016: p. 15) found three core 
messages in ISIS propaganda:
- Successful restoration of the caliphate by ISIS, making it the only 
authentic Islamic state on the globe; 
- A message that ISIS is the only legitimate Islamic organisation in the 
world, from theological, legal, and political points of view, therefore 
it nullifies existing governments, rival Jihadi organisations, and also 
political Islamic groups; 
- A message that ISIS is more capable and unified than al-Qaeda ever 
was.
These messages show that a terrorist group leads its propaganda ef-
forts not only against its direct enemies, but also against its Islamic rivals 
as well. The propaganda is made in a way to attract potential followers and 
recruits, and to radicalize them further towards the use of violence.
The question in the present information age is also what role mod-
ern social information media plays in the radicalisation process. Modern 
social information networks are based on websites and applications that 
enable users to create and share content or to participate in social net-
working (Oxford Dictionary, 2018). Social media represent a group of in-
ternet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological 
foundations of the Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of 
any user-generated content. Forms of social media are scattered across not 
only Facebook and Twitter, but across internet forums, message boards, 
product-review websites, blogs, open editable contents and websites 
that share picture and video material. Such examples include Facebook, 
Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, YouTube, Wikipedia, Second Life, etc. 
(Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: p. 61).
All these social media platforms can be used and misused by the ter-
rorist and radical groups, as propagandistic messages can easily be spread to 
great numbers of recipients. Additionally, as stated by Taylor (2017), propa-
ganda dissemination through the internet, offers anonymity on high lev-
els, as well quick site relocation, which lowers risks of apprehension by law 
enforcement. Hegghammer (2016: p. 163) identified several potential ben-
efits of internet (mis)usage by Jihadi terrorist groups: speed, cheapness, 
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globalist character, and the fact it is more expansive than analogue alter-
natives. Therefore, the internet is a more affordable platform for propa-
ganda distribution, recruitment, fundraising, reconnaissance, and opera-
tional coordination than any other existing means. Khosrokhavar (2017: 
p. 57) added that the internet actually represents “an instrument that am-
plifies the capacity for violence in radical people or groups by allowing 
types of communication that forgo rigid structures and face-to-face meet-
ings.” It can even be said that in the today’s society terrorist groups would 
not exist (at least not on a scale they do) without the use and presence of 
social media. 
Figure 1: Radicalisation process and propaganda
Example of the Magazine Inspire
In this sub-chapter, we present and briefly analyze an example of radi-
calisation and propaganda tools, called Inspire. Inspire has been one of 
the main magazines published by Islamist radicals spread over the inter-
net to large masses in different continents, including to Western Europe. 
Inspire is an English-language magazine published by al-Qaeda of Arab 
Peninsula (AQAP). ISIS has been publishing a similar online magazine 
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called Dabiq. We also have other magazines published in the past, such as 
Jihad Recollections with a few issues in 2009. 
Inspire is an online magazine that is published irregularly. The latest 
issues are Summer 2017 (17), Autumn 2016 (16), Spring 2016 (15), Autumn 
2015 (14), Winter 2014 (13), etc. This means we cannot predict publishing 
date of new issues of the magazine. But, all new issues will be available on 
the internet for all interested radicals.
Propagandistic radicalisation moves can be found in all 17 issues of 
Inspire magazine. In the last issue from 2017 (pages 14–16), author Hamza 
Usama bin Laden gives advice to anyone who intends to carry out a “mar-
tyrdom operation.” Below, we added our comments in parentheses to ex-
plain broader characteristics of the radicalisation move. In the beginning 
of the article, the author asks Allah for mercy upon all the great martyrs, 
who already committed attacks for Ummah (move of glorification of 
the extreme act, legitimisation by referring to Allah). The article is writ-
ten in story-like style, full of words like: noble knight, the greatest of vir-
tues, glory, worship, blessed operation, etc. (this creates an attractiveness 
and desire to be a part of this process). Allah is also dubbed as the great-
est of protectors3 for whom, the martyr has to do the best deeds. Only in 
this way Allah will have a good opinion of the future terrorist (this cre-
ates an illusion that there is only one way and nothing else). The future 
terrorist has to prioritise his targets and the article identifies the follow-
ing prioritised targets: people who violate “pure” religion of jihadists and/
or the prophet, Jews, American crusaders, if unable to find Americans, 
NATO member states crusaders, and Russians for their interference in 
matters of Islam (this represents an operationalisation of effort and an at-
tempt to direct the radicalised person). The author stressed that when at-
tacking these targets the terrorist has to convey the message of the “bless-
ed operation” through the media. The intent of the attack must be well 
known to the masses (this serves to spread the message on its purpose, 
and also to spread the fear to the broader audience). If a radicalised per-
son follows this advice, the propaganda circle is completed. A person was 
attracted, motivated and persuaded, directed and his/her act was trans-
mitted to many different publics by various media (multiplication of the 
impact). Additionally, a successful attack by such a person will likely be 
documented and consequently serve to create new propagandistic mate-
rial for new recruits. This is why Inspire also reports in detail about some 
3 Followed by the lines from Quran: “If Allah is your helper, none can overcome you. And if He 
forsakes you, who is there after Him who can help you? ” [3: 160]
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past successful terrorist attacks. These reports include explanation on the 
why and how these attacks were carried out. 
A person that calls himself Sheikh Hamd bin Hamoud Al-Tameemy 
sums up the target selection in one of the magazines published in 2017. He 
published it in a part of the magazine called “Ruling of the Lone Jihad” 
(this part reflects the wish to influence lone wolves, that is people who 
radicalise by themselves using such literature). He claims, that it is way 
easier to target the “so-called male civilians” in comparison to military 
targets. The latter expect own casualties while the former (civilians) do 
not. He also points out that attacks on civilians will ignite more fear, and 
that fear will spread among the entire population and not only within 
the military personnel. The same person described categories of the target 
civilian population in an issue of Inspire from 2016. He divided civilian 
non-Muslim population in four different categories (the first three cate-
gories are protected by Sharia law):  
- non-believers who have peace agreements of ceasing fight with 
Muslims, 
- non-Muslims who live under the rule and protection of Islam, 
- protected non-Muslims, and
- ‘combatant non-believers’ also dubbed as infidels. 
Every Muslim has the “right” to fight these non-believers (the last 
category above) at any given time and at any given place, claims the au-
thor. This was followed by the lines from Quran: 
And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wher-
ever you find them and capture them and besiege them, and sit in wait 
for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish 
prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiv-
ing and Merciful. And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they 
fight against you collectively.
And additional lines were also included: 
And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wher-
ever they have expelled you.
Content of Inspire magazine can be distributed in two different pil-
lars. The first pillar consists of articles that sum up the main events since 
the last issue (official statements and Inspire reactions), personal informa-
tion about terrorists who committed attacks (sometimes dubbed as ‘mar-
tyrs’), interviews with influential people in al-Qaeda, guidance about tar-
get selection and lifestyle, and specific instructions for homemade IEDs 
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(improvised explosive devices) and other devices with which one can harm 
civilians. The second pillar consists of themes that are part of the everyday 
lives of perpetrators. These are mainly recommendations for future perpe-
trators (sometimes dubbed as ‘martyrdom seekers’), on how to overcome 
the fear in Jihad, including the quotes by influential al-Qaida members to 
be followed (entitled “Words of Wisdom”), etc. 
Specifically, the entire Inspire content is divided into several sections.
- Editor’s letter. In the beginning of every issue, the editor, called by 
the name Yahya Ibrahim, shortly sums up the entire issue. The sum-
mary is full of advertising of Jihadi ideas. The language is strongly 
anti-American4, and it advises potential recruits and radicals to car-
ry out attacks in the future;
- The second rubric consists of statements about the US military raids 
and own operations by the Mujahedeen martyrs. In cases of mili-
tary operations done by the United States, Inspire offers condolenc-
es to Muslim brothers and glorifies lost martyrs. Executed terrorist 
attacks against civilians are praised under the term “blessed oper-
ations.” Statements are full of praise, congratulations, and Quran 
verses, and Arabic poetry. Perpetrators are elevated into heroes, who 
fulfilled their promises (“when the heroes were assigned, they acceded 
to,” “they promised and fulfilled,” “congratulations to you,” “o Ummah 
of Islam, for this vengeance that has soothed our chests”). 
- The rubric called “Words of Wisdom.” In some 100 words, influen-
tial al-Qaeda members (dead or alive) are quoted. Usama bin Laden 
has been quoted in the 17th issue of the magazine, even though he 
had been killed in a military operation led by the United States in 
year 2011. Therefore, the cult of personality outlives these main fig-
ures of terrorist organisations. His quote addresses future perpetra-
tors and radicals: “. . . in front of you is a great opportunity to resist this 
oppression and tyranny that has for decades been upon you. . .” In some 
cases quotes from influential people in terrorist world are backed up 
by lines from Quran as described already above. 
- The rubric called “Open Source Jihad.” This part of the magazine 
gives specific instructions how to build weapons at home, such as 
IEDs. It also describes how to create damage (mainly to economy) 
4 In his letter in the beginning of the issue 15 (spring 2016), the editor has stressed the dis-
ruption United States created in the Middle East. He stated that the United States are 
“exhausting and weakening the Sunni population, so it can not enjoy living a free life under 
Sharia.” He also claimed that politics of United States is cowardly and “dirty,” because it is 
unable to confront Muslims directly on the ground. He also claimed that Democrats are 
smilingly stabbing Muslims in the back, while the Republicans openly kill them.
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and cause victims (mainly civilians). In the issue number 17, there 
is a 20-page long instruction on how to assemble a homemade train 
derailment tool (the entire issue is about public transport, specifical-
ly about public railway systems). In their words, this form of weapon 
distinguishes itself from others because it is: 
easy to design; operation is not martyrdom operation, thus it can be re-
peated; easy to hide your tracks from forensics /…/, causes great impact 
on the economy; the enemy is confused /…/ new kind of attack; security 
agencies will be puzzled and confused to find a solution. 
 Some other issues offer instructions how to build pressure cook-
er bombs, explosives for home assassinations (parcel bombs, door 
trap bombs, and magnetic car bombs), timed hand grenades, hidden 
bombs made with simple kitchen materials, etc. 
- As we can see, the radicalisation process stimulated by Inspire mag-
azine is multi-layered. Not only it describes the “How to?” it also 
describes the “Why?” and “Who?”. Every gruesome act that a fu-
ture terrorist should commit is supported by verses from the Quran, 
which in the view of authors and editor adds to the credibility of the 
article and the whole terrorist action. 
Conclusion
This paper argued that the basic point of Islamist radicalisation process is 
to win the hearts and minds of people. We can confirm this argument and 
give the following explanation how this is done in the Islamist radicalisa-
tion process. We found out that radicalisation is a vital process for a radi-
cal or terrorist social group because it enables them to obtain future mem-
bers, fighters, and supporters. Youngsters are more vulnerable to such a 
process than older people. Especially critical is the misuse of Islamic reli-
gious texts as an excuse or legitimisation to use violence for achieving very 
narrow political aims. The next stage is the extensive use of propaganda, 
especially through the internet and social media. The cases of al-Qaeda 
and ISIS show that the hearts and minds of the population can be won by 
indiscriminately using attractiveness (carrots) and threats (sticks) in the 
propaganda process. The main factors of propaganda by terrorist groups 
that affect radicalisation are selective memory, amplification of certain 
messages, creation of an illusion of supreme Islamic truth and supreme re-
ality, claiming responsibility for attacks, misuse of religion and specific re-
ligious texts, the mobilisation into an attractive and important endeavor, 
extortion, the dehumanisation of enemies, threats, etc. 
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Based on this, we can describe Islamist propaganda as the preme-
diated spread of messages to potential targets, sympathisers, members 
of terrorist organizations, and their enemies through online social plat-
forms and traditional media with the intention of winning the hearts 
and minds or deterring the enemy. The latter is easily done by showing 
merciless violence (e.g. beheadings, shooting people in front of cameras, 
etc.). Additional lessons from the magazine Inspire confirm that messag-
es of attraction and messages of violence are simultaneously combined 
in an Islamic propaganda approach. Each number of this magazine in-
cludes messages of glorification of the brave acts, legitimisation using re-
ligious quotes, a desire to be a part of a violent Islamist Jihad, the oper-
ationalisation of desire to help by identification of potential targets, etc. 
Messages that there is no other alternative are also involved. The radical-
isation approach also takes care about publicizing preparation and execu-
tion of attacks, and uses such messages for spreading fear, getting support, 
and teaching new radicals how to attack. Additionally, Islamist propagan-
da involves specific instructions how to build explosive devices and oth-
er weapons at home. All this is done in combination with Arabic poetry, 
Quran verses, and instructions how to overcome fear, descriptions of he-
roic brothers who killed many people, etc.
The question is how to fight such the multi-layered process of radi-
calisation, especially at the point of our highest vulnerability: youngsters. 
Schools, families, and social networks play a crucial role here. Families pro-
vide children their primary socialisation, where children are taught to dis-
tinguish right from wrong. The socialisation of children in schools should 
also focus on talking about the presently taboo theme – the radicalisa-
tion of youngsters. Children should be educated about radicalisation, es-
pecially about online radicalisation, and extreme violence, and the same 
goes for teachers and social workers. The educational system should per-
ceive radicalisation process as a reality. From this standpoint, many work-
shops and lectures should be held for youngsters, where the consequenc-
es of radicalisation process would be shown. More studies with the best 
and worst practices should be conducted and publicly presented, teachers 
should be more careful about deviations from normal behavior in class-
rooms and in public, and the presence of the above analyzed propaganda. 
We also need more comparative studies on radicalisation and de-radicali-
sation. The de-radicalisation process should also aim to win the hearts and 
minds of population, and therefore use all possible media and education-
al tools to present alternative narratives. Schools should be able to identify 
early indicators of Islamist or any other radicalisation with groups of kids 
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or, even more importantly, lonely individuals. This is a difficult task that 
will require further research in this field.
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When addressing radicalism a problem occurs at the very begin-ning – in terms of the unclear definition of the subject under examination. Usually, the problem begins with vague defini-
tions that are too broad or inadequate in other ways. As pointed out by 
Đorić (2016), expert elaborations tend to contain three kinds of errors in 
this respect: the use of synonyms, voluntarist qualifications and disregard 
of the difference between the general and specific. A superficial use of syn-
onyms often leads to the equalisation of terms, such as populism, right-
wing radicalism, extremism, neo-fascism, ultra-radicalism, terrorism, and 
so on.
Most often the voluntarist approach uses radicalism as a stigma 
in political discourse, and this occurs in two ways: for disqualification, 
where the designation of radicalism is used as a label of inferiority to de-
marcate competitive ideas or groups; or the same designation can serve 
as an “orientation” criterion of the analysis in which the term radicalism 
serves to qualify the extreme poles of the relationship between the left and 
the right wings, in order to more easily discern the nuances between dif-
ferent competitive actors in the political space. This is not always wrong, 
because such an “orientation” use is not necessarily without an analyti-
cal value, but it can only be realised under three conditions: if the con-
cept of radicalism is clearly defined, if it is consistently applied, and at the 
same time empirically supported. If this is not the case, and only one of 
these conditions is absent, we have slipped into voluntarism. There is a 
Factors of Radicalization
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current example: in Slovenia, as elsewhere in Europe, this “orientation” 
confusion typically presents us with the problem that I am going to de-
scribe in the rest of this paragraph, and that was most clearly visible after 
the parliamentary election, in Slovenia in 2018, when the governing coa-
lition was composed of numerous heterogeneous and small political par-
ties. Despite the explicit, substantive as well as declarative competitive-
ness of all political parties that managed to enter Parliament, their only 
common characteristic was in the unified qualification of the one new-
ly-formed party (established in June 2017) called the Left (Levica). Only 
because no other party (in Slovenia) was located even farther left from it, 
this political party has been considered the “extreme left” by all political 
actors and most of the media, although neither in its programme nor its 
actions has there been anything that would distinguish the Left from the 
classical social-democratic parties that existed for most of the 20th centu-
ry.1 The third case of erroneous designation occurs through blurring the 
difference between the general and the specific; this shift often leads to 
the hasty equalisation of radicalism with terrorism, merely due to the as-
sumption that any terrorism is at the same time also radicalism (which it 
is) – but the reverse is not always true. Not every form of radicalism ad-
vocates the use of terrorism, as the first is a general concept, while the sec-
ond is a specific one (by analogy with fruit/apple, building/house, justice/
equality, etc.). This supports the point that one of the biggest problems 
in examining radicalism and extremism “lies in the fact that these social 
phenomena are dynamic and, in order to be analysed in a scientifically ob-
jective manner, they must be examined in the specific temporal, spatial 
and socio-political context” (Đorić, 2016: p. 215).
Modernisation and Pluralism
In addressing the subject in the title, I will consider this general warning 
expressed in three more concrete points:
1 It is true, however, that the Left party is more to the left than its most proximate competitor, 
that is, the Social Democrats party [Socialni demokrati], after the latter’s once social-democratic 
profile was diluted by the party’s declared, decisive and actual move to the political centre, 
where now (in Slovenia) most parliamentary parties try to hold their positions. There are 
two reasons for the Social Democrats’ turn to the right in the past quarter of the century. 
Firstly, due to their susceptibility to neoliberalism, and secondly their premeditated attempt 
to destigmatise themselves from the socialist system in which this party was constituted 
(under the then name The League of Communists of Slovenia - Zveza komunistov Slovenije). This 
is not to be considered mimicry, but the transition philosophy of the “Visegrad Group” of 
former socialist countries: Social Democrats – to survive in such nations – saved themselves 
from the stigma of impersonating the former one-party regime by proving that they were the 
trustworthy followers of the neoliberalism that replaced the collapsed system of the Eastern 
bloc.
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1. radicalism (as a general qualification) should be distinguished from 
the concrete factors of this social phenomenon;
2. the factors of radicalisation are not typical of any single social sphere, 
system or organisation; on the contrary, as a rule they can occur in 
all dimensions of human (social and psychical) action;
3. radicalism is defined (in this article) as a combination of four factors: 
cognitive, political, existential and temporal.
The first point involves the understanding of the factors of radi-
calism in terms of its conditions, or, as it were, in terms of its constituents 
(in such cases when this phenomenon actually occurs in reality); which 
means that no individual factor can be considered as the cause of radical-
ism.2 If, independently of the context, religion or socialisation, the media 
or authoritarian leaders, deprivation or inequality, culture or values… are 
declared the cause of radicalism, this is similar to saying that the cause of 
radicalism is like water which is consumed, in one way or another, by all 
radicalised people. A typical example of such erroneous reduction to a sin-
gle factor of the causal effect is the polemics about the causes of fascism in 
American sociology (Bannister, 1992: pp. 174–176). A specific variation of 
such overrating of an individual factor is its selective valuation, in which 
only the obvious, expected or desired effects of a factor are considered, and 
its opposite effects are ignored. An example of this variation is the quali-
fication of the theology of Martin Luther, the founder of the Protestant 
Reformation, in which the emancipatory effect of his radicalism on the re-
lation between the believer and God is often one-sidedly emphasised, and 
this same radicalism’s effect on secular authorities is ignored, although it 
was quite opposed to the first effect, because it strengthened the legitima-
cy of absolutism (Spruk, 2018).
The second point calls attention to the false assumption which in the 
West has (again)3 escalated in the Islamophobic responses to the terrorism 
2 An analogy with precipitation: water, condensation, droplet growth, temperature, pres-
sure, air flow etc., are the factors without which precipitation could not occur, although 
none of them is the cause that in itself would explain this result.
3 Also in Slovenia, the same pattern of wrong responses has been traditionally present since 
the late 19th century and is known as the “cultural fight”. This syntagm mistakenly qualifies 
the history of radical social movements in the territory of Slovenia, the essence of which 
is allegedly “culturally” conditioned due to the antagonism between the Catholic and 
Communist social movements, which empirically cannot be sustained. The result of this 
approach is – on one side – ignoring the historically important and very strong Christian-
socialist current that opposed the clericalists of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia (and 
that during World War II recruited most of the partisans in the fight against fascism), and at 
the same time – on the other side – this same approach blurred the difference between the 
actors on the political left, where the dominant social-democratic current was equated with 
the representatives of the Stalinist version of Marxism, although even in the early 1930 the 
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of Islamic extremists. Namely, that radicalism is immanent to a certain 
religion as opposed to other religions and spheres of action, which is a 
mistaken belief. Radicalism is not an inherent characteristic of any social 
sphere, and at the same time no sphere is immune to this phenomenon or 
holds monopoly over it. This applies to politics as well as religion, econom-
ics, the arts, dietary practices,4 physical needs, gardening5 and other fields. 
Forget this and radicalism can easily be attributed only to the religious6 or 
political spheres (as seen in the example of the religious functionaries of 
the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia, who still blame the political au-
thorities from the former socialist system for all the current problems of 
their organisation; Štuhec, 2000: p. 21). Simplified qualifications of radi-
calism – particularly in the case of terrorism – are the principal origin of 
such wrong reactions (Lerner 2006: pp. 167–171). It is the problem of the 
origin of radicalism that is one of the questions to which there is no essen-
tial difference between the religious and political fields. This can be seen 
both from the empirical evidence7 as well as the definition of these gener-
al fields, such as in the following examples:
A religion is a complex mixture of beliefs, values, symbols and rituals. 
Most mayor religions /…/ contain beliefs and values about this world, 
whatever they may say about another, super-empirical one /…/ Religion 
can be seen as a part of the ideological sphere of a society when it oper-
ates in a way which helps to maintain the political, cultural and economic 
arrangements of that society over time. (Bocock, 1985: p. 207)
“Religion refers to the systems of general compensators”8 (Stark, & Bain-
bridge, 2007: p. 47), with characteristically both politics and religion 
latter were still a very marginal political force (Dolenc, 1996; Dragoš, 1998, 2011, 2015; Pelikan, 
1997, 2002; Prunk, 1977; Repe, 2015). 
4 For example, veganism, particularly in cases, when it is practiced from birth.
5 In Great Britain as many as 17 %of the owners of gardens were victims of thefts, most often 
of garden gnomes – which were most frequently the target of the organisations fighting for 
the liberation of garden gnomes and for their return to the forest. “The most well-known 
phenomenon of this kind was noticed in France, where the Front for the Liberation of 
Garden Gnomes took several thousand gnomes from the gardens” (Thieves [Tatovi], 2018).
6 See the list of examples in Lerner, 2006: pp. 41-43.
7 “Sacrifice and self-sacrifice, particularly from young people, is known in numerous national 
and liberation movements; we know this also from Slovenian history. Because Islam is 
very heterogenous, and can be understood in different ways, it can act as the grounds for 
encouraging people to sacrifice and self-sacrifice for religious-political goals /…/ There is 
nothing exceptional in this. The Crusaders also left for war, obtaining concessions for their 
sins in advance, in case they would die, while fighting with infidels.” (Kerševan, 2015).
8 Compensators are unattainable, unverifiable or non-existent rewards for which there is de-
mand (e.g. an afterlife). Definition: “Compensators are expectations of a reward correspond-
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maintaining their respective monopolies in terms of the “protection of 
compensators against their rebut. (ibid.: p. 300)
What was said about religion, applies, mutatis mutandis, also for other 
forms of  superior order of meaning. Modernisation has, if not com-
pletely abolished, at least made more difficult the maintenance of the 
monopoly of locally constrained socially integrated systems of meaning 
and values. (Berger & Luckmann, 1999: p. 32)
The boundaries of politics are always and necessarily highly contested of 
the range of issues that can potentially be considered  as political – from 
the economy to the environment, and from morality to sex /…/ These 
debates and challenges underscore the fact that an element of force is 
always necessarily involved in politics. From this perspective, politics can 
be conceived in the terms of Harold Lasswell’s book Politics: Who Gets 
What, When, How (1936). (Turner, 2006: pp. 446–447)
Not accidentally, the fields of religion and politics, as described in 
the above quotes, are so similar that we probably would not even notice 
if somebody would mixed up the words and replaced “religion” with poli-
tics”, and vice versa – the definitions would still remain equally meaning-
ful. The historical differentiation of religion and politics towards specific 
and autonomous9 systems, that we started to face half of millennium ago 
in the West, does not mean in itself that these two fields of social regula-
tion have remained without a common core. Instead, both systems – poli-
tics and religion – are oriented to that which they have never surrendered: 
they are specialised to operate with all three kinds of transcendences, i.e., 
with the small and medium, as well as large-scale.10 In relation to tran-
scendence, the differences between both fields in terms of the division of 
labour only refer to the amount of the attention they attract:11 religion 
mainly puts forward large transcendences, while politics focuses on the 
ing to the explanations that are not easily susceptible to unambiguous valuation /…/ People 
consider compensators in terms of rewards” (Stark & Bainbridge, 2007: p. 44).
9 Autonomy is the systems’ reaction towards the reduction of risk, as well as contingency and 
complexity of the outer environment in which they operate. At the same time this is how 
they create their own, new problems, for which only they can find appropriate solutions 
(Luhmann, 1995: pp. 186, 204). One of these solutions is the interpenetration of systems (ibid.: 
pp. 212–218) – however, it is in the case of the interpenetration of political and religious systems 
that this strategy is the most theoretically vague, politically risky and legally constrained. 
10 Transcendences are the basic building-blocks of meaning (as defined by Thomas Luckmann, 
1997: pp. 109–112).
11  The degree of attention is institutionally regulated with positive and negative sanctions, or 
with benefits and costs (as Stark & Bainbridge, 2007, would say).
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medium ones. But, as noted above, neither is without them. With, in this 
sense, both politics as well as religion being typically omnipresent or hy-
percomplex12 systems, it makes sense to consider the following two theses 
in relation to radicalisation. For lack of space I will not go into detail, but 
will only give a short formulation of both:
- the more the systems of institutionalised meanings (in our case, pol-
itics and religion)13 are hypercomplex, the greater the possibility for 
the radicalisation of dissatisfied minorities among the members of 
the system;
- although, in the long term, modernisation and pluralisation of so-
cial systems are narrowing  the space for radical choices, this can 
only be said for top to bottom radicalisation, and not in the opposite 
direction.
The more optimistically we understand modernisation the more 
these two theses will sound pessimistic, as a “tax” on Enlightenment il-
lusions. This “tax” is justified for two reasons; the first is linked to the ex-
pected scope of modernisation processes, and the second to their depth. 
The estimations of both were exaggerated, beginning with the father of 
sociological science, Émile Durkheim (for more on this see Berger & 
Luckmann, 1999: pp. 33–34). Sociologically, there is no controversy, and 
thus it is believed that – more than ever before in the history of human 
societies – such strong factors as modernisation and modern14 pluralism 
lead to relativisation due to demonopolisation. Values, the persuasiveness 
of their explanations and the power of institutional mechanisms that sup-
port them, are becoming weaker due to the competition that erodes them. 
This results in the “decanonisation” of truths as well as “dis-orientation 
12 It is hypercomplex in terms as understood by systems theory (for a definition, see Niklas 
Luhmann, 1995: 471), and the fundamental problem of these systems is autoparalysis. Will-
ke describes this problem as the paradox of the “relationship between complexity and con-
tingency: paradoxality of the principled possibility of creating diverse realities by choosing 
certain options of the complex whole on one hand, and the autoparalysis of the complex 
system for the very abundance of options” on the other (emphasis in Willke, 1993: p. 87). 
Willke wrote this diagnosis, that gives a good explanation of today’s crisis of the system of 
parliamentary democracy, in 1989, that is, in different times that were extremely optimistic 
for the development of democracy.
13 Because the art system also belongs among hypercomplex systems (specific theories or 
aesthetics + “language” + rules + institutions + production processes + definitions of sys-
tem boundaries of inside/outside), this system is also considered overburdened and con-
sequently equally susceptible to radicalisation. However, it is not dangerous, because – as 
opposed to politics and religion – it is based on essentially different relationship between 
coercive and persuasive forms of power. 
14 As a consequence of modernisation processes, modern pluralism differs from previous 
pluralisms in pre-modern societies (Berger & Luckmann, 1999: pp. 28–29).
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of the individual and entire groups” (ibid.: pp. 33–38). Although modern 
pluralism is useful, because it promotes the peaceful coexistence of dif-
ferent lifestyles, it cannot be considered a “direct inhibitor of the process 
of expansion of crises of meaning”, as Berger and Luckmann have put it. 
The authors show that the problem lies in the narrow scope of pluralisa-
tion processes. Namely, pluralisation only suggests to the individual how 
they should behave towards others, but that is all. Pluralisation is neither a 
map nor an algorithm for action. Now individuals have to find their own 
way of how to “very concretely lead one’s life,” as they find themselves in a 
situation when “the unquestioned validity of the traditional order is shak-
en” (ibid.: pp. 29–30), faster and faster and more and more dramatically.
Moreover systems theory – about which Berger and Luckmann give 
an account with regard to the individual as a psychic system (confronta-
tion with meaning) – points to the same problem with regard to inter-
active, social and societal systems.15 The processes of modernisation and 
pluralisation have come to present a growing challenge for the system-
ic regulation of their boundaries with the environment due to the grow-
ing contingency; that is, the possibility that “something can be like this or 
like something else” (Luhmann, 1995: pp. 25, 56–57). The growing contin-
gency is related to the growing complexity and the need for its selection, 
which, as I have said, applies to all human systems. The more complex 
the circumstances the more difficult is the regulation of the difference be-
tween a system and its environment (both external and internal). With re-
gard to the strategies of radicalisation, contingency is important, because 
it increases the degree of vagueness, insecurity, distress and risk, and in 
turn radicalism can (under certain circumstances) become a possible exit 
from the resulting dilemma.
The Cage of Radicalisation
Radicalism means – as I defined it at the beginning of this paper – a com-
bination of four factors (as illustrated in Figure 1):16
- Cognitive factor: this involves the attitude to reality. Its perception 
is possible on the dimension between two extreme poles, between 
complete relativism and the opposite extreme, a fundamentalist at-
titude to the world or to certain truths in individual fields. With 
regard with this dimension Krüger’s definition of fundamentalism 
seems appropriate: “‘Fundamentalism’, thus understood, implies not 
only a set of substantive ideas, but also a particular cognitive style 
15 For a general theory of systems and their classification see Luhmann, 1995: pp. 1–11.
16 Figure 1 present factors as dimensions in space.
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and stance, as well as a style of social positioning” (Krüger, 2006: p. 
888).
- Political factor: this means the choice of the mode of action in all 
those cases and circumstances that involve making the decision that 
something needs to be changed. Of course, the answers to the ques-
tion of how this should be done can be different, although not en-
tirely arbitrary. They are possible on the dimension between two ex-
treme poles, where one pole presents the minimum correction in 
terms of reformism, and the opposing pole presents the maximum, 
that is, radical change (with taking into account that being radi-
cal within this dimension is not the same as radicalism in a wider 
sense).17
- Existential factor: this defines the direction of action, including two 
opposing directions that are usually combined, and sometimes can 
be one-sidedly intensified. One possibility is to direct the action in-
wards, involving only a change in the psychological world of the in-
dividual or social networks within a community. The opposite is 
the outward action, where changing the world is the condition for 
change at the micro level. The most evident consequences of both 
choices are segregation in the case of acting inwards, and proselyt-
ism in the case of acting outwards.
- Temporal factor: this involves the perception of time in the acaus-
al sense, where “time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2006: p. 423). We usually imagine time superficial-
ly as a chronological sequence of “presents”, classified in three more 
general categories, the past, present and future. More adequate is the 
intentional qualification of temporality, where this phenomenon 
both in terms of contents and attitude to them depends on the po-
sition of the observer. Intentionality opens up many different and 
17 This radicalness in the mode of action needs to be separated from the wider phenomenon of 
radicalisation, presented in Figure 1, for the following reasons: the first case involves radicalness 
in the narrow sense of a conscious choice of action (within the dimension), while the second 
involves radicalisation in the wider sense of the effect of all four dimensions (Figure 1) that 
coincide in the extremes. The difference is important, because radicalism in the narrow sense 
is easier to change, as it still involves a conscious decision, where – in Weber’s terminology – 
the actor carries out either purposive-rational or value-rational action (Brunkhorst, 1998: pp. 
2–3), while it is no longer possible to easily exit radicalism in its wider sense: it already acts as a 
“cage”, because action is no longer only dependent on the actor, but mainly on the context in 
which it takes place.
 For the needs of this article let it be enough to define radicalism in the narrow sense as the 
action of those individuals, groups or organisation that carry out “positive or negative 
influence on more mainstream movement organizations by pushing for more action than 
on-radical actors are willing to commit” (Cross & Snow, 2011: p. 117).
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subjectively possible combinations, because – “I do not pass through 
a series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve and 
which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of every mo-
ment, its predecessor undergoes a change /…/ beginning to outline 
itself against, or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment 
ago it was my present. When a third moment arrives, the second un-
dergoes a new modification;” and so on (ibid.).18
This approach to understanding time is three times more adequate 
than the conventional one. First, it deters us from reducing time, as we 
18 This is why Merleau-Ponty points out that instead of reducing temporality (to a mere sequence 
of factual events A → B → C) we always have to deal with the “network of intentionalities” that 
is not composed only of A, B and C, but also of A’, B’, A’’, B’’, etc. For a schematic illustration 
of this network, taken from Husserl, see Merleau-Ponty, 2006: p. 423; for an explanation 
see ibid.: pp. 416-439. The aforementioned events, marked by the capital letters and one or 
two apostrophes, also include memory which cannot be reduced only to present or to past. 
Memory is the intersection of both, which means that the same object of memory can involve 
several different intersections, depending on the viewpoint. In this regard, Davie’s revealing 
classification of memory related to the reproduction of religious tradition in Europe lists 
eight different types of memory (Davie, 2003: p. 273). 
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usually do, to a series of superficial events, by introducing an addition-
al logic of connections that are not only causal; second, it considers these 
connections – or better associations – of objective events as depending on 
the observer. And third, the intentional concept avoids the reduction of 
temporality on factuality that can be objectively measured, such as with 
a clock, since time is a relational phenomenon  (“network”) to which we 
only have access through conscious understanding. This means that one 
and the same object of temporal events (A, B, C) triggers different phe-
nomena. Because these are defined by the position of the actor that sub-
jectivates objectivity (in A’, A’’…), the phenomenological approach to 
temporality is particularly important in confronting radicalism. It calls 
attention, for example, to the fact that a literal reading of holy books or 
historical chronologies is as equally possible as any other, and that it is im-
possible to ignore this (typically fundamentalist) feature by assuming a 
binary logic (actual / fictional, permitted / prohibited, adequate / inad-
equate), where only one possibility would be the right one and the other 
stigmatised as unreal.
The arrow in Figure 1 illustrates the radicalisation of an individu-
al actor. Only when the fundamentalist attitude to reality is combined 
(from the temporal perspective) with the radical mode of outward action 
do we have radicalisation as a social phenomenon. If all four dimensions 
do not appear simultaneously, then radicalness is not dangerous, because 
it remains within the individual dimensions. The same can be said for in-
stitutions as the tools of power, as was pointed out over half a century ago 
by Robert K. Merton, the critic of classical functionalism, in the debate 
on simultaneous functionality and disfunctionality of an actor (Merton, 
1979).19 The same applies to radicalism – which at times can even be con-
sidered beneficial.
Examples
A typical example of one of the benefits of radicalism is the demand for 
the separation of church and state from the religious sphere. This mod-
ernist solution – which Slovenia has even written into its Constitution 
(Article 7) – started with the demand for the establishment of a “wall of 
separation” between the church and the state. This innovative and radical 
19 “In every concrete example a certain phenomenon can have functional as well as dysfunctional 
consequences”, says Merton (1979; p. 115). From this he derives two conclusions in regard 
with social analysis: “To the extent that functional analysis focuses wholly on functional 
consequences, it leans toward an ultraconservative ideology; to the extent that it focuses 
wholly on dysfunctional consequences, it leans toward an ultra-radical utopia” (ibid., p. 103). 
Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 94.
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idea was first set out by Roger Williams (1603–1683), an English theolo-
gist and reformed Baptist, who aimed, in his words, to safeguard the re-
ligious gardens against the secular desert, and protect the church against 
the harmful influence of the secular authorities. Williams’ solution was 
adopted a hundred years later by the third president of the USA, Thomas 
Jefferson, although this time with the opposite aim: to keep conflictual 
religious tendencies away from the federal authorities, and to protect the 
secular government against any religious influence (Weber, 1998; Dragoš, 
2001). Although in Williams’ case we speak about religious fundamen-
talism and radical political demands, we cannot consider this radicalisa-
tion (as a “cage”),20 as Williams’ endeavours were not directed outward, 
but rather inward (isolation against a secular exterior, rather than diffu-
sion of religion outwards). Numerous other cases of radicalism can be seen 
as neutral; that is, neither detrimental nor beneficial to society. For exam-
ple, a vegan lifestyle or the separation of dental floss in plastic waste – ly-
ing within the fields of dietary practices and environmental concerns, re-
spectively – could both be considered radical, maybe even fundamental, 
actions (if they involve the belief that they help change the world). But as 
long as such gestures are directed only to the actor that performs them, 
they do not have any detrimental effects in terms of Figure 1.
A different case is the recent European trend of promulgate sanc-
tions on wearing headgear in public that partly or entirely cover the 
face (as in France, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, and, to some extent, the 
Netherlands). In terms of the mode of action this is a radical measure, be-
cause it violates both religious and human rights. At the same time it is 
directed outwards, as it implies the formal imposition of new habits that 
are to be observed by all members of society, while in practice this can ac-
tually be seen as a measure against Muslim women that wear a niqab or 
burqa. In terms of the third dimension (Figure 1) involving the attitude 
to reality, these measures could be strongly suspected as indicating a shift 
towards fundamentalism, which, in this case, is even supported by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. How could we under-
stand in any other way the explanation that this prohibition is “necessary 
in a democratic society”, as the judges’ explanation reads, because it aims 
to “ensure the conditions for a common life as an element for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Prepoved, 2017)? How can 
200 women from the social margins, who cover their mouths and noses in 
Denmark population of 5.7 million, shake democracy along with the con-
ditions for a common life, and endanger the freedom of others? It is those 
20 See footnote 17.
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who truly believe this that have a fundamentalist attitude to reality. Only 
the fourth dimension in Figure 1 (temporality) shows the social function 
of such sanctioning of clothes. Even if we are not phenomenologists, it is 
not difficult to predict different temporal “networks of intentionality” in 
the perception of this measure. Obviously, some will believe that this is 
only a safety measure against the erosion of tolerance in society, while oth-
ers will see the same measure as a symptom or even a trigger of intolerance.
One of perhaps the most bizarre examples of radicalism, which is 
unimaginable outside the social context, is the recent movement known 
as “QAnon”21 in the USA. It consists of a vast collection of pro-Trump 
claims and predictions that foretell, like one of Nostradamus’ prophecies, 
the fight against a “deep state”, including ideas such as 1) the “Russian 
investigation” is a distraction to hide something else, namely Donald 
Trump’s endeavours to uncover a network of paedophiles, naturally in-
cluding Barak Obama and Bill and Hillary Clinton, and after these fig-
ures are arrested they will be imprisoned in Guantanamo, Cuba; 2) the 
Republicans lost the Senate elections in Alabama on purpose, because 
this is a long-term plan to fight against those who are tampering with 
voting machines, with the final goal of this strategy being to bring down 
George Soros; or 3) President Kennedy’s assassination only happened be-
cause he wanted to disclose the existence of the “deep state” and its se-
cret government, while according to some versions of this story Kennedy 
is still alive, and the assassination was faked by this same “deep state” in 
order to kidnap Kennedy and then use him, in some way, to gain power 
in the next elections, etc. QAnon is not interesting because of the bizarre 
and obviously false stories that it proposes , but because it has been able 
to attract mass attention and help start a kind of social movement (called 
by some the “Trumpenproletariat”). An application for mobile phones re-
lated to these conspiracy theories has become one of the top sellers on 
Apple’s online store, while a video with the same kind of contents has 
already reached over 200,000 views on YouTube; a man “took over” the 
Hoover Dam bridge in Arizona, blocked the road and demanded the pub-
lication of some classified documents, the existence of which he was in-
formed of by QAnon; and at a Donald Trump’s rally in Florida his sup-
porters wore T-shirts with capital letter Q and posters saying “We are Q” 
(Kopušar, 2018). If we classify these developments in Figure 1, we can see 
that they are oriented towards extremes on all four dimensions (radical-
ism in the mode of action, outward orientation, the change of the entire 
21 Q is a code for an anonymous person who is supposedly a high official with access to classified 
information, and Anon is an abbreviation of the word anonymous.
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society, a fundamentalist attitude to reality, and an “alternative” reading 
of events). How much impact this radicalism will have depends on both 
the social circumstances and the most powerful man in the country who 
is creating them.
The reason why Figure 1 is marked as a “cage” is because it illus-
trates the social context that moves various combinations of dimen-
sions towards one or the other direction. When negative extremes of the 
four dimensions coincide, everything goes wrong, because they encour-
age closed, self-referential logic. One of the important constituents of the 
context that strengthens the development of individual dimensions is so-
cial power: that is why it does matter who combines the extremes in the 
abovementioned dimensions (Figure 1) – whether the actors are people in 
power or from the social margins. In this context, Koopmans (1993) and 
others22 point out that the qualification of radicalism primarily depends 
on the state and its reaction to certain events. Since in Europe Muslims 
(beside the Roma) are now the most stigmatised part of the population, 
some educational experts warn that Muslim schools – despite their prac-
ticing religious indoctrination – pose less threat for the radicalisation of 
their students than mixed schools that are also attended by Muslim chil-
dren, because in mixed schools children are exposed to more pressure 
coming from the environment due to their specific religious or ethnic dif-
ferences (Merry, 2018). While I am certainly not trying here to advocate 
educational indoctrination, what I am suggesting is a choice of lesser risk. 
Although studies with the opposing findings also seem convincing (e.g. 
Hewstone et al., 2018), it is very likely that the reduction of discrimina-
tion and stigmatisation that can occur in the learning process does not de-
pend on the (non-)existence of religious schools, but on the social context 
in which they operate.
Apart from social power and status, the context of radicalisation also 
depends on material inequality and the related expectations. According 
to Gallup and Castelli (1989: p. 122) – “American blacks are, by some 
measures, the most religious people in the world.” They see the reason for 
this in the context in which such people live, as individual religiosity is 
most influenced by ethnicity or colour of skin, social-economic status, de-
gree of education, size of the city in which a person lives, and the religios-
ity of one’s parents (Batson et al., 1993: pp. 38–43). If the changes in eco-
nomic or social conditions that are occurring in the richest societies of the 
world prevent the majority of people from expecting that their material 
22 “The tolerance of different regimes for certain types of behavior can cause dramatic shifts in 
what constitutes radicalism over very short periods of time” (Cross & Snow, 2011: p. 117).
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conditions will ever improve, and in fact they fear they will become ever 
worse off, then this is a favourable condition for radical thinking. While 
in the past half century the characteristics of the USA and UK which gave 
rise to Trump and Brexit have been amply and empirically documented 
and commented on, they still deserve to be repeated:
In the UK, the average income of the richest 10% is almost 10 times as 
large as for the poorest 10%. The OECD average is 9.5, in France and Ger-
many it is around 7 and in the US 16. OECD (2015)
In this context, Slovenia stands out as one of the most developed 
countries among the smallest in the world (with only two million inhab-
itants). However, it is in relation to social inequality that public opinion 
is also becoming radicalised in Slovenia, although, as opposed to the US 
and UK, it has a much better situation in this regard. Slovenia was always 
(and remains) a state with one of the smallest degrees of income inequal-
ity in Europe, and therefore is among the world’s most egalitarian coun-
tries according to this criterion. This is why Slovenia still (for now) also 
boasts a below the  European average degree of poverty among its popula-
tion, is high in the world in terms of the degree of general safety and has 
a low per capita number of criminal acts and prisoners, a rapid reduction 
in the traffic mortality rate, high gender equality rate, low neonatal mor-
tality rate, and is further distinguished by a series of other key indicators 
that show the good quality of life (Messner, 2014; Flere & Lavrič, 2005: p. 
741; UNICEF, 2009; Porter et al., 2014). In short, if a alien from the space 
would shipwreck on the planet Earth and chose to live in the Slovenian 
oasis, they would come off rahter well.23 However, even in Slovenia pub-
lic opinion has become radicalised, and the most so in terms of inequality. 
What has been going on to cause this?
The right side of Table 2 shows that Slovenia remains (in almost all 
years of the measured period) a very, and even exceptionally low, degree 
of inequality with respect to the whole EU. Even the Nordic states do not 
come close to it, and although they are among the best in the world they 
still lag behind Slovenia according to this criterion, because they have a 
higher average Gini coefficient (GC). In 2016, only Iceland and Slovakia 
hadan even lower GC than Slovenia (Eurostat, 2018). For Slovenia, a for-
mer socialist country, this is an excellent result, because most of the for-
mer socialist countries show a much higher degree of inequality, which ex-
ceeds the European average. 
23 But only under the condition that they do not tell they are alien (Dragoš, 2016; Lukšič-Hacin, 
2017; Kramberger et al., 2004).
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However, the last column of Table 2 shows that in the years dur-
ing and after the most recent economic crisis inequality has increased in 
Slovenia, with the GC having risen by 7.5 percent in seven years. During 
the same period of time it has only increased by 0.7 per cent on average in 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Inequality (Gini coefficient) and the attitude towards it, as 
measured by the share of those who strongly agree with the statement 
that the government “should adopt measures to reduce differences in peoples’ 
incomes” (measured on a five-degree scale: 1 = strongly agree … 5 = not 
agree at all; summarised from Toš, 2017: pp. 354-355)
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nations. If we compare this significant shift towards a greater inequality in 
Slovenia with the left side of the table, which shows the public attitude to-
ward the issue of wealth redistributions, it becomes clear where the dissat-
isfaction comes from. The figures show that the percentage of Slovenians 
who strongly agree that inequality should be reduced and that it is the re-
sponsibility of the government to achieve this is above the European av-
erage, as well as that seen in the Nordic and former socialist countries. 
Similarly, in Slovenia the growth in this percentage between the years 
2002 and 2014 – while also increasing in the rest of Europe – is above the 
European average.
The next factor that makes Slovenia consistently stand out from 
the rest of Europe is the political one (= dimension: “mode of action” 
in Figure 1). Typically, it shows the simultaneous presence of a marked-
ly leftist orientation of public opinion and the continued rule of neolib-
eral governments (cohibentency). Slovenia has one of the “leanest” states, 
and is rather stingy towards its citizens considering the size of its GDP. 
Slovenian expenditure on social protection (as a percentage of GDP) is 
well under the European average, and has been decreasing over the past 
decade, while in other EU countries this figure has been increasing. The 
same applies to expenditure on pensions (as a percentage of GDP), while 
the Slovenian health sector is on the verge of collapse, due to both a lack 
of finances and staff. According to this criterion it is completely uncom-
parable with the European average. There are similar stories in the public 
resources available for science, as well as for the housing sector that is one 
of the most privatised in Slovenia and among the worst in Europe. There 
is also a very high level of precarious employment, a high level of dissatis-
faction regarding trust in company managers and directors, and Slovenia 
also has one of the highest levels of state involvement in the economy24 
(Eurostat, 2017; OECD, 2017; Dragoš & Leskošek, 2016). As shown in 
Table 2, public opinion is very critical of the Slovenian state, while the po-
litical consequences of this can be seen in Table 3.
In its political preferences, it is Slovenian society that is most ori-
ented to the left in Europe. In Slovenia in all the years examined the aver-
age value on the ten-degree (self-evaluated) scale is well under 5, while the 
European average is above this mean value, which also applies to the for-
mer socialist countries that are most comparable with Slovenia, and even 
more for the Nordic group. For reasons of comparison Table 3 also in-
cludes two more countries (participating in the ESS 2002-2016 survey) 
24 This indicator of central government spending by function is measured as a percentage of 
total expenditures: the OECD average is 12 %, and data for Slovenia show 17 %; the opposite is 
shown for social protection: Slovenia 25.4 %, OECD average 26.4 % (OECD, 2017).
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that stand out with regard to this factor, i.e. Spain and the “European” 
complement, Israel; the first is at the extreme, because it has the same val-
ue as Slovenia, while the second is the most right wing. As is evident from 
the last two columns of the table, in economically the most critical years 
– that is, between 2002 and 201425 – public opinion in Slovenia moved 
more to the left than anywhere else in Europe. Moreover, Slovenia is also 
the country in Europe with the highest percentage of respondents who 
(according to various criteria) are very critical of capitalism and consider 
socialism to be better (Toš & Vovk, 2014). In short, a basic characteristic 
of Slovenia is that, right from the very foundation of this young country, 
in 1991, the general public has been moving notably to the left, while the 
25 Economically the mentioned period is the most critical for three reasons: because it indicates 
the peak of the most recent recession, which marked the triumph of neoliberalism and the 
collapse of various stock market bubbles that had inflated due to a belief in infinite economic 
growth; because this collapse was followed by a very severe economic crisis, comparable with 
that in the 1930s; because even after leaving this crisis nothing indicates that we have had 
learned anything from it. 
Table 3: The leftist orientation of Slovenian public opinion (between 
2002 and 2014, based on self-evaluation in the question): “Politics 
sometimes speaks about the left and the right. Where would you classify yourself 
on the scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right?” (Toš, 2017: pp. 
352-353)
STATE YEAR AVERAGE VALUE
DIFFERENCE
2002 – 2014
% Direction of shift
Slovenia
2002 4.70

















+ 0.4 Slightly to the right
2014 5.36
EU (24)3 2002 5.11 - 0.2 Slightly to the left
2014 5.10
1 Ex-socialist states (without Slovenia): the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland.
2 Nordic states: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden.
3 The stated average of the EU countries (including Israel and Switzerland).
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Table 4: “How satisfied are you in general with the functioning of democracy in 
Slovenia?” - comparison of Slovenia with the EU average and with the 
Czech Republic and Norway (between 2002 and 2014; summarised 
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Slovenian elites have been moving to the right. The results of these trends 
are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
Slovenian dissatisfaction with democracy is at a critically high lev-
el. Table 4 shows that in 2014 the share of people who declared them-
selves unsatisfied with democracy in Slovenia amounted to over 64 %, well 
above the European average of 25.3 %. For reasons of comparison this ta-
ble also includes the Czech Republic as the country that is most similar to 
Slovenia due to its experience of socialism, although the percentage of its 
citizens who are unsatisfied with democracy is substantially lower (24.2 
%), and Norway, where the dissatisfaction is the lowest seen in Europe. 
The same trends can be seen in the right column of the same table: in 12 
years the average self-assessed level of satisfaction, as measured on a scale 
from 0 to 10, fell 33.9 % in Slovenia, while during the same time the aver-
age fall for the whole EU was only 4.4 %. One consequence of these trends 
is an extraordinary radicalisation of public opinion in Slovenia over the 
past decade. As seen from Table 5, the percentage of self-defined conserv-
atives who reject any changes to the current system has been approaching 
zero; the percentage of reformists that wish for gradual changes, which in 
the previous quarter century represented the majority of the public, has 
fallen dramatically; while those who think that “the entire way of func-
tioning of our society needs to be radically changed with a determined ac-
tion” have become the majority.
Table 5: Attitude to social change in Slovenian public opinion (Toš, 
2014: p. 106)
* Until 2003: Our society as it is now, should be defended against any upturn
** Until 2003: Our society’s entire functioning should be radically changed with a revolutionary action
Our society should be 
gradually changed with 
reforms
Our society’s entire func-
tioning should be radically 
changed with a determined 
action**
FDV - CJMMK, Slovenian public opinion 1992-2013
Our society, as it is now, 
should be defended against 
any change*
THREE TYPICAL VIEWS OF THE SOCIETY IN WHICH WE LIVE ARE GIVEN
Which of them you consider to be the closest to your own opinion?
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In short, the case of Slovenia is an educative illustration of the influ-
ence that social context has on radicalisation, even when seemingly noth-
ing is wrong. Despite one of the lowest levels of inequality, and many other 
very favourable factors, public opinion in Slovenia has become radicalised, 
because of the growing distance between ordinary citizens and the po-
litical elites that run the country following a neoliberal plan. According 
to the results of the survey outlined above, an aversion to democracy has 
deepened with the majority of the population, who favour the option of 
having a “strong leader that would fix things” instead of more democracy. 
In 2015 – that is, several years after the end of the most recent economic 
crisis – this attitude was expressed by as much as 62.4 % of the Slovenian 
public, the highest level in Europe, while only 13 years ago this opinion 
was held by much less than half the population (Dragoš, 2016: p. 45).26 
Among those who would prefer to have an authoritarian leader over great-
er democracy, most are voters with low education, the unemployed, the re-
ligious, those over the age of 60, and those who live in poverty or close to 
it (Toš & Vovk, 2014). In short, despite the relatively low degree of ine-
quality in Slovenian society, social factors are among the main ones linked 
to the mainstream distrust of democracy. With regard to other contex-
tual reasons related to radicalisation, two other factors need to be not-
ed, namely social capital along with unfavourable psychological shifts re-
lated to what is usually uncritically idealised as the Slovenian “national 
character”. While the indicator of the quality of social ties in Slovenia re-
mains below the European average27, it is with regard to “national charac-
ter” that Slovenians are markedly above the European average, and here 
they value the most negative personal characteristics, which are related 
to the concept of authoritarian personality. These characteristics are: sub-
missiveness, modestolatry,28 conformism and traditionalism. Despite the 
already high measured values for these characteristics at the start of the 
26 In these terms the statement of the current president of Slovenia, Borut Pahor, seems typical: 
“With regard to running the governments, a certain world trend also needs to be considered. 
We are witnessing the growing phenomenon of strong political leaders, also in countries 
with long democratic traditions. For many people it is attractive to have a leader that can 
compensate for the deficiencies of democracy. If democracy does not work, they say to 
themselves, at least it is better to have a strong leader. Contrary to those that typically jump to 
conclude that this leads to authoritarianism, I am not so sure that the two are interconnected. 
People look for strong leaders for whom they believe would be able to fix things /…/ I am 
reserved towards predictions of apocalypse in cases when a strong political personality takes 
over leadership of the government” (Korljan, 2018).
27  Although slightly above the average of the former socialist countries.
28  It shows agreement with the statement: “It is important to be humble and modest, not to 
draw attention.”
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period examined in this survey, these value orientations only grew strong-
er over the following 14 years (Toš, 2017: pp. 376 ss).
Conclusion
The potential for radicalisation is not the characteristic of a single social 
sphere, system or organisation; quite the contrary, it can emerge in all di-
mensions of human (social and psychological) action. With the concept 
of radicalisation, as illustrated with the “cage” of four dimensions, we can 
thus avoid the most common mistakes that can occur when addressing 
the problem indicated in the title of this paper, namely the unreflected 
use of synonyms, voluntarist qualifications and ignoring the difference 
between the general and specific. The dimensions included in the concept 
are political (involving the mode of action), cognitive (attitude to reality), 
existential (direction of action) and temporal in the acausal sense (which 
Merleau-Ponty names the “network of intentionalities”). Radicalism aris-
es because of an unfavourable combination of these dimensions, when 
moves along them coincide in the direction of extremes. Social context 
is an important amplifier of such shifts, and within this the primary fac-
tors are the power relations among the actors, inequality in the distribu-
tion of goods and opportunities, and the related expectations people have 
with regard to their lives. The example of Slovenia is particularly inter-
esting to illustrate such effects, because this country does not have a very 
problematic degree of inequality among its citizens. Nonetheless, pub-
lic opinion in Slovenia has become radicalised to a greater extent than 
in other European countries (although it remains within the political di-
mension of the “mode of action”, as shown in Figure 1). The main charac-
teristics of the social context that explains this state of affairs are the pro-
longed and openly expressed division between – on one hand – people’s 
expectations, which are socially rather egalitarian and politically orient-
ed to the left (socialist), and – on the other hand –the actions of the polit-
ical elites who have applied neoliberal strategies of development. The fu-
ture direction of Slovenian society, in terms of the strengthening of these 
individual and contradictory characteristics, depends on the social con-
text. The least favourable direction would be the one leading towards the 
cage of radicalisation (Figure 1), where the extremes coincide. Slovenia is 
currently at a crossroads where everything still remains open, including a 
destructive version of the future that could resemble the 1930’s. This is be-
cause the country has many of the factors needed to realise this outcome, 
as laid out in the following equation: an aversion to parliamentary democ-
racy and capitalism + favourable views of socialism and a strong leader + 
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the predominance of the authoritarian personality type + nationalism = 
national socialism. 
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In January 2015, Lutz Bachmann, the leader of the German anti-Mus-lim Pegida movement, posted a photo of himself on his Facebook pro-file posing as Adolf Hitler and captioned by hate speech, referring to 
the migrants as “vermin”. This triggered an avalanche of media backlash 
and public distancing, also within the right movement’s membership it-
self. It seemed that a direct fascination with the Führer was going to be 
too difficult to justify even in the framework of political convictions of 
the likeminded and the wider public, which has come to expect nothing 
other than this sort of islamophobia and hated towards migrants from 
Pegida and its leader. Kirn (2015: p. 51) notices that Bachmann’s positions 
were considered absolutely fine until the publication of the leader’s por-
trait. But having thus penetrated the media agenda,  the leader’s public 
flaunting of his Hitlerian visage, which veritably reflects the truth about 
Pegida, miscarried and resulted in his, at least temporary, resignation 
from Pegida’s leadership.
Bachmann later tried to apologise by claiming that the photograph, 
featuring him wearing the typical Hitlerian parting with the addition of 
the recognizable moustache, was only an attempt at satire after a visit to 
the hairdresser for his sound book titled He is back. He added that that 
satire was a normal human reaction, which needs to be applied from time 
to time to allow for self-mockery (Connolly, 2015). This paper specifical-
ly examines the issue of the intolerability of the fascination with Hitler 
in Facebook users from Slovenia and, in turn, runs aground a similar 
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dilemma: how very seriously should online flirting with fascism be tak-
en and considered to represent radical hate speech, while avoiding hasty 
generalizations? The textual evidence is unequivocal: social networks in 
Slovenia were flooded by markedly homogenous hate speech of intoler-
ance, hatred, xenophobia and islamophobia after the outbreak of the ref-
ugee crisis, in particular after August 2015, which was continuously made 
legitimate by Slovenian politicians and their parties. At the same time, a 
large part of the mass media leaning towards or even financed by those 
same political parties saw a new political and marketing niche for self-pro-
motion in the dissemination of fear, racism, intolerance and a negative at-
titude towards the refugees. In its most extreme form, the discourse occa-
sionally resorted to direct approval of the worst crimes against humanity 
that were committed by fascist forces during WWII, including a fascina-
tion with Hitler, the Third Reich, and concentration camps as a freshly-
discovered historical “solution” to the refugee problem. There can be no 
other explanation for the numerous calls for the Furner’s intervention, 
and the seeming disposition towards concentration camps and the use of 
gas chambers.
Is the fascination with Hitler on social networks, then, a de facto 
manifestation of oncoming fascism in Europe; and how to epistemolog-
ically explain it without arriving at (erroneous) conclusions? Can the en-
thusiasm over former fascist leaders alone constitute fascism; or, are refer-
ences to Hitler to be taken at some other plane? Stanley (2018: pp. 9–10) 
lists common traits shared by fascist politicians as follows: a) emphasis on 
a common sense of history through the creation of a mythic past; b) re-
writing the people’s understanding of reality through the establishment 
of the language of ideals, achieved in turn through propaganda and pro-
moting anti-intellectualism; c) attacking universities and educational sys-
tems, when these challenge their ideas; d) creating a state of »unreality« 
through conspiracy theories and fake news replacing reasoned debate; e) 
the introduction of dangerous and false beliefs replacing the established 
understanding of reality; f) the naturalization of group differences, es-
tablished through a seemingly natural and scientifically supported hier-
archy of values; g) the solidification of social differences by using fear; h) a 
feeling of victimhood, developed in the dominant population every time 
progress of a minority group is detected; i) the appeal of the law and order 
policy, casting »us« as law-abiding citizens and »them« as criminals rep-
resenting an existential threat to the nation; j) sexual anxiety that threat-
ens the patriarchal hierarchy by growing gender equality. 
It is impossible to deny that the evocations of Hitler and the Third 
Reich represent a form of promotion of fascism. Three public discourses on 
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Hitler may be distinguished, though they may not necessarily be »fascist 
discourse«. Below, these are treated summarily. The first includes modern 
attempts at reinterpreting fascism as an expletive; the assumption under-
pinning this thesis is that either the examined social phenomenon does 
not constitute fascism since it serves to obfuscate real social antagonisms, 
or that the marker “fascism” is only used to disqualify a political or any 
other opponent. Such a potentially dangerous “reductive” thesis is pro-
mulgated, among others, by Žižek (2018: p. 39): 
Their function is to obfuscate actual social antagonisms – people are 
magically united against some demonized ‘fascist’ threat… The de-
monized image of a fascist threat clearly serves as a new political fetish, 
in the simple Freudian sense of a fascinating image whose function is to 
obfuscate the true antagonism. Fascism itself is inherently fetishist, it 
needs a figure like that of a Jew, condemned as the external cause of our 
troubles – such a figure enables us to obfuscate the immanent antago-
nisms that cut across our society. My claim is that exactly the same holds 
for the notion of ‘fascist’ in today’s liberal imagination: it enables us to 
obfuscate immanent deadlocks which lie at the root of our crisis.
In an interview, Žižek (Forstnerič Hajnšek, 2016) pointed out: “It 
is fashionable to speak about Europe becoming fascist. When I hear the 
word, I clench. Fascism usually replaces thinking. Instead of analysing an 
adverse situation, slap the fascism sticker on it, and it all gets clear.” It 
seems that to Žižek the search for the fascist as an enemy functions to ob-
fuscate real social antagonisms. The more we look for the fascist, the blind-
er we are to real social problems. Therefore, the fascist threat is an unnec-
essary demonization practice: a fascist is demonised so as not to have to 
face real issues. The image of the fascist threat serves as a new political fet-
ish, in the simple Freudian sense of a fascinating image whose purpose is 
to obfuscate true antagonisms; while fascisms is inherently fetish – hence 
the need for the figure of the Jew as the external root cause of our plight; 
however, such a character obfuscates the immanent antagonisms that gov-
ern our society. In the theory of fallacies, the ad Hitlerum line of argu-
mentation comes with the same caveat: drawing analogies with Hitler 
will usually result in ensnaring the counterpart in a fatal analogy. A sim-
ilar conclusion has been drawn by Mike Godwin, the author of the com-
monly referred to Godwin’s law: as a discussion grows longer, the proba-
bility of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1. Since the 
Nazi leader has become a traditional metaphor to epitomise evil on on-
line fora, any comparison drawn with Hitler is always simple, yet highly 
efficient, as noted by Erk (2012: p. 97). On the other hand, what is always 
š ol s ko p ol j e ,  l e t n i k x x i x ,  š t e v i l k a 5– 6 
136
lurking is the danger that the real relevance and the historical gravity of 
the Nazi atrocities would pale into insignificance as a result of the hyper-
trophy of analogies with Hitler. However, Godwin’s discovery does little 
to explain people’s desire and need to sympathise with the Nazi regime. In 
fact, the fascination with Hitler is diametrically opposite to Godwin’s law 
and may be paraphrased in the following rule: as the discussion on the ref-
ugees grows, why the parallel rise in probability that a person would men-
tion Hitler as a potential solution?
If the first type of discourse on fascism can be labelled reductive, 
since it minimizes the significance of fascism and attributes the relevant 
discussion with a certain self-blinding tendency, or even draws parallels 
between the purposes of anti-fascism and fascism: that is a fetishist ex-
clusion of the Other, then the next type is imitational. Meaning that fas-
cism, including the fascination with Hitler, can only be virtual, satirical, 
»unreal«, perhaps pedagogical, and containing elements of parody. In 
this type, imitations of the Führer function most often to amuse, or pro-
vide a current social critique at best, but never serve to approve or foster 
fascist belief. Contrary to Žižek’s reading, under which the marker is too 
hastily employed, this reading reduces the marker to a mere tool for con-
sideration: a good example of such imitational discourse is the 2015 David 
Wnendt film titled Er is wieder da, a satirical parable on the return of 
Hitler in the twenty-first century, his resurfacing among the Germans, 
who convivially embrace him, and who, in return, delivers a number of 
grievous remarks about the society. Wnendt, perhaps in order to promote 
the film, even decided to engage in a small-scale psychological experi-
ment and sent the male lead, Oliver Masucci, out on the streets of Berlin 
(Drury, 2015) with a surprising result: people pulled him over to take self-
ies and begged him to re-introduce concentration camps – 2015 marked 
one of the high tides of the refugee crisis in Germany – and support right 
wing movements in Germany.
In this second type of discourse on fascism, Hitler is still perceived as 
a pop icon, rendering the fascination with his personae not entirely attrib-
utable to the existence of fascist beliefs. Sometimes, Hitler is the source of 
material for comedy, featuring online in the form of various memes, with 
the emphasis on the interplay of incongruity and the search for amuse-
ment.  The World Wide Web has made possible numerous visual, graph-
ical and textual depictions; one noteworthy example is a scene from the 
2004 German film Der Untergang, featuring a dramatic performance by 
Bruno Hanz as Hitler, which has been imitated profusely. Published on 
Youtube, the videos invariably alter the scene’s context by subtitles play-
ing out different variations of social events so as to further the agenda of 
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the authors of the subtitles, which is to ridicule. In the cases of Facebook 
users listed below; however, people do not embrace fascist nostalgia for 
name-calling, nor do they wish just to play make-believe fascism; rather, 
they are actually enthusiastic about it, at least from the perspective of the 
“useful solutions” that the holocaust offered.
Textual evidence: Hitler’s awakening by Facebook users 
from Slovenia
“Nothing ever dies on the Internet,” says Rosenfeld, the author of Hi 
Hitler! – How the Nazi Past Is Being Normalized in Contemporary Culture 
(2015: 9). Facebook profiles, blogs, his websites and his digital presence 
are going to survive, making sure that Hitler’s presence in humanity is a 
constant. And while social networks today are one of the drivers of free 
speech online, providing an open platform for the expression of political 
and social beliefs in a significantly more open manner than in the past, 
there is a certain element of danger contained of trends of the line be-
tween freedom of speech and hate speech becoming increasingly blurred. 
People create posts, upload images or videos and make comments without 
being fully aware of the extent to which this may degrade and insult oth-
er groups, or individuals (Dawn, 2012). 
If users are anonymous, the situation only worsens. The statements 
cited below were made from August 2015 to December 2015 on Facebook. 
They refer to the transit of refugees across Slovenia during one of the 
peaks of the refugee crisis and represent just a small proportion of all re-
corded opinions of Slovenian users. Importantly, it must be noted that 
the authors are not anonymous and have not concealed their identity. The 
sample – since only a small selection is cited – is intended for illustration 
purposes only. We emphasise that the statements were not sampled from 
Facebook profiles given over to the expression of radical positions and the 
dissemination of xenophobia, or locations frequented by aspiring radical 
right-wingers or neo-Nazi followers. The personal profiles of the authors 
reveal that the sample is a valid representation of a system of belief of com-
mon people, who had not been subjected to any prior ideological indoc-
trination. Below follows a list of thirty documented statements that show 
readily identifiable basic elements of fascination with Hitler discussed 
above:
1. “Off to Auschwitz with them! They don’t belong anywhere else.”
2. “Too late for borders – they are here already – Hitler must be brought 
back from the dead. He’d sort this out fast.”
3. “Mauthausen, followed by a group shower.”
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4. “Dachau, Auschwitz, etc. still in condition for repopulation. Folks, I 
know, it’s ugly to hear it from me, but if we want what’s best for our 
kids, European countries will have to, absolutely, really, have to do 
something to protect our people. I’m not a racist, but this can’t be 
happening in Europe. A million people, are you nuts? Where to put 
them? Who to feed them? Should it come to war, I hope the EU wins, 
even though a lot of people think Europe is led by Jews.”
5. “Lock ‘em all up in concentration camps, the trash of a nation have no 
business in the EU.”
6. “Oh, no. C’mon people, these are poor ol’ refugees. Mercy, Adolf, 
please reincarnate.”
7. “Sometimes, when you see this real images and the statements by the 
police, you wish that Hitler woke up and put an iron curtain on our 
border with Croatia.”
8. “Hitler was a cruel leader, but he put all who disrespected him in their 
place. He also taught his people to respect their nation and their land. 
Despite his cruel behaviour, he was a respected and successful leader.”
9. “Auschwitz’s been deserted for too many years, and the stacks are in 
need of cleaning.”
10. “Take them to Auschwitz, the vermin.”
11. “Gas it up.”
12. “Stinkin’ vermin. I’d make gas chambers instead of these centres and 
ship ‘em off there. Goddam.”
13. “Gas chambers still open?”
14. “Europe will come to miss ‘mein Führer’ Adolf Hitler. Fuck it, this IS 
hate speech.”«
15. “Hitler, where are you? Shoot ‘em all up.”
16. “Lock all 5,000, or how many there may be in Slovenia, in a gas 
chamber.”
17. “Put ‘em on trains. On cattle cars, then ‘destination’ Dachau.”
18. “Gas chambers are the solution.”
19. “Here is our Lebensraum. They should adapt to us, not the other way 
‘round. What is being done is just the opposite; they have almost more 
rights than we do, and people are just idle. We will be exterminated, 
that’s their goal. Where is Hitler, when you need on? He’d sort it out.”
20. “I think the entire Middle East is going to migrate. This means the 
soon downfall of Europe. Regrettably, we’re missing the kind of ruler 
that the Germans had in 45.”
21. “Gas chambers, then run all the bloody vermin directly in there.”
22. “Put ‘em all in camps with gas chambers.”
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23. “The refugees just need to be fed rat poison or locked up in a gas 
chamber. Death to the refugees, long live Slovenians.”
24. “The furnaces in the concentration camps need to be stoked so that 
this lot can burn and migrate through the chimney stacks.”
25. “All we need is a Hitler too quickly put them all away. I’d chip in for 
the ammo from my own salary.”
26. “Release the gas, otherwise we’ll be slowly beaten and stabbed, since 
there’s more and more of them by the hour, what about our poor 
kids?”
27. “Sorry, but just wake up Dolfi, if we can’t hack it.”
28. “Where’s Hitler now?”
29. “Open up Auschwitz, and then welcome them home. I want to work 
there and we’ll shower them, the bunch of Muslims.”
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30. “Hitler’s spirit has risen in Europe, which will unify the people this 
time over and wash the immigrants back to where they came from. 
People in Europe are not as naive as the politicians in Brussels im-
agine. You can lie some time to ten people, but you can’t lie all the 
time to all the people.”
The anti-refugee xenophobia exhibits certain common characteris-
tics both in the cited statements and otherwise. Firstly, a large part of the 
statements directly calls for Adolf Hitler to be reawaken (statements 2, 6, 
7, 8, 14, 15, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28, 30). What is typical is that Hitler is imagine as 
if in a form of hibernation, or as somebody who needs to wake up himself 
(7, 27), or somebody who needs to be resuscitated (2), since we all “miss” or 
need him to intervene against the refugees (14, 15, 19, 25), because of which 
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he needs to reincarnate (6). The author of (8) paints, with great sympathy, 
an image of Hitler’s historical success, as a foundation for the need for 
his reappearance, while the author of (30) recognises that the spirit of the 
Nazi leader is already present, that he is arisen and will “wash away the mi-
grants.” All of the above ideas associate directly with the icon of the lead-
er of the Third Reich and indisputably emanate a fascination with him, 
as well as a type of open idolatry, while perceiving Hitler as the only tru-
ly successful person that will handle the problem of the inflow of refugees 
in Europe in the same manner as with the Jews. In other words: his crimes 
against humanity and the holocaust are regarded with admiration and 
pride; there are moments when he is intimately and amiably addressed as 
Adolf (6) and “Dolfi” (27) .
A second characteristic is the reference to Nazi concentration camps, 
offered as a solution to the refugee crisis and the “annulment” of the ref-
ugees, who are frequently termed “trash” (5) or “vermin” (10, 12, 21). 
Accompanying are references to three widely known camps, well-estab-
lished in Slovenian historical memory (Auschwitz, Dachau, Mauthausen). 
That the refugees ought to be deported and locked up in concentration 
camps is asserted by a particularly high number of users (statements 1, 3, 
4, 5, 9, 10, 17, 22, 24, 29). Some of them also directly indicate the suggest-
ed method of execution, while others do not. The former mostly connect 
concentration camps with gas chambers. In this sense, gas as the suggest-
ed method of execution is mentioned by authors of 3, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 21, 23, 
24, 26 and 29, who sometimes refer also to chimney stacks, which need to 
be “cleaned” (9), or cleverly suggesting that the refugees migration route is 
now going to lead through the stacks (24). Other Facebook users, a signif-
icantly lower number, proposed shooting (15, 25), or using rat poison (23). 
Generally, most often the evocation of Hitler as the image of the saviour 
is accompanied by a reference to the concentration camps and gas cham-
bers, while the anticipation of his arrival is pervaded by the feeling that he 
will “sort it out” (19) and handle what we “can’t hack” (27).
What is fascism and what isn’t? Casual epistemic fascism
What to think of the beliefs of such Facebook users and where to place 
them? To what extent and observing which criteria may they justifiably by 
attributed fascist beliefs?  In a highly-publicized article, Fuchs (2017: pp. 
228–263) analyses user-generated fascism, which he calls “Fascism 2.0”, 
a more appropriate term than “participatory fascism”. Based on Hitler’s 
127th birthday (20 April 2016) and the fascination of Twitter users, he de-
velops a thesis on the four elements of such fascism: online authoritarian-
ism, online nationalism, online friend-foe scheme, and online patriarchy 
š ol s ko p ol j e ,  l e t n i k x x i x ,  š t e v i l k a 5– 6 
142
and naturalism. Fuchs attributes the fascination with Hitler and the 
growth of “Fascism 2.0” to the social crisis, which generates fascism. 
According to Griffin (1991: p. 201), the “fascist minimum” is repre-
sented by three mythic components: the myth of the rebirth, populist ul-
tra-nationalism and the myth of decadence. Today, many radical right 
wing and extremist movements contain elements of the above and it rep-
resents the ideological core of the movements or the parties similar to 
them. Their desire for ethnic purity and a sort of fundamental order plac-
es them alongside of fascism. The fascism of social network users inter-
prets the myth of the rebirth literally, as far as the Führer is concerned: it 
is Hitler, who needs to be reborn, his time is allegedly coming again. The 
fascist myth of the rebirth, taken as a palingenetic myth, can be associ-
ated with the feeling of a fresh start or regeneration, following a stage of 
crisis or downturn (Griffin, 1991: pp. 33–35). However, the convictions of 
Facebook users are not entirely associated with the coming of a new era 
and a sense of belonging; the evocation of Hitler is rather a practical reci-
pe for what to do with the refugees, so belonging to the established fascist 
idea is hardly an appropriate designation. 
Are there any social and historical idiosyncrasies, typical only in so-
cial network users from Slovenia? Even though individual thought pat-
terns cannot be the result of abstract thinking alone, removed from social 
certainties, historical reminiscence and the political atmosphere, whose 
composition is heavily influenced by intensive journalistic and media 
propaganda, the affinity to fascism cannot be directly tied to the Home 
Guard tradition entirely. Šumi (2015: pp. 28–44) finds that the propagan-
da drive against Jews by the Home Guard was central to the argumenta-
tion of their political programme. General Leon Rupnik certainly could 
not go without it in all of his published speeches. It also constituted the 
entire purpose of the political and military alliance with Germany and 
the Third Reich. Concurrently, allied policies, positions and military ac-
tions were, as a rule, subject to sarcasm and ridicule, in particular as these 
were believed to be the result of falling for the Zionist plot, the disclosure 
of which and, in turn, destruction was the holy objective of the struggle by 
the Third Reich and its allies. Similarly, Slovenian partisans were consis-
tently portrayed as a tragically misguided, laughable vigilante movement 
by a handful of traitors to the Slovenian nation and the Catholic religion, 
who have voluntarily fallen for the Jewish propaganda and global conspir-
acy, which blinded them with their fairy-tale of communism. The Home 
Guard fought with conviction on the side of Germany for the victory of 
the healthy Aryan race against the Jewish-borne destruction of Europe 
and all things Slovenian. The Home Guard quisling authorities and its 
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mouthpieces thought of themselves as privileged participants in an ep-
ochal, decisive war against Jews, the Zionists and their global conspira-
cy, while Hitler and the Third Reich were perceived as the only, last his-
torical opportunity for Europe, Aryans, including Slovenians, civilization 
and the pure Catholic faith to ward off the cataclysm of the Jewish hell-
bent plan. 
Similarly, the above mentioned Facebook users cannot be necessar-
ily accused of negationism, i.e. the denial of historical facts against hu-
manity, describing a movement that denies the Nazi genocide over Jews in 
1941–1945 (Finkielkraut et al., 1998). In fact, we know nothing about their 
anti-Semitism, since they only state a fascination over Hitler’s “efficien-
cy”. Pavlič’s research (2015: pp. 245–257) has found that the degree of an-
ti-Semitism and negationism in secondary school students in Slovenia is 
not negligible. However, methodological prudency dictates that users are 
not attributed with beliefs that cannot be evidenced. In addition, there is 
no evidence of their membership in groups or movements that are other-
wise considered racist, homophobic, zealot, anti-Semitic, aggressively na-
tionalist or similar, or that they abide by National Socialism in any oth-
er form, or employ neo-Nazi iconography. Moreover, we do not know if 
they have adopted Nazi modes and patterns of operation, such as glorify-
ing one race’s supremacy over others, promulgation of the mythical expla-
nation of the nation’s history, verbal and physical altercations with others, 
or if they are perhaps organising military training. 
Once the above mentioned users are shed of the listed circumstanc-
es, their mental allegiance might be termed casual epistemic fascism: the 
proponents’ system of beliefs still follows the fascist tradition, but only to 
the extent that they harbour convictions of the success, historical role, and 
efficiency of fascism, Nazism or national socialism, perceiving the forego-
ing with casual nostalgia and expectation. Casual epistemic fascism does 
not represent a political ideal, its followers lack the drive for active engage-
ment, and, in all likelihood, not everyone fosters ambitions and expecta-
tions for the coming of a fascist social and political order, since there are 
not any indications that the Facebook users quoted above might be cred-
ited with such inclinations, completely equating them with existing neo-
Nazi and other radical ideas on the political right. It seems more likely 
that they have turned to Hitler with a certain resentment, casually and 
exclusively out of a need driven by their xenophobic and Islamophobic be-
liefs. Even though each fascism is based on a system of beliefs and opin-
ions, epistemic fascism may be distinguished from the full-fledged fascism 
in this respect, as these are not users that are likely to practice the use of 
fascist symbols in their daily life, or pursue a political agenda. At the same 
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time, their fascism had been used opportunistically for the purpose of dis-
semination of own Islamophobic, xenophobic and intolerant attitudes to-
wards the refugees.
In the users’ statements, the refugees are not necessarily identified 
as a threat on a nationalist level through a kind of a patriotic discourse, 
but have become that Other in a manner, similar to the erased in the past. 
The difference being that the mythologization of being European is now 
replaced by its defence: European, that is Judeo-Christian, roots must be 
defended from the incursion of the alien Islam. The problem is not that 
we are witnessing a “new racism” in hiding, spoken about by Van Dijk 
(2000: p. 33), but that we are faced with a direct apology of old racism and 
fascism.
Hate Speech, Fascism and the Refugee as the New-age Jew
Racism in Slovenia traditionally targets “non-Slovenians”, which is a term 
usually used for the ethnic origin of people coming from the territories 
of former Yugoslavia, with the standard addition of the Roma people and 
immigrants (Trplan 2005: p. 226). Jalušič (2015: p. 40), has found that the 
dominant understanding of racism today is that it represents an ideology, 
or racist ideology, manifested through speech and the symbols of hatred 
as one of the key reasons for the focus on hate crimes. A similar conclusion 
can be drawn about fascism: its historical backdrop is the interpretation 
of the Nazi totalitarianism and the holocaust as phenomena, whose ori-
gin can be traced directly to Nazi ideology (anti-Semitism and racism and 
Hitler as the extreme irrational zealot), and not some separate new struc-
ture of authority that took root in the twentieth century Europe, but it 
also follows from the thesis of “victory” over fascism in WWII. 
Anti-Semitism was replaced by anti-Islamism during the refugee cri-
sis, and the hatred towards Jews by the hatred towards Muslim refugees. 
The latter have become the new-age Jew. Refugees do not exist, they are 
outside the realms of social and political subjectivity. Any emotion of em-
pathy is redundant in relationships with them, they do not require help; 
on the contrary, they must be eliminated: gassed, shot, and murdered. 
Presented as a homogenous ethnic, national and religious group, their or-
igin, political, or religious beliefs are irrelevant; their homogeneity is con-
structed and warranted by the simple fact that we need to get rid of them 
and that Hitler will see to it. The casual epistemic fascism does not gen-
erate a discourse of exclusion; instead, it demands a clean, ultimate exclu-
sion in the form of extermination. The refugees as the Other, as opposed 
to “us”, are no different from us, but represent an ultimate threat. Peaceful 
co-existence and the intermingling of different racial and ethnic groups 
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are not issues relatable to refugees, but only a radical rejection of every 
possibility of the former. Being dehumanised, the abstract perception of 
refugees is that of a threat that needs to be eliminated.
With the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 and 2016 
and the appearance of distinct hate speech in Slovenia in the public dis-
cussions on the attitude towards the refugees, two camps were again 
formed in the heated discussions: numerous figures from the fields of so-
ciology and other humanities, as well as the lay and critical public detect-
ed unfathomable cases of, expecting law enforcement authorities to sanc-
tion it. Conversely, there were opposing opinions by mostly political and 
ideological reactions, which had difficulties concealing their mere toler-
ance of the phenomenon of hatred and hate speech in the spirit of more or 
less latent xenophobia, mostly under the pretext of safeguarding the free-
dom of speech, as the result of their ideological or political agenda, or sim-
ply out of some economic or other justification of the fear of refugees.  In 
this stalemate, it was the law enforcement institutions that were called 
upon to be the arbiter, even with regard to sociologically charged inter-
pretations and public diagnosis of the society; for example, the state pros-
ecutors were expected to take action. Public discussions did not bring any 
significant progress, mostly because of the law enforcement institutions’’ 
lack of involvement in the discussions. The first more intensively exam-
ined case of a highly publicised tweet of Sebastjan Erlah, a publicist, was 
reported to the state prosecutor’s, but the charges were dismissed. Similar 
charges were later brought to bear on account of different posts on social 
networks; however, the results of those proceedings are not in the public 
domain. When Erlah, acting as a publicist, posted a tweet on his Twitter 
account, saying that Middle Eastern refugees must be ambushed at the 
border and shot (“I have a more radical idea: allow them up to 500m of 
the border. Anything closer than that and shot them all, God will know 
his own.”), this was followed by numerous other examples, and keeping up 
with the tone (Vezjak, 2017).
The Slovenian public was also able to follow a website called Zlovenia 
for a few months, whose anonymous author was attempting to identify 
the authors of similar hate posts. Below is a small sample of the statements 
by social network users, mainly Facebook, posted at the site: “Shoot, and 
once ten are down, they are guaranteed not dragging themselves to Europe 
anymore,” “Good enough for killing only,” “If I see one nigger in Prevalje, 
I’ll slaughter him,” “It’s ‘bout time that the people get a licence to kill eco-
nomic migrants,” “Let’s slaughter us some ragheads, “Any Muslim is a ter-
rorist by default,” “Shoot every one in three as a warning,” “Put all the mi-
grants under a sort of dome, then just gas ‘em, or let loose a hail of bullets,” 
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and similar. The number of very specific and identified cases is staggering; 
actually, these were not cases of particular hate speech, but its mass out-
burst (Vezjak, 2017). It stood to reasons that the state prosecutor’s office 
would provide a sensible explanation as to why they had not taken action, 
even though criminal charges were raised. 
In their analysis of the language of the “anti-Semitic mind” in pres-
ent-day modern Germany, Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz (2017: p. xiv) 
find that the World Wide Web has become the largest and most influ-
ential propagator of anti-Jewish statements, in particular in social media:
“You ugly little Jews, mankind’s rats, one should gas all genetically 
declared Jewish criminals.” Or, “The Jews are to be blamed for everything. 
Therefore we should eliminate the Jews, in whatever way we can.” These 
are two examples among thousands in online comments, in chat forums, 
on Twitter accounts, on Facebook, and so on. 
They also list some cases that bear a strong resemblance with the 
quoted users from Slovenia – insofar as these refere to Jews: “Its time again 
for proper Aryans to turn on the gas! [. . .] HEIL HITLER!” (Schwarz-
Friesel and Reinharz, 2017: p. 131), “I’m going to give you a grand gassing 
in Auschwitz!” (Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, 2017: p. 251), or “It’s get-
ting to be time again for proper Aryans to turn on the gas!” (Schwarz-
Friesel and Reinharz, 2017: p. 268). Sometimes, the use of gas is aimed at 
Israelis, too: “The Israelis are the rats of the world and should one and all 
be poisoned with Zyclon gas, the way you do with rats” (Schwarz-Friesel 
and Reinharz, 2016: p. 268). Such anti-Semitic discourse has largely dou-
bled up on anti-Muslim today. In his analysis of islamophobia, Lean (2017: 
p. 66) highlights the significant surge of anti-Islamism and the role of so-
cial networks in this regard:
Conversations about the anti-Muslim blogosphere cannot overlook the 
role of social media. Indeed, without it, write-ups about Muslim-led vio-
lence and the threatening cloud of ‘Islamic extremism’ that are so domi-
nant on the Internet today would not enjoy the traction and success that 
they do. Social media replaces traditional advertising. While Facebook 
has been influential in the past, it is Twitter that, more recently, stands 
out as the platform that is so crucial to getting Islamophobic messages 
out to the masses.
Kompatsiaris and Mylonas (2015) detect a significant linguistic sim-
ilarity between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hatred in the membership of 
the Greek extremist party called Golden Dawn, that some consider fas-
cist: the vocabulary, as in the case of Hitler’s Germany, is aimed at mi-
grants, Jews and Bolsheviks, who contain an element of “impurity” and 
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threaten to destroy the nation. Undeniably, the fires of the anti-refu-
gee political propaganda are in a large part stoked by politicians; Stanley 
(2018: p. 92) makes a detailed report on Trump’s completely fabricated ac-
cusation of Mexican refugees being rapists. Casual epistemic fascism and 
racism is indisputably the result of international migrations, creating an 
increasingly nationally and ethnically heterogeneous society. Intolerance, 
the creation of stereotypes, the division to “us” and “them”, discrimina-
tion and new racism, which is adopting the ideas of the Third Reich and 
the fascination with Hitler are based on national, religious and ethnic 
identities. Bučar Ručman (2014) finds that the ideological machinery of 
a state is a key player in the (re)production and dissemination of (neo)rac-
ism, the discourse of Otherness, stereotypes and prejudice, operating be-
hind the curtain of such a discourse upon which discriminatory and ra-
sist social practices are founded. At the same time, the recourse to hatred 
and the division between “us” and “them” follows from the feeling of be-
ing endangered, direct assault, rape, terrorist attack, the expected loss of 
jobs and abuse of subsidies in the destination country.
Casual epistemic fascism as a form of hate speech is certainly based 
on social stereotypes on refugees; the formation of a feeling of threat from 
a Muslim invasion took place through the processes of attribution of char-
acteristics based on group membership and not individual traits. The par-
anoia, so typical of islamophobia, is propped up by the dichotomy be-
tween the external Other, perceived as an enemy, and an internal saviour. 
The framework of such a dichotomous division is also the birthing plane 
of a homogenous demand for a super “us” that would face off with the im-
agined enemy. The evocation of Hitler by means of a wide-spread political 
and media propaganda is the logical, though radical, offspring of the psy-
chopolitics of hatred, permanently fostered by certain political parties in 
Slovenia and their media.
Conclusion
On 27 January 1945, the Red Army liberated one of the worst Nazi con-
centration camps – Auschwitz in Poland. At least 1.6 million Jews, Roma, 
Slavs and other “lesser” peoples died there. Auschwitz is also the final rest-
ing place of 1,351 Slovenians. At its session on 1 November 2005, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations designated Auschwitz liberation day as 
the Annual International Day of Commemoration to Honour Holocaust 
Victims. The Slovenian government designated in 2008 27 January as the 
National Holocaust Remembrance Day. Slovenians, too, remember the 
holocaust as a terrible experience of the unhuman, the beastly, the experi-
ence of ethnic cleansing and a history of extermination. According to Alič 
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(2018), almost 13,000 Slovenians died in Italian, German, Croatian and 
Hungarian concentration camps, of which the majority in Riseria di San 
Sabba in Trieste, a sub-camp of Auschwitz, – over four thousand. During 
WWII, almost 59,000 Slovenians were interred in concentration camps, 
of which 36,000 in the Italian camps of Rab, Gonars, Renicci and Visco.
What is the horizon of beliefs and judgements of this world, adopted 
by those who in 2015 and even today want a repeat of the experience, call-
ing for new extermination in the case of the refugees and offering “migra-
tion through the stacks?” Copsey (2018) finds that, in political science to-
day, the line separating the radical right and fascist is hard to define. He 
believes that the (neo)fascism of the past is the best way to understand the 
modern radical right, but this chain of reasoning is missing a link. One 
part of this link is the casual epistemic fascism, wearing the disguise of 
many forms of adoration of the Third Reich, and expressed in the belief 
that the time is coming for Hitler to walk among us. The distinction be-
tween the causal epistemic and the full-fledged fascism may explain the 
magnitude of the phenomenon: the rise of radical movements, right wing 
popularise, nationalism across Europe and the world cannot be explained 
by counting actions and memberships alone. It also allows for a more seri-
ous consideration of fascism even when fascism appears at the level of indi-
viduals’ convictions, and even when it is remedied, though treated it with 
insufficient gravity and due analysis, upon detection on social networks.
In 1995 Umberto Eco wrote: 
Ur-fascism is still present, sometimes, even surprisingly in the open. It 
would be a lot easier for us, if someone appeared and said: ‘I want to re-
open Auschwitz, I want the Black Shirts to parade the squares of Italy 
again.” Life is not that simple. Ur-fascism may return in the meekest of 
disguises. It is our duty to expose it and point a finger at any of its new 
versions – each and every day and in every corner of the world. 
Eco’s choice, the one he considered easier, is before us: this paper lists suf-
ficient evidence of the existence of not just ur-fascism as a structural reali-
ty, but even in the form of a desire to reawaken and reopen concentration 
camps; and we should not be lulled by the fact that it is present amongst 
Facebook users alone. Erlah’s example explains why, for reasons that are 
incomprehensible, we cannot prosecute and limit fascism in accordance 
with our criminal legislation. In this regard, it is imperative that we be 
guided by methodological inhibitions. It is not just that there are not any 
substantial reasons to believe that the philosophy of life of the mentioned 
Facebook users harbours “full-fledged” convictions on the imperative of 
fascist transformation of Europe and the arrival of a saviour in the guise 
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of Hitler; no, in all likelihood, the users carry no such convictions. On 
the other hand, the declaration of their position on the level of utteranc-
es cannot be neglected: the enthusiasm over the Führer, gas chambers and 
concentrations camps, which are to be reused. These remain their core 
message; one whose significance must not and cannot be simply waved 
off as empty talk, nor can it be examined separated from the social and 
media practices in which flirting with fascist leaders and the subscription 
to their ideas seems to be becoming the norm. Or, as Timothy Snyder 
(2018) ominously wrote: “Some Americans ask: What is wrong with the 
Internet? Others ask: Can fascism return? These questions are the same 
question.”
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BEING MAINSTREAM, BEING RADICAL: HOW DO YOUNG PEOPLE 
UNDERSTAND RADICALISM IN CROATIA
Motivated by the lack of theoretical concepts to grasp the shock of 9/11, 
social scientists put forward the concept of radicalisation. Since then, it 
has become one of the buzz concepts in social sciences, particularly in 
security and terrorist studies. However, recent critiques point out the 
need to reconceptualise radicalisation so that it can be used outside its 
dominant, Western home-grown violent terrorism context. Following 
those critiques, we adopt a relative approach to radicalisation and use it 
empirically in the context of South-Eastern Europe and youth studies. 
More concretely, the goal of this paper is to analyse how the terms “rad-
ical” and “mainstream” are understood by Croatian youth. To do this, 
we employed qualitative methodology, namely focus groups conducted 
in urban and rural settings on a sample of young people. We wanted to 
uncover where the line between the “radical” and “mainstream” is for 
young people. By answering these questions, we sought to confirm the 
assumption that in Croatia, although the term “radical” cannot be un-
derstood in the context of violence, it may have dangerous repercussions 
for social and individual development of young people and society as a 
whole. Our results show that young people in Croatia conceptualise rad-
icalism as a relative, neutral, and context dependent term. At the same 
time, they describe both the mainstream and radical individuals in neg-
ative connotations. 
Keyword: Croatia, mainstream, terrorism, radicalism, mainstream, youth
Povzetki/Abstracts
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BITI MAINSTREAM, BITI RADIKALEN: KAKO MLADI 
NA HRVAŠKEM RAZUMEJO RADIKALIZEM 
Zaradi pomanjkanja teoretičnih konceptov, ki bi lahko zaobjeli šok 11. 
septembra, so družboslovci predstavili koncept radikalizacije. Od takrat 
je postal eden od najbolj aktualnih konceptov v družbenih vedah, zlas-
ti v varnostnih vedah in terorističnih študijah. Vendar pa nedavne kri-
tike opozarjajo na potrebo po ponovni rekonceptualizaciji radikalizacije, 
da bi jo lahko uporabili zunaj svojega prevladujočega konteksta zahodne-
ga ‘domačega’ nasilnega terorizma. Po teh kritikah sprejemamo relativni 
pristop k radikalizaciji, ki ga empirično uporabimo v okviru jugovzhodne 
Evrope in študij mladih. Konkretneje, cilj tega prispevka je analizirati, 
kako hrvaška mladina razume izraza ‘radikalen’ in ‘mainstream’. V ta 
namen smo uporabili kvalitativno metodologijo, in sicer fokusne sku-
pine, ki so potekale na vzorcu mladih v urbanih in podeželskih okoljih. 
Želeli smo odkriti, kje je za mlade meja med ‘radikalnim’ in ‘mainstrea-
mom’. Z odgovorom na ta vprašanja smo skušali potrditi predpostavko, 
da ima na Hrvaškem, čeprav izraza ‘radikalen’ ni mogoče razumeti v kon-
tekstu nasilja, lahko nevarne posledice za družbeni in individualni raz-
voj mladih kot tudi družbe kot celote. Naši rezultati kažejo, da mladi na 
Hrvaškem pojmujejo radikalizem kot relativen, nevtralen in od kontek-
stna odvisen pojem. Hkrati tudi opisujejo tako ‘mainstream’ in radikalne 
posameznike z negativnimi konotacijami.




The subject in the title is addressed through a concept appropriate both 
for religious as well as political ideology. It is the concept of a “cage” made 
of four dimensions: the first is the cognitive relationship to reality (this 
dimension involves two extremes: relativism / fundamentalism), the sec-
ond involves the mode of impacting the environment (reformism / radi-
calism), the third dimension is presented by the direction of action (out-
ward / inward) and the fourth is the temporal dimension. Radicalisation 
is defined by the coincidence of unfavourable combinations of these di-
mensions, which is why it is difficult to understand it, if it is reduced only 
to one level, and qualified more as a reason than as an effect. This ap-
proach also provides the easiest way to avoid three very common mistakes 
when considering radicalisation: unreflected use of synonyms, volunta-
rist qualifications, and disregard of the difference between the general 
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and the specific. The second part of the paper gives some examples on 
the influence of the social context on the phenomenon of radicalism, 
with a special emphasis on the Slovenian example. Despite having one of 
the lowest degrees of social inequality and other very positive indicators, 
Slovenia is a good illustration of the emergence of radicalisation when ap-
parently nothing is wrong.
Keywords: radicalisation, social power, social inequality, social systems, 
democracy, ideology
DEJAVNIKI RADIKALIZACIJE
Naslovna tema je obravnavana skozi koncept, primeren tako za religij-
sko kot za politično ideologijo. Gre za koncept »kletke«, sestavljene iz 
štirih dimenzij. Prva je kognitivno razmerje do resničnosti (dimenzija z 
dvema ekstremoma: relativizem / fundamentalizem), druga je v načinu 
delovanja na okolje (reformizem / radikalizem), tretjo dimenzijo pred-
stavlja smer delovanja (navzven / navznoter) in četrto časovna razsežnost. 
Radikalizacija pomeni sovpadanje neugodnih kombinacij na omenjenih 
dimenzijah, zato jo težko razumemo, če jo reduciramo zgolj na eno ra-
ven in jo kvalificiramo bolj za vzrok kot pa učinek. S tem pristopom se 
tudi naj lažje izognemo trem najpogostejšim napakam pri obravnavi 
radikalizacije: nereflektirani uporabi sinonimov, voluntarističnim kvali-
fikacijam in pa ignoriranju razlike med splošnim in posebnim. V drugem 
delu prispev ka je navedenih nekaj primerov o vplivu družbenega kontek-
sta na pojav radikalizma, s posebnim poudarkom na slovenskem prime-
ru. Kljub eni najnižjih stopenj družbene neenakosti in kljub drugim zelo 
ugodnim rezultatom je Slovenija dobra ilustracija nastanka radikalizacije 
v razmerah, ko na videz ni nič narobe.
Ključne besede: radikalizacija, družbena moč, družbena neenakost, 
družbeni sistemi, demokracija, ideologija
Dianne Gereluk and Carol-Ann Titus
HOW SCHOOLS CAN REDUCE YOUTH RADICALIZATION
An increased public discourse about the radicalization of youth is nota-
ble since 9/11. There is heightened anxiety about how: youth may turn to 
extremist groups; become radicalized, and; act on these feelings to under-
take extremist activities.  Schools are increasingly called upon to look out 
for youth who turn to radicalized groups, but lack the awareness or train-
ing to thoughtfully address ways in which to create conditions for youth 
to not turn to these radicalized groups.  In this paper, we argue that in or-
der for educators to support youth in their schools so that they are not 
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drawn to radicalized groups, we suggest three directives.  First, educators 
must understand the indicators that are a precondition for youth radical-
ization.  Second, educators must understand how their learning environ-
ment may play a role in whether youth feel isolated or marginalized from 
the general community, which may lead to radicalization.  Third, an ex-
plicit formal curriculum must embed a broader political deliberation to 
understand the broader political and social determinants that lead to ter-
rorism and extremism.  While schools must not be burdened solely to ad-
dress those youth who may become radicalized, schools have a significant 
role to help support those youth who feel that radicalization is the only 
way forward for them.
Keywords: youth, radicalization, schools, curriculum, extremism
KAKO LAHKO ŠOLE ZMANJŠAJO RADIKALIZACIJO MLADIH
Vse od 11. septembra 2001 je opazno povečano javno razpravljanje o ra-
dikalizaciji mladih. Obstaja namreč večja zaskrbljenost glede tega, kako 
se mladi lahko pridružijo ekstremističnim skupinam; postanejo radika-
lizirani in delujejo na podlagi teh občutkov, da bi izvedli ekstremistič-
ne dejavnosti. Šole so vedno pogosteje pozvane, da poiščejo mlade, ki se 
obračajo k radikaliziranim skupinam, vendar jim primanjkuje ozavešče-
nosti ali usposabljanja za premišljeno obravnavanje načinov, kako ustva-
riti pogoje za mlade, da se na te radikalizirane skupine ne obrnejo. V tem 
članku predlagava tri direktive, da učitelji v svojih šolah lahko podprejo 
mlade, da jih ne bi pritegnile radikalizirane skupine. Prvič: učitelji mora-
jo razumeti kazalnike, ki so predpogoj za radikalizacijo mladih. Drugič: 
učitelji morajo razumeti, kako lahko njihovo učno okolje igra vlogo pri 
tem ali se mladi počutijo izolirane ali marginalizirane od širše skupnos-
ti, kar lahko privede do radikalizacije. Tretjič, jasen formalni učni načrt 
mora vključevati širšo politično razpravo, da bi razumeli širše politične in 
družbene determinante, ki vodijo v terorizem in ekstremizem. Medtem 
ko šole ne smejo biti obremenjene le z obravnavanjem tistih mladih, ki se 
lahko radikalizirajo, imajo prav šole pomembno vlogo pri podpori tistim 
mladim, ki menijo, da je radikalizacija zanje edina pot.
Ključne besede: mladina, radikalizacija, šole, kurikulum, ekstremizem
Iztok Prezelj, Klemen Kocjančič and Urša Marinšek
ISLAMIST RADICALISATION TOWARDS EXTREME VIOLENCE 
AND TERRORISM
Islamist terrorism and the related Islamist radicalisation have become 
very serious national and international security threats in Europe and 
around the world. Islamist radicalisation towards extreme violence and 
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terrorism takes place locally in many conflict areas of the Middle East, 
Asia, Africa, and in European ethnically and religiously mixed cities. 
This process is led and stimulated by the global Jihadi idea of establish-
ing an Islamic religious state or caliphate. This paper aims to explain the 
process of Islamist radicalisation at the conceptual level, presents the idea 
of Jihad, the related misuse of Islamic religious principles, and empiri-
cally explores the related propaganda process, especially the use of social 
media and the magazine Inspire to attract and mobilise potential terror-
ists. The paper argues that the basic fight in the radicalisation story is the 
fight for the hearts and minds of the population. Finally, the paper pro-
poses some ideas of how to fight Islamist radicalisation in public schools. 
Key words: Islamism, radicalisation, extreme violence, terrorism, propa-
ganda, winning hearts and minds, social media, Al Qaeda, ISIS
ISLAMISTIČNA RADIKALIZACIJA V SMER SKRAJNEGA NASILJA 
IN TERORIZMA
Islamistični terorizem in islamistična radikalizacija sta postala zelo 
resni nacionalni in mednarodni varnostni grožnji v Evropi in tudi širše. 
Islamistična radikalizacija v smeri izvajanja ekstremnega nasilja in teroriz-
ma je prisotna na številnih konfliktnih področjih in v evropskih etnično 
ter versko mešanih mestih. Ta proces je voden in stimuliran s strani ide-
je globalnega džihada, ki ima cilj vzpostavitve islamske verske države oz. 
kalifata. Članek predstavlja proces islamistične radikalizacije, idejo dži-
hada in s tem povezane zlorabe islamskih verskih principov. Poleg tega 
se besedilo osredotoča na uporabo socialnih omrežij in revije Inspire v 
propagandne in mobilizacijske namene. Članek utemeljuje, da je osnovno 
orožje v boju proti radikalizaciji v bistvu boj za “srca in misli” prebivalst-
va. Članek v zaključnem delu izpostavlja ideje, kako se boriti proti islamis-
tični radikalizaciji v javnih šolah. 
Ključne besede: islamizem, radikalizacija, ekstremno nasilje, terorizem, 
propaganda, pridobivanje podpore, družbeni mediji, Al Kaida, ISIS
Julian Richards
A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION OF RADICALISATION
Interest in radicalism has a long history, dating back at least to the stir-
rings of Enlightenment Europe. Scrutiny of processes of radicalisation, 
however, have a much more recent history, with an upsurge in interest fol-
lowing the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001. Two key drivers have shaped 
the renewed interest. First, bureaucratic pressures in governments charged 
with dealing with the problem of terrorism have led to a number of at-
tempts to profile terrorists and shape process models that can “explain” 
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radicalisation. Second, a growing realisation that attacks after 9/11 – espe-
cially in Europe – were committed not by foreign radicals but by “home-
grown” citizens, has led to an increase in policy circles in the human fac-
tors concerning how individuals become drawn into violent movements, 
from a societal and sociological perspective. In terms of research and mod-
elling, there is growing recognition of two poles in the landscape: mac-
ro-level, or top-down models focus on the ideologies and ideologues who 
are pulling individuals into the radical movement. Micro-level, or bot-
tom-up models, conversely, look at the individuals becoming radicalised 
and their personal life-stories and experiences. More recently, research 
into radicalisation has settled into a new narrative that offers a synthe-
sised perspective on macro- and micro-level factors. This more enlight-
ened approach stresses the context-specificity of radicalisation, in that, 
while environmental factors causing despair and humiliation may be 
broad and widely present, the circumstances in which any one individ-
ual will be drawn into a violent course of action will be highly variable. 
This, in turn, stresses the importance of continual and repeated empirical 
research into individual tipping-points leading to violent radicalisation. 
Key words: radicalism, radicalisation, extremism, terrorism, modelling, 
empiricism
KONCEPTUALNO RAZISKOVANJE RADIKALIZACIJE
Zanimanje za radikalizem ima dolgo zgodovino, ki sega vsaj do začetkov 
razsvetljenske Evrope. Preučevanje procesov radikalizacije pa ima veliko 
novejšo zgodovino, s povečanjem zanimanja po napadih 11. septembra 2001 
v ZDA. Ta obnovljeni interes sta oblikovala dva ključna dejavnika. Prvič: 
birokratski pritiski v vladah, ki so zadolžene za reševanje problema teroriz-
ma, so privedli do številnih poskusov, da bi opredelili teroriste ter oblikova-
li procesne modele, ki radikalizacijo lahko ‚razložijo‘. Drugič: naraščajoče 
spoznanje, da napadov po 11. septembru – zlasti v Evropi – niso izvedli tuji 
radikalizirani posamezniki, temveč ‚domači‘ državljani, so privedli do pov-
ečane pozornosti političnih krogov za človeške dejavnike v zvezi s tem, kako 
se posamezniki pritegne v nasilna gibanja, iz družbenega in sociološkega 
vidika. V smislu raziskav in modeliranja vedno bolj prihajata v ospredje dva 
pola: makro raven ali ‚top-down‘ modeli, ki se osredotočajo na ideologije in 
ideologe, ki posameznike pritegnejo v radikalno gibanje. Prav nasprotno pa 
modeli na mikro ravni ali ‚bottom-up‘ modeli gledajo na posameznike, ki 
postajajo radikalizirani, ter na njihove osebne življenjske zgodbe in izkušn-
je. Nedavno so se raziskave o radikalizaciji ustalile okoli nove naracije, ki 
ponuja sintetizirano perspektivo dejavnikov na makro in mikro ravni. Ta 
bolj razsvetljen pristop poudarja kontekstualno specifičnost radikalizacije, 
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saj so lahko okoljski dejavniki, ki povzročajo obup in ponižanje, široki in 
vseprisotni, okoliščine, v katerih bo vsak posameznik vpleten v nasilni po-
tek dejanj, bodo zelo spremenljive. To pa hkrati poudarja pomembnost red-
nih in ponavljajočih se empiričnih raziskav posameznih prelomnih točk, ki 
vodijo v nasilno radikalizacijo.
Ključne besede: radikalizem, radikalizacija, ekstremizem, terorizem, mo-
deliranje, empirizem
Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
RADICALIZATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND CONFLICTING 
DIVERSITY
Despite the consensus that radicalization and violent extremism represent 
a major threat to political, economic and social security of contemporary 
democratic societies, the discussion about what precisely is radicalisation 
is far from being over. In fact, the problem of radicalization and violent 
extremism have brought to the forefront problems previously either com-
partmentalized in specialized courses on intelligence and security stud-
ies or at the very fringes of scholarly interest. This introductory article to 
‘Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity’ journal 
special issue identifies some of the most pressing of problems and chal-
lenges associated with radicalization and violent extremism as their rela-
tionship is anything but unambiguous or unproblematic. It also introduc-
es the articles and the interview that are part of this journal special issue.
Keywords: radicalization, violent extremism, conflicting diversity, 
education
RADIKALIZACIJA, NASILNI EKSTREMIZEM IN KONFLIKTNA 
RAZLIČNOST
Kljub soglasju, da radikalizacija in nasilni ekstremizem predstavljata 
pomembno grožnjo za politično, gospodarsko in socialno varnost sodob-
nih demokratičnih družb, je razprava o tem, kaj je radikalizacija, vse prej kot 
zaključena. Pravzaprav je problematika radikalizacije in nasilnega ekstremiz-
ma postavila v ospredje probleme, ki so bili prej del specializiranih tečajev o 
obveščevalnih in varnostnih študijah ali celo na samem obrobju znanstven-
ega interesa. Uvodni članek z naslovom ‘Radikalizacija, nasilni ekstremizem 
in konfliktna raznolikost’ identificira nekatere izmed najbolj perečih prob-
lemov in izzivov, ki so povezani z radikalizacijo in nasilnim ekstremizmom, 
saj je njun odnos vse prej kot nedvoumen ali neproblematičen. Hkrati pred-
stavi tudi ostale članke ter intervju, ki so del te tematske številke.
Ključne besede: radikalizacija, nasilni ekstremizem, konfliktna različnost, 
vzgoja in izobraževanje
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Mitja Sardoč
RADICALIZATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND CONFLICTING 
DIVERSITY: AN INTERVIEW WITH MICHEL WIEVIORKA
This interview with Prof. Michel Wieviorka discusses some of the most 
pressing issues associated with radicalization and violent extremism. The 
initial section of the interview is devoted to the discussion of the main dif-
ferences between violent extremism fueled by radicalisation and other for-
ms of terrorism that existed in different European countries back in the 
1960s and 1970s. In the central part of the interview, Prof. Wieviorka re-
flects on some of the conceptual problems associated with the ‚standard‘ 
interpretation of radicalization and violent extremism. The concluding 
part of the interview takes a closer look at the role education should play 
in the tackling of radicalization and violent extremism.
Keywords: radicalization, violent extremism, terrorism, conflicting diver-
sity, violence
RADIKALIZACIJA, NASILNI EKSTREMIZEM IN KONFLIKTNA 
RAZLIČNOST: INTERVJU Z MICHELOM WIEVIORKO
V tem intervjuju prof. Michel Wieviorka obravnava nekatera od najbolj 
perečih vprašanj, ki povezana z radikalizacijo in nasilnim ekstremizmom. 
Uvodni del intervjuja je namenjen razpravi o glavnih razlikah med nasil-
nim ekstremizmom, ki ga spodbuja radikalizacija in druge oblike ter-
orizma, ki so obstajale v različnih evropskih državah že v šestdesetih in 
sedemdesetih letih. V osrednjem delu intervjuja prof. Wieviorka razmišlja 
o nekaterih konceptualnih problemih, povezanih s “standardno” inter-
pretacijo radikalizacije in nasilnega ekstremizma. Zaključni del intervjuja 
podrobneje obravnava vlogo, ki naj bi jo imela vzgoja in izobraževanje pri 
spoprijemanju z radikalizacijo in nasilnim ekstremizmom.
Ključne besede: radikalizacija, nasilni ekstremizem, terorizem, konfliktna 
različnost, nasilje
Boris Vezjak
RADICAL HATE SPEECH AND ISLAMOPHOBIA:  
THE FASCINATION WITH HITLER AND FASCISM 
ON THE SLOVENIAN WEBOSPHERE
This paper examines cases of radical hate speech posted on Slovenian so-
cial networks during the development of the refugee crisis in Europe and 
Slovenia beginning in 2015. The onset of this radical behaviour is sub-
ject to particular scrutiny – the manner and the causes underpinning 
the transition of a discourse of hatred, racism, xenophobia and intoler-
ance to one of open approval of Hitler, fascism, Nazism, the Third Reich; 
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and the fascination with the horrendous events of the holocaust, geno-
cide, extermination, systematic starvation, torture, mass killing or gasifi-
cation as methods that should be used against the refugees, in a manner 
not unlike that against the European Jews, arguing that Hitler reawaken 
might solve the problem of the refugees coming to Europe and Slovenia in 
the first place. Strangely, this discourse is not championed by extreme, far 
right groups, such as neo-Nazis, skinheads, or nationalists. On the con-
trary, it is the ordinary social networks users that have, in their fascination 
with the Nazi leader and the final solution method (die Endlösung), re-
placed the stereotype of the Jew with the Refugee. The rise of hate speech 
in a part of the population is evidence of the fact that fear, the feeling of 
threat and the encouragement of hatred have, at least in social networks, 
occasionally morphed to the norm; in Facebook users this is termed casu-
al epistemic fascism, representing a system of beliefs that undoubtedly in-
directly sympathises with the holocaust, genocide and the mass killings – 
in the present case based on anti-Muslim prejudice against the refugees. 
Keywords: fascism, islamophobia, xenophobia, hate speech, social media, 
Facebook, Adolf Hitler, Slovenia
RADIKALNI SOVRAŽNI GOVOR IN ISLAMOFOBIJA: FASCINACIJA 
NAD HITLERJEM IN FAŠIZMOM NA SLOVENSKEM SPLETU
Članek obravnava primere radikalnega sovražnega govora na sloven-
skih socialnih omrežjih ob razvoju begunske krize v Evropi in Sloveniji 
z začetkom v letu 2015. Posebno pozornost posveča vprašanju vznika te 
radikalnosti – v čem in zakaj se je diskurz sovraštva, rasizma, ksenofo-
bije in nestrpnosti spremenil v odkrito odobravanje Hitlerja, fašizma, 
nacizma, tretjega rajha in fascinacijo nad grozljivimi dejanji holokavs-
ta, genocida, iztrebljanja, sistematičnega stradanja, mučenja, pobijan-
ja ali zaplinjanja kot metod, ki bi jih, tako kot na primeru evropskih 
Judov, morali uporabiti na primeru beguncev in na ta način, s pomočjo na 
novo prebujenega Hitlerja, rešiti problem njihovega prihoda v Evropo in 
Slovenijo. Nosilci takšnega diskurza niso ekstremne, desno usmerjene ek-
stremistične skupine, neonacisti, skinheadi, nacionalisti, temveč prepros-
to uporabniki socialnih omrežij, ki so v fascinaciji nad nacističnim vod-
jem in metodo dokončne rešitve (die Endlösung) zamenjali figuro Juda 
in jo nadomestili s figuro begunca. Vzpon sovražnega govora v delu preb-
ivalstva dokazuje, da so strah, občutki ogroženosti in spodbude sovrašt-
vu najmanj na socialnih omrežjih občasno prešli v normalizirane oblike, 
pri uporabniki Facebooka pa to označujem z izrazom priložnosti epistem-
ski fašizem in ga razumem kot sistem prepričanj, ki nedvoumno posredno 
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goji simpatije do holokavsta, genocida in ubijanja – v tem primeru na pod-
lagi antiislamističnih predsodkov do beguncev.
Ključne beside: fašizem, islamofobija, ksenofobija, sovražni govor, 
družbena omrežja, Facebook, Adolf Hitler, Slovenija
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evalvator nacionalnega programa za mladino, programa Erasmus + za 
področje mladine, raziskovalni partner slovenske E+ nacionalne agen-
cije za področje mladine, ekspert Evropske komisije za področje mladi-
ne, še posebej za orodje YouthWiki, član bazena raziskovalcev mladi-
ne pod okriljem Partnerstva med Svetom Evrope in Evropsko Komisijo, 
svetovalec Organizacije za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi, svetovalec 
International IDEA ter svetovalec Evropskega mladinskega foruma. Je 
avtor ali soavtor več kot 30 izvirnih znanstvenih člankov, 25 poglavij v 
znanstvenih zbornikih, 10 znanstvenih monografij in več uredniških 
del, bodisi zbornikov bodisi znanstvenih revij, ter avtor več policy paper-




Srečo Dragoš, PhD in sociology, is a social worker and a professor of soci-
ology at the Faculty for Social Work (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia). 
His main areas of interest are the general sociology, sociology of religion, 
social politics and social work. In the recent published work he has writ-
ten about social inequality and social capital (in Slovenia), multicultural-
ism and social policy. 
Dr. Srečo Dragoš, sociolog in socialni delavec, je predavatelj Fakultete za 
socialno delo na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Raziskovalno se ukvarja predvsem 
s področji splošne sociologije, sociologije religije, s socialno politiko in 
s socialnim delom. V zadnjem času se ukvarja predvsem z družbenimi 
neenakostmi, socialnim kapitalom (v Sloveniji), multikulturalizmom in 
socialno politiko. 
Dianne Gereluk
Dianne Gereluk is professor in Educational Leadership, Policy and 
Governance at the Werklund School of Education, University of Calgary. 
Her research examines normative aspects of educational policy and practice 
specifically related to politically contested and controversial issues in edu-
cation.  An overarching philosophical focus examines how educators can 
create the conditions for more robust political deliberation in an increas-
ingly polarized civil society. She is author of Education and Community 
(Continuum, 2006), Symbolic Clothing in Schools (Bloomsbury, 2008), 
Education, Extremism and Terrorism (Bloomsbury, 2012), Questioning 
the Classroom: Perspectives on Canadian Education (Oxford University 
Press, 2016 co-authored with Christopher Martin, Bruce Maxwell, and 
Trevor Norris), and Understanding School Choice in Canada (University 
of Toronto Press, 2016, co-authored with Lynn Bosetti). Her edited book 
with Michael Corbett, Rural teacher education in Canada: connecting 
land and people (Springer) will be published in 2019. 
Dianne Gereluk je profesorica na področju vodenja v vzgoji in izobraževan-
ju, izobraževalnih politik in upravljanja na Werklund School of Education 
Univerze v Calgaryju. Njeno raziskovalno delo obravnava normativne vid-
ike izobraževalne politike in prakse, posebej povezane s politično sporni-
mi in protislovnimi vprašanji v izobraževanju. Krovna filozofska usmer-
itev proučuje, kako lahko pedagoški delavci ustvarijo pogoje za močnejšo 
politično razpravo v vse bolj polarizirani civilni družbi. Je avtorica kn-
jig Education and Community (Continuum, 2006), Symbolic Clothing 
in Schools (Bloomsbury, 2008), Education, Extremism and Terrorism 
(Bloomsbury, 2012), Questioning the Classroom: Perspectives on Canadian 
Education (Oxford University Press, 2016 [soavtorji Christopher Martin, 
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Bruce Maxwell in Trevor Norris), ter Understanding School Choice in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2016 [soavtorica Lynn Bosetti]). 
Leta 2019 bo objavila zbornik Rural teacher education in Canada: con-
necting land and people (Springer), ki ga soureja z Michaelom Corbettom.
Klemen Kocjančič
Klemen Kocjančič holds a university graduate degree in theology, a 
M.A. in Defence Studies and a Ph.D. in History. His research focus is 
on military history (Second World War in Slovenia), foreign personnel 
in armed forces, intertwinement of religion and military, and also reli-
gious terrorism.
Klemen Kocjančič je univerzitetni diplomirani teolog, magister ob-
ramboslovja in doktor znanosti s področja zgodovine. Raziskovalno se 
ukvarja z vojaško zgodovino (druga svetovna vojna na Slovenskem), vpra-
šanjem tujih pripadnikov v oboroženih silah, prepletom religije in voja-
štva, ter verskim terorizmom. 
Marko Kovačić
Marko Kovačić is a researcher at the Institute for Social Research in 
Zagreb where he is affiliated to the Center for Youth and Gender Studies. 
He specializes in youth political sociology and youth policy (particular-
ly youth participation, youth work and civic education). He is a nation-
al correspondent on youth policy for the Youth Partnership between 
the Council of Europe and the European Commission, a Youth Wiki 
national correspondent, as well as the expert on youth policy for the 
European Commission. In addition, he is a founder and a lecturer at the 
first academic studies on youth at the University of Rijeka. So far he has 
published 20 peer-review research articles, co-authored three books, and 
managed approximatelly 20 (international research) projects, all in the 
field of youth studies.
Marko Kovačić je raziskovalec na Inštitutu za družbene raziskave v 
Zagrebu, kjer je član Centra za mladinske in študije spolov. Je specializi-
ran za politično sociologijo mladih in mladinsko politiko (predvsem par-
ticipacijo mladih, delo mladih in državljansko vzgojo). Je nacionalni do-
pisnik za mladinsko politiko za Partnerstvo mladih med Svetom Evrope 
in Evropsko komisijo, nacionalni Youth Wiki dopisnik ter strokovnjak 
za mladinsko politiko pri Evropski komisiji. Poleg tega je ustanovitelj in 
predavatelj na prvih akademskih študijah o mladini na Univerzi na Reki. 
Objavil je 20 raziskovalnih člankov, je soavtor treh knjig in je vodil pri-





Urša Marinšek holds a Bachelor degree in Defence Studies and is a stu-
dent of postgraduate Defence Studies. Her research focus is on radical-
ization and Islamic propaganda. 
Urša Marinšek je diplomirana obramboslovka in študentka podiplom-
skega študija obramboslovja. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z radikalizacijo in 
islamistično propagando.
Iztok Prezelj
Iztok Prezelj is an Associate Professor and Vice-Dean for Scientific 
Research at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. In 
this capacity, he is directing the Institute of Social Sciences with 20 re-
search centres. He was a Head of Defence Studies at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences in the period from 2015-2017. His teaching and research activ-
ities cover counter-terrorism, national security, threat and risk assess-
ment, intelligence studies, crisis management and critical infrastructure. 
He published widely in the mentioned fields and also coordinated many 
influential research projects in the mentioned fields. 
Iztok Prezelj je izredni profesor in prodekan za raziskovalno dejavnost na 
Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. V slednji funkciji vodi 
Inštitut za Družbene vede, v katerem deluje 20 raziskovalnih centrov. V 
obdobju od 2015 do 2017 je bil predstojnik Katedre za obramboslovje. 
Področja njegovega raziskovalnega in pedagoškega delovanja so: protite-
rorizem, nacionalna varnost, ocenjevanje groženj in tveganj, obveščeval-
ne študije, krizni menedžment in kritična infrastruktura. Na omenjenih 
področjih je objavil veliko število kakovostnih znanstvenih del, prav tako 
pa je tudi vodil številne projekte s tovrstno vsebino. 
Julian Richards
Julian Richards successfully completed a doctorate in political vio-
lence in Pakistan, at Cambridge University, in 1993. He then spent near-
ly 20 years working in intelligence and security for the British govern-
ment. In 2008, he co-founded the postgraduate Centre for Security and 
Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS) at the University of Buckingham, in the 
UK. Among various affiliations, he is on the editorial board of the aca-
demic journals, Intelligence and National Security; and the International 
Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs. He has published four 
books on various aspects of intelligence analysis and national securi-
ty, with the latest (Extremism, Radicalization and Security: An Identity 
Theory Approach) delivering a detailed critique of research on extremism 
and radicalization, and the implications for policy. He is a regular media 
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commentator at national and international levels on security and intelli-
gence issues, and has been to give evidence before the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee at the Houses of Parliament on the draft Communications 
Data Bill. His current research interests include attitudes towards surveil-
lance in contemporary society, the rise of cyber-threats and cyber-securi-
ty, security issues in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and violent extremism in 
Europe. 
Julian Richards je leta 1993 uspešno zaključil doktorat iz političnega na-
silja v Pakistanu na univerzi v Cambridgeu. Nato je skoraj 20 let delal na 
področju obveščevalnih podatkov in varnosti za britansko vlado. Leta 
2008 je soustanovil podiplomski center za varnostne in obveščevalne štu-
dije (BUCSIS) na Univerzi v Buckinghamu v Veliki Britaniji. Je član ured-
niškega odbora akademskih revij Intelligence and National Security ter 
International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs. Objavil 
je štiri knjige o različnih vidikih analize obveščevalnih podatkov in na-
cionalne varnosti, vključno z najnovejšo (Extremism, Radicalization and 
Security: An Identity Theory Approach), ki podaja podrobno kritiko razis-
kav ekstremizma in radikalizacije ter posledic za politike. Je redni medij-
ski komentator o varnostnih in obveščevalnih vprašanjih na nacionalni 
in mednarodni ravni. Je tudi pričal pred skupnim parlamentarnim odbo-
rom na parlamentarnih zasedanjih o osnutku Zakona o komunikacijskih 
podatkih. Njegovi trenutni raziskovalni interesi vključujejo odnos do na-
dzora v sodobni družbi, porast kibernetskih groženj in kibernetsko var-
nost, varnostna vprašanja v Pakistanu in Afganistanu ter nasilni ekstre-
mizem v Evropi.
Mitja Sardoč
Mitja Sardoč (PhD) is a senior research associate at the Educational 
Research Institute in Ljubljana (Slovenia) where he is member of the 
‘Social Contract in the 21st Century’ research programme. He is author 
of scholarly articles and editor of a number of journal special issues on 
citizenship education, multiculturalism, toleration, equality of opportu-
nity and patriotism. He is Managing Editor of Theory and Research in 
Education [http://tre.sagepub.com/] and member of the editorial board 
of Educational Philosophy and Theory and the Open Review of Educational 
Research. He edited two books published by Wiley (Citizenship, Inclusion 
and Democracy and Toleration, Respect and Recognition in Education). He 
is also a contributing author to the SAGE Encyclopedia of Educational 
Theory and Philosophy. He is editor-in-chief of The Handbook of Patriotism 




Mitja Sardoč (PhD) je zaposlen kot raziskovalec na Pedagoškem inštitu-
tu v Ljubljani, kjer je član programske skupine ‘Družbena pogodba v 21. 
stoletju’. Je avtor znanstvenih in strokovnih člankov s širšega področja 
vzgoje in izobraževanja ter urednik vrste tematskih številk domačih in 
tujih znanstvenih revij s področja državljanske vzgoje, multikulturaliz-
ma, enakih možnosti itn. Je glavni urednik revije Theory and Research 
in Education, odgovorni urednik revije Šolsko polje ter član uredniške-
ga odbora revij Educational Philosophy and Theory ter Open Review of 
Educational Research. Je tudi urednik dveh zbornikov, ki sta izšli pri založbi 
Blackwell (Citizenship, Inclusion and Democracy ter Toleration, Respect 
and Recognition in Education), avtor monografije Multikulturalizem: pro 
et contra ter soavtor monografije Enake možnosti in družbena (ne)enakost 
v družbi znanja. Je urednik publikacije Handbook of Patriotism, ki bo leta 
2019 izšla pri založbi Springer.
Carol-Ann Titus
Carol-Ann Titus is a PhD Candidate at the Centre of Military, Security 
and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. Over the last twenty 
years, Carol-Ann has worked in the field of intelligence and national secu-
rity in Canada.  She is an expert on Canadian security policy, risk percep-
tion, terrorism and counterterrorism, and intelligence studies.   
Carol-Ann Titus je doktorska kandidatka na Centru za vojaške, varnost-
ne in strateške študije na Univerzi v Calgaryju. V zadnjih dvajsetih letih je 
Carol-Ann delala na področju obveščevalnih podatkov in nacionalne var-
nosti v Kanadi. Je strokovnjakinja za kanadsko varnostno politiko, zazna-
vanje tveganja, terorizem in protiterorizem ter obveščevalne študije.
Boris Vezjak
Boris Vezjak (PhD) is associate professor of philosophy at the depart-
ment of philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Faculty of Education in Maribor, 
Slovenia. His field of interest covers various topics, such as history of phi-
losopy, theory of discourse, media analysis and theory of argumentation. 
He is the author of several books, commentaries and translations, such as 
Plato: Charmides (1994), Plato: Philebus (2000), Plato: Parmenides (2001), 
The relaxed ideology of Slovenes: on political implications of the philosophe-
me relaxedness (2007), Mistakes and fallacies in argumentation: a guide to 
bad argumentation in quotidian life (2007, together with Janez Bregant), 
The Twilight of media autonomy (2009), Paranoia, manipulation and ra-
tionality: on psychopolitics of conspiracy, hatred and humiliation of reason 
(2010), Introduction to Socrates for young people (2011) and Ad populum: 
analyses of social discourse (2012).
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Dr. Boris Vezjak (PhD) je izredni profesor na Oddelku za filozofijo 
Filozofske fakultete in Pedagoške fakultete v Mariboru. Ukvarja se pred-
vsem z zgodovino filozofije, teorijo diskurza, medijsko analizo in teorijo 
argumentacije. Je avtor številnih prevodov in knjig, med drugimi: Platon: 
Harmid (1994), Platon: Fileb (2000), Platon: Parmenid (2001), Sproščena 
ideologija Slovencev: o političnih implikacijah filozofema sproščenost (2007), 
Zmote in napake v argumentaciji: vodič po slabi argumentaciji v družbe-
nem vsakdanu (2007, skupaj z Janezom Bregantom), Somrak medijske av-
tonomije (2009), Paranoja, manipulacija in racionalnost: o psihopolitiki za-
rot, sovraštva in poniževanja razuma (2010), Sokratov pojmovnik za mlade 
(2011) in Ad populum: analize družbenega diskurza (2012).
Milica Vučković
Milica Vučković is a research and teaching assistant at the Faculty of 
Political Science, University of Zagreb. She holds MA in political science 
from the Central European University. She is currently in the last year of 
her PhD studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana at the de-
partment of Communication with specialism in online political commu-
nication. At the Faculty of Political Science she is teaching assistant for 
courses Cyberpolitics, Media and the Public, Social Media. She is author 
of scholarly articles in the area of new media and strategic communica-
tion. She is editor in the Political Analysis (Političke Analize), Croatian 
professional journal with a focus on the political science. Before joining 
Faculty of Political Science, she worked as a public relations specialist. 
Milica Vučković je raziskovalka in asistentka na Fakulteti za politične 
vede Univerze v Zagrebu. Magistrirala je politologijo na Srednjeevropski 
univerzi. Trenutno je v zadnjem letu doktorskega študija na Fakulteti za 
družbene vede v Ljubljani na oddelku za komunikologijo s specializacijo 
na področju spletne politične komunikacije. Na Fakulteti za politične vede 
je asistentka za predmete Cyberpolitics, Media and Public, Social Media. 
Je avtorica znanstvenih člankov s področja novih medijev in strateškega 
komuniciranja. Je urednica v hrvaški strokovni reviji Političke analize, s 
poudarkom na političnih znanostih. Preden se je zaposlila na Fakulteti za 
politične vede, je delala kot strokovnjakinja za odnose z javnostmi.

Navodila avtorjem/-icam člankov v reviji Šolsko polje
Članek (praviloma v obsegu od 7000 do največ 10.000 besed) naj ima na začetku: 1) naslov ter ime in priimek 
avtorja/-ice; 2) povzetek v slovenskem in angleškem jeziku, do 300 do 350 besed; 3) ključne besede v slovenščini 
in angleščini (do 5); 4) kratko predstavitev avtorja/-ice (do 100 besed v slovenščini in angleščini), navedena naj 
bo tudi organizacija zaposlitve.
Prispevki naj bodo napisani v knjižni slovenščini ob upoštevanju veljavnega pravopisa, v nasprotnem primeru si ur-
edništvo pridržuje pravico, da članka ne recenzira oziroma ga zavrne.
Če je prispevek že bil objavljen v kaki drugi reviji ali če čaka na objavo, je treba to izrecno navesti.
Prispevek naj ima dvojni medvrstični razmik, tip črk naj bo Times New Roman, velikost 12 pik (v opombah 10). 
Besedilo naj bo levo poravnano, strani pa zaporedno oštevilčene. Odstavki naj bodož ločeni s prazno vrstico.
Uporabiti je mogoče tri hierarhične nivoje podnaslovov, ki naj bodo oštevilčeni (uporabljajte izključno navaden 
slog, v prelomu bodo ravni ločene tipografsko): 1. – 1.1 –1.1.1
Za poudarke uporabite izključno ležeči tisk(v primeru jezikoslovnih besedil, kjer so primeri praviloma v ležečem 
tisku, lahko za poudarke izjemoma uporabite polkrepki tisk). Ležeče pišite tudi besede v tujih jezikih. Raba 
drugih tipografskih rezov (podčrtano, velike male črke, krepko kurzivno ...) ni dovoljena. Ne uporabljajte dvo-
jnih presledkov, prav tako ne uporabljajte preslednice za poravnavo besedila. Edina oblika odstavka, ki je dovol-
jena, je odstavek z levo poravnavo brez rabe tabulatorjev prve ali katerekoli druge vrstice v ostavku (ne uporablja-
jte sredinske, obojestranske ali desne poravnave odstavkov). Oglate oklepaje uporabljajte izključno za fonetične 
zapise oz. zapise izgovarjave. Tri pike so stične le, če označujejo prekinjeno bese... Pri nedokončani misli so tri 
pike nestične in nedeljive ... Prosimo, da izključite funkcijo deljenja besed. 
Sprotne opombe naj bodo samooštevilčene (številke so levostično za besedo ali ločilom – če besedi, na katero se 
opomba nanaša, sledi ločilo) in uvrščene na tekočo stran besedila. 
Citati v besedilu naj bodo označeni z dvojnimi, citati znotraj citatov pa z enojnimi narekovaji. Izpuste iz citatov in 
prilagoditve označite s tropičjem znotraj poševnic /.../. Daljše citate (več kot 5 vrstic) izločite v samostojne od-
stavke, ki jih od ostalega besedila ločite z izpustom vrstice in umikom v desno. Vir citata označite v okroglem 
oklepaju na koncu citata: (Benjamin, 1974: str. 42). Če je avtor/-ica naveden/-a v sobesedilu, priimek lahko 
izpustite. 
V besedilu označite najprimernejša mesta za likovno opremo (tabele, skice, grafikone itd.) po zgledu: [Tabela 1 približ-
no tukaj]. Posamezne enote opreme priložite vsako v posebni datoteki (v .eps, .ai, .tif ali .jpg formatu, minimalna 
resolucija 300 dpi). Naslov tabele je nad tabelo, naslov grafa pa pod grafom. Prostor, ki ga oprema v prispevku za-
sede, se šteje v obseg besedila, bodisi kot 250 besed (pol strani) ali 500 besed (cela stran). 
Na vir v besedilu se sklicujte takole: (Ducrot, 1988). Stran navedka navedite za dvopičjem: (Foucault, 1991: str. 57). 
Če so trije avtorji/-ice navedenega dela, navedite vse tri: Bradbury, Boyle in Morse (2002), pri večjem številu pa 
izpišite le prvo ime: (Taylor et al., 1978).
Dela enega avtorja/-ice, ki so izšla istega leta, med seboj ločite z dodajanjem malih črk (a, b, c itn.), stično ob letni-
ci izida: (Bourdieu, 1996a). 
Dela različnih avtorjev/-ic, ki se vsa nanašajo na isto vsebino, naštejte po abecednem redu in jih ločite s podpičjem: 
(Haraway, 1999; Oakley, 2005; Ramazanoğlu, 2002). 
Pri večkrat zaporedoma citiranih delih uporabite tole: (ibid.).
V članku uporabljena dela morajo biti po abecedi navedena na koncu, pod naslovom Literatura. Če so bili v prispev-
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Knjige: Bradbury, I., Boyle, J., in Morse, A. (2002) Scientific Principles for Physical Geographers. Harlow: Prentice Hall.
Garber, M. (1999) Symptoms of Culture. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
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